ملاحظات

الثقة والذعر: مقدمة الطبعة المنقحة

(1)
Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund. The figure of nearly $9000 per person comes from dividing the IMF’s headline figure of $2.7 trillion of write-downs on U. S.-originated assets by the current U. S. population of 306 million.
(2)
See Goode & Ben-Yehuda 1994, especially the prologue and chapter 10.
(3)
For an excellent overview and introduction to the literature and other resources on this episode, see www.xhosacattlekilling.net (accessed October 22, 2009).
(4)
The classic study of this is by Edgar Morin (1971).
(5)
The main phases in human evolution are discussed accessibly in Klein & Edgar (2002) and Stronger & Andres (2005), more technically and comprehensively in Klein (2009). Many specialists uses the subspecies name Homo sapiens sapiens to refer to fully modern humans (those of whom we have evidence only in the last fifty thousand years), leaving open whether earlier humans should also be considered members of Homo sapiens. I follow this usage here.
(6)
See Ridley 1996, especially chapter 2.
(7)
Ants are sisters, but share three-quarters of their genes, as explained in Hölldobler & Wilson (1994, pp. 95–106).
(8)
This theory was due originally to Hamilton (1964), and the classic popular exposition is given in Dawkins (1976). However, Hölldobler & Wilson (2008) have suggested that kin selection may not be enough on its own to explain the evolution of eusociality, and propose a contribution from group selection mechanisms.
(9)
When biologists speak of individuals “sharing” genes, they are referring to those genes that vary across members of the same species. The great majority of human genes are common to the whole species; indeed, most are shared with other primates. For the theory of kin selection, what matters is the probability that two individuals share a mutation that first appeared in the genome of their most recent common ancestor. This probability is given by the proportion of genes that have been inherited from their most recent common ancestor, instead of from other ancestors—even if the ones inherited from other ancestors are, at most loci, identical.
(10)
Recent DNA evidence for chimpanzees suggests that the degree of relatedness of male chimpanzees in a typical group may be less close than had previously been thought (see Lukas et al. 2005). In particular, relatedness of males (who typically remain in the group on becoming adult) may be little greater than that of females (who come into the group from outside as adolescents). This evidence needs to be confirmed more widely, but if correct would imply that explanations for chimp cooperation based on kin selection would need supplementing by other mechanisms.
(11)
See Dawkins (1976) for sticklebacks, Wilkinson (1990) for vampire bats, and Pusey & Packer (1983) for lions. The theory explaining such behavior, known as “reciprocal altruism,” is due to Trivers (1971).
(12)
See Bishop 1992, pp. 125, 192.
(13)
Of course, if one counted same- and opposite-sex ancestors, potentially doubling the numbers at each generation, the total would be vastly greater.
(14)
See Cavalli-Sforza 2000, pp. 45-46.
(15)
Cochrane & Harpending (2009) make this case forcefully, although as they admit some of the elements of the case are conjectural, particularly for genes affecting complex behavioral traits. In particular, it is hard to know how fast the spread of advantageous traits would have been through a population dispersed across the globe.
(16)
The evolution of human consciousness is brilliantly discussed in Mithen (1996); early development of these ideas was by Humphrey (1984). Klein & Edgar (2002) and Klein (2009) give clear accounts of the main questions and uncertainties surrounding the evolution of symbolic capacity in man; for a view placing the key developments later, see Renfrew (2007). Deacon (1997) is a comprehensive account of the challenges facing an evolutionary account of symbolic ability. Tomasello (1999) links human cultural capacities to an evolved ability to put ourselves in the position of the psychological responses of others. This ability was adaptive because it improved our powers to predict and it had dramatic consequences for the cumulative nature of our culture because it enormously increased our ability to imitate the behavior of those others. These arguments are discussed in more detail in chapter 14.
(17)
The last common ancestor through the maternal line of all human beings alive today lived around 140000 years ago (see Cavalli-Sforza 2000, pp. 77–82; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 2003). The last common ancestor through the paternal line lived more recently, perhaps 50000 years ago (see Thomson et al. 2000); this reflects the fact that the most reproductively successful males can have more children than the most reproductively successful females, so their genes spread faster through the population. The last common ancestor whose inheritance passed through both lines very probably lived much more recently, possibly even as recently as 2000–5000 years ago (Rohde et al. 2004). However, because of genetic recombination the probability that any mutation in that individual would have been transmitted to all living descendants is vanishingly small. Sufficiently adaptive mutations in such an individual might establish themselves in a large proportion of living descendants within one or two thousand years, especially if such an individual lived in a place that was a center of commerce and migration (see also Cochrane & Harpending 2009). This explains the widespread prevalence of certain alleles such as those coding for malarial resistance or lactose tolerance in adults. But it seems unlikely that those coding for whatever changes enabled human symbolic capacity were of such recent origin given their widespread prevalence.
(18)
The puzzle of multiple discoveries of agriculture is discussed in Richerson et al. (2001). See also the prologue to part IV.
(19)
Blackmore (1999) emphasizes that we cannot conclude that the evolution of human institutions (which are one form of the behavior patterns she calls, following Dawkins (1976), “memes”) is beneficial for human beings, or even for their genes. She argues that “what makes us different [from other animals] is our ability to imitate” and stresses that once behavior patterns are imitated, “something is passed on. This ‘something’ can then be passed on again, and again, and so take on a life of its own.” Memes evolve, in other words, for the good of the memes and not for the good of anyone or anything else. Nevertheless, we can investigate whether human psychology, as shaped by natural selection, makes it easier for certain memes to spread than for others; the extent to which meme evolution is thus constrained by psychology is an empirical question.
(20)
See Sterelny 2003.
(21)
This is well expressed in Cowen (2009).
(22)
See Cosmides & Tooby (1992) and other contributions to the same volume. Buss (2008) is a textbook treatment. Buller (2005) challenges the main claims of evolutionary psychology on a number of grounds, including its neglect of the diversity of psychological traits in human populations and of the extent to which even apparently uniform and stable adult traits may be learned rather than inherited. The arguments developed in this book are not subject to the criticisms leveled by Buller, as I discuss in more detail in part II.

الجزء الأول: الرؤية الضيقة

الفصل الأول: من المسئول؟

(1)
The startling character of cooperative exchange involved in the production of even simple objects is not a new observation; see, for example, the discussion of pencils in Friedman & Friedman (1990, pp. 11–13). In 2009 an artist named Thomas Thwaites decided to try producing a toaster “from scratch—beginning by mining the raw materials and ending with a product that Argos sells for £3.99.” See www.thetoasterproject.org (accessed October 22, 2009)—interestingly, the way the artist found to smelt the iron ore into steel was to use a microwave, so this was hardly an example of economic self-sufficiency. Stephen Dubner has drawn attention to the following passage in the Babylonian Talmud (Tractate Berachot 58a) that predates Adam Smith’s famous tale of the Babylonian pin factory by some 1500 years:
Ben Zoma once saw a crowd on one of the steps of the Temple Mount. He said, Blessed is He that discerneth secrets, and blessed is He who has created all these to serve me. [For] he used to say: What labours Adam had to carry out before he obtained bread to eat! He ploughed, he sowed, he reaped, he bound [the sheaves], he threshed and winnowed and selected the ears, he ground [them], and sifted [the flour], he kneaded and baked, and then at last he ate; whereas I get up, and find all these things done for me.
And how many labours Adam had to carry out before he obtained a garment to wear! He had to shear, wash [the wool], comb it, spin it, and weave it, and then at last he obtained a garment to wear; whereas I get up andfind all these things done for me. All kinds of craftsmen come early to the door of my house, and I rise in the morning and find all these before me.
See http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/specialization-not-as-recent-as-you-may-think/#more-2580 (accessed October 22, 2009).
(2)
Terkel 1974.
(3)
Hamermesh (2005) has studied routine as a characteristic of different kinds of work and documents its links to income and education levels. He describes these links as “yet another avenue by which standard measures of income inequality understate total economic inequality.”
(4)
Hacking (1990) is a fascinating account of the rise of statistics as a discipline and the wonder provoked in its practitioners by the apparent regularity of human behavior in large numbers.
(5)
The proportion of jobs in rich countries lost through international competition is by most estimates smaller than the proportion lost through technical change. See Bourguignon et al. (2002) for a summary of these issues. Nevertheless, the spectacular recent growth of China and India, as well as the growing importance of service jobs outsourced compared to manufacturing jobs, makes the potential structural effects of international competition somewhat larger than they appeared at the time of the first edition. See Coe (2008).
(6)
See the discussion in Sivéry 2000, especially pp. 44–47, and also De Vries 1976, especially chapter 2 and pp. 159–64. I am grateful to Sheilagh Ogilvie for these references.
(7)
Packard 1957.
(8)
Klein 2001—Naomi, not Richard.
(9)
Cited in Jones 1988, p. 151.
(10)
Tolstoy 1971, p. 1188.

مقدمة إلى الجزء الثاني

(1)
See Wrangham & Peterson (1996), Bowles (2009), and the more detailed discussion of this evidence in chapter 3.
(2)
Though not quite indistinguishable: human brain size has fallen since around fifty thousand years ago, and some of this fall may have taken place in the last twelve thousand years. One theory (see Wrangham 2003; Cochrane & Harpending 2009) suggests this may have been due to a process like the domestication of animals, in which particularly violent or antisocial individuals had their breeding possibilities reduced through ostracism. Domesticated animals typically have brains smaller than their wild relatives. It is too early yet to say whether this theory will prove persuasive, but we can be confident that it will not remove the need to explain how human institutions have managed to tame the violence of which our species is still capable.

الجزء الثاني: من قردة عُليا سفَّاكة للدماء إلى أصدقاء اعتباريِّين: كيف صار التعاون الإنساني مُمكنًا؟

الفصل الثاني: الإنسان ومخاطر الطبيعة

(1)
In the first edition I phrased the second point slightly differently, as “grand-children have been, again on average, very slightly more intelligent than their grandparents.” However, Professor Kimmo Eriksson of Mälardalen University in Sweden has kindly pointed out that this is not strictly true. As he explains, “since intelligence has de facto increased, the positive effect of natural selection must more than cancel the negative average effect of mutations. However, from grandparents to grandchildren there are two rounds of mutation and only one round of natural selection, so the negative effect will probably still dominate” (personal communication). This explains the sadly less elegant formulation to which I have resorted for this edition. I am grateful to Professor Eriksson for this clarification.
(2)
Suppose that of a population of 200 million, 20 million have a certain condition. Then a test with 99 per cent reliability, applied to the whole population, will generate 19.8 million true positives and 1.8 million false positives. This means that if you test positive, you have a probability of just over 90 per cent of having the condition. If the condition is much rarer, affecting only 20000 in the population, then the test will generate 19800 true positives and 1.98 million false positives. This means that even if you test positive, the probability you have the condition is still only a little over 1 per cent, namely, 19800 as a proportion of 1.98 million plus 19800. This idea is embodied in the statistical theorem known as Bayes Law.
(3)
See Hacking 1990.
(4)
Dunbar 1992.
(5)
Ricardo 1817.
(6)
See Perrin (1979) for an account of how Japan gave up guns in the mid sixteenth century and reverted to the sword.
(7)
Klein & Edgar 2002.
(8)
Ridley 1996, pp. 197ff.
(9)
Originally by Peltzman (1975). See also Evans & Graham (1991). Peterson et al. (1994) make a similar investigation of airbags. Walker (2006) reports that drivers drive more closely to cyclists who wear safety helmets. However, Sen & Mizzen (2007) have provided some reasons to be skeptical about the size of the effects measured in other studies. They point out that sometimes seat-belt use or the purchase of cars with airbags may be prompted by drivers’ recognition of preexisting dangers, so the measured association may mean that high risk causes the adoption of safety measures, rather than vice versa. Overall, it seems reasonable to expect that there is some offsetting effect of riskier behavior when protective equipment is used, though not enough to neutralize entirely the protective effect of the equipment.
(10)
Adams (1995), who writes accessibly about the theory of risk compensation in general.
(11)
For the evolution of European economies away from peasant self-sufficiency, see De Vries (1974) for the Netherlands, De Vries (1976, especially chapter 2) for Europe more generally, Britnell (1997) for England, and Ogilvie (2000, especially pp. 94–108) for an overview. I am grateful to Sheilagh Ogilvie and Leigh Shaw-Taylor for these references. Leigh Shaw-Taylor has also shown me unpublished evidence from English poll tax records suggesting that as early as 1381, peasants numbered a quarter or less of the population in many villages and were typically outnumbered by craftsmen and traders. For more anecdotal information about North America, used to support a theory of historical changes in self-sufficiency, see Locay (1990).
(12)
Anderson 2000, pp. 326–28.

الفصل الثالث: العنف عبر التاريخ الإنساني

(1)
Dostoyevsky 1865.
(2)
For the evidence that men are, on average, more violent than women, see Daly & Wilson (1988), Wrangham & Peterson (1996), Barash & Lipton (2002), and Ghiglieri (1999); Barash (2002) provides a summary. Needless to say, all such comparisons are based on averages of behavior patterns in the populations in question and do not imply biological determinism in any individual case.
(3)
So, of course, does killing a related member of the same sex and species, but the rivalry is less intense because of the shared genes.
(4)
Act 4, scene 3.
(5)
Evidence from a preindustrial society (specifically, the Yanomamo of Venezuela) that men who kill others have more children is found in Chagnon (1988), though it is also a plausible inference from other ethnographic studies, such as Meggitt (1977). Robarchek & Robarchek (1997, p. 133) cite data that appear to support this inference, though they themselves have doubts about its validity.
(6)
Andersson (1994) discusses the theory of sexual selection at length. It is discussed specifically in relation to violence in Ghiglieri (1999). Sexual selection was central to Charles Darwin’s vision of human society, as I discuss in Seabright (2009b) and as documented by Desmond & Moore (2009). The role of sexual selection in generating conflict, both between the sexes and among members of the same sex, has generated a good deal of recent research, summarized in Arnqvist & Rowe (2005). This research has been criticized by Roughgarden (2004, 2009). Her criticism wrongly interprets the notion of sexual conflict as implying that the interests of the sexes are opposed; in fact, they have many interests in common and only some that diverge. Nevertheless, she provides much fascinating empirical material showing how varied are the traits that have evolved under sexual selection—a point, incidentally, with which I believe Darwin would have been in much fuller agreement than she concedes.
(7)
Evidence about infanticide in primates is set out in De Waal (2001, especially at pp. 27, 30, 60-61, and 88-89). It is also discussed, in relation to primate and human violence more generally, in Ghiglieri (1999, especially pp. 129–33), though Ghiglieri overlooks the evidence that bonobos are strikingly less violent than chimpanzees. Diamond (1993, pp. 290–94) discusses the relevance for humans of intraspecies violence in nonhuman species and gives a graphic description of the violence witnessed by Jane Goodall and her team. This violence is also described by Ghiglieri (1999, pp. 172–77), who points out that in the chimpanzee groups he observed, recorded violence was lower than in the Goodall groups, apparently because the former had reached a more stable accommodation between groups: each group had enough males to make defense possible without making attack attractive. The best (and best-written) overview of great-ape violence is certainly Wrangham & Peterson (1996), which is more balanced and less sensationalist than its title (“Demonic Males”) might lead one to expect.
(8)
Lorenz 1963.
(9)
The evidence about human violence in general is controversial, and questions about causality (such as whether there is an “instinct” for violence) are even more controversial than questions about the incidence of violence at particular times and places. For the argument I advance in this chapter it is enough to show that human societies have usually been violent in the absence of institutions for deterring violent behavior. Gat (2006) is far the best overall treatment. Bowles (2009) is a careful summary of evidence about violence among foragers. Ember (1978) is an early survey of warfare (inter alia) among hunter-gatherers, and Gat (2000a,b) among preindustrial societies more generally. Ferguson & Gat (2000) debate the reliability of this evidence. Gat (1999, 2006) also contain evidence about the nature and purposes of such violence. A sobering overview of the human species’ capacity for murderous violence is Diamond (1993, chapter 16). Robarchek & Robarchek (1997) compare two societies that, at the time of observation, had very different violence levels, though the more peaceful community (the Semai Senoi of Malaysia) had in previous years been successfully recruited into the anticommunist armies used by the British colonial administration, where they became ruthless and efficient killers (Ghiglieri 1999, p. 185).
(10)
See Gat 1999 and Knauft 1990.
(11)
See Kent 1989 and Baker et al. 2006.
(12)
See Edgerton 1992 and Leblanc 2003.
(13)
Ember 1978.
(14)
Leblanc 1999.
(15)
Meggitt 1977.
(16)
Zollikofer et al. 2002.
(17)
Keeley 1996, appendix, table 6.2.
(18)
Bowles 2009.
(19)
World Health Organization, Mortality Database.
(20)
Eisner 2001.
(21)
Levy 1983.
(22)
Matthew White, Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century, published on line at http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-1900.htm. Although not a refereed source this is carefully assembled and seems to have the right orders of magnitude.

الفصل الرابع: كيف روَّضنا غرائز العنف؟

(1)
See Seabright 1993 for a survey.
(2)
Summarized in Fehr & Gächter 2000a.
(3)
Fehr et al. 1993.
(4)
Fehr & Gächter 2000b.
(5)
Ibid.
(6)
Gintis et al. 2003; Henrich et al. 2006.
(7)
de Quervain et al. 2004.
(8)
Basu 1984.
(9)
Durant 1926, p. 307. I am grateful to Stanley Engerman for pointing this out to me.
(10)
However, the strength of the reciprocity motivation may have important implications for the ways in which cooperative behavior can be encouraged in practice. For instance, there is evidence that increasing penalties for tax evasion may sometimes result in reduced tax compliance, because it is interpreted by previously honest taxpayers as a signal that many others are dishonest, thereby prompting them to reduce their own compliance; see Kahan 2003.
(11)
Elias 1969. This was the first volume; the second is Elias 1982.
(12)
Duerr 2000.
(13)
Clark 2007, p. 10. For a vigorous critique of Clark’s argument, see Bowles 2007.
(14)
Gat 2006.
(15)
Binmore 1998, p. 87.
(16)
Gintis 2006.
(17)
Cosmides & Tooby 1992. I discuss in chapter 5 some controversies surrounding the interpretation of these findings.
(18)
This argument is due originally to Frank (1988).
(19)
Owren & Bachorowski 2001.
(20)
But see Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) and Preuschoft (1992). Preuschoft & van Hooff (1997) discuss in detail the relations between human smiling and laughter and other similar primate expressions such as the “play face.”
(21)
Ekman et al. 1988; Frank et al. 1993. Mehu et al. (2007) show that smiles in general are associated with cooperative dispositions and are found frequently in situations involving sharing.
(22)
Krumhuber et al. 2007.
(23)
There are other theories of the evolution of laughter, not necessarily incompatible with the one outlined here. For instance, Ramachandran & Blakeslee (1999) propose that laughter evolved to signal to other members of a social group that a feared threat (from a predator, for instance) is in fact not serious. This makes sense of the resemblance to the “play face” and could explain why we laugh in relief. This could in turn account for the use of laughter to signal to a listener that the person laughing is not himself a threat.
(24)
Gray & McNaughton 2000, chapter 4.
(25)
It’s true that drinks tend to be served after agreements are signed, but trust is as important after the agreement as before: each party still needs to decide whether it can trust the other to stick to the agreement.
(26)
Mark Greenberg points out that what biologists call the handicap principle (see Zahavi 1975) may also be at work; by drinking alcohol in your company, I am signaling that I am so confident in my skill at discerning your trustworthiness that I am willing to disable it with a powerful depressant drug. This can work both to reassure you that I intend to trust you (by behaving in a trustworthy manner myself) and to warn you how quickly you will be discovered if you betray that trust.
(27)
Kosfeld et al. 2005.
(28)
Damasio (1995) argues that the emotions are even central to intellectual reasoning on the part of the individuals.
(29)
Zimbardo 2007, pp. 219, 301.

الفصل الخامس: كيف تطوَّرت العواطف الاجتماعية؟

(1)
Lerner et al. (2007) have shown that cortisol responses to stressful situations vary crucially according to whether fear or indignation components are most important in the emotional characterization of the situation, with cortisol elevated by fear and lowered by indignation.
(2)
Marmot (2004). It was widely believed until recently that in nonhuman primate groups exactly the same thing was true, but when it was first possible to measure cortisol levels of primate groups in the wild, some slightly surprising results emerged. An interesting paper by Muller & Wrangham (2004) showed that cortisol levels were positively correlated with dominance among chimpanzees in the wild. The authors suggest that this is because dominant chimpanzees in the wild spend a great deal of energy maintaining their dominance— more so, certainly, than senior civil servants have to do.
(3)
See “Comfort Food, For Monkeys” by John Tierney, The New York Times, May 20, 2008.
(4)
A fascinating early contribution to this literature is Axelrod (1984). Smail (2008) is an intriguing recent approach to the study of human history in the very long run, viewing it as an account of the way we have learned to manipulate our own endocrine systems and those of people we know.
(5)
See “The Misfits,” The Economist, June 12, 2008.
(6)
Tooby & Cosmides 1997; Price 2008.
(7)
Opportunists might or might not be calculators. Alternatively, they could be those in whom reciprocity was triggered by evidence that they would encounter the person concerned in the future and inhibited by evidence that they would not, without the process being under conscious control.
(8)
See Fehr & Henrich 2003.
(9)
Fehr & Gächter 2000a.
(10)
Hrdy 2009.
(11)
Wilson & Sober 1994; Gintis 2000. Hölldobler & Wilson (2008) have even suggested that group selection is a more plausible mechanism for the evolution of eusociality than kin selection.
(12)
Jones 1994, p. 231.
(13)
See Eshel & Cavalli-Sforza 1982.
(14)
Wrangham 2003.
(15)
Gintis 2000; Gintis et al. 2003.
(16)
Bowles 2009.
(17)
De Waal 1982.
(18)
Schaffer & Seabright 2009.
(19)
See Buller 2005, especially pp. 163–90.
(20)
Gambetta 1993. The theory of the Mafia as an organized response to problems of establishing trust has been applied to Russian conditions by Varese (1994, 2001).
(21)
Bowles 1991.
(22)
Granovetter 1972. Barabási (2002) is a very good introduction to this and other work on the properties of networks: how they form and grow, and what makes them effective, stable, and resistant to external threats.
(23)
See Wirth 1938, for example. Biggart (2002) is a collection of essays in which the elegiac strain is clearly heard.
(24)
This view is most famously associated with Douglass North and Robert Paul Thomas (see North & Thomas 1973; North 1990).
(25)
See epilogue to parts I and II, note 14, below.
(26)
The passages from Jacobs [1961] 1992 are on pp. 32 and 40. Jacobs’s ideas about cities are explored in more detail in chapter 10.

الفصل السادس: المال والعلاقات الإنسانية

(1)
This discussion, including many of the examples cited, draws from the introduction to Seabright (2000) and from Ledeneva & Seabright (2000).
(2)
Ferguson 2008.
(3)
Buchan 1997, p. 24.
(4)
This point is central to the theory of money developed by Banerjee & Maskin (1996).
(5)
Monnerie 1996, pp. 47–69.
(6)
Ibid., p. 63.
(7)
This theory is due to Marin et al. (2000).
(8)
See “Have a Car? Need Briefs? In Russia, Barter Is Back”, New York Times, February 7, 2009.
(9)
I’m grateful to Charles Goodhart for drawing my attention to the work of Randall Wray, on which I draw here and which has significantly modified my view of the historical development of money since the first edition of this book.
(10)
Radford 1945.
(11)
See Naples Daily News, March 27, 2003, http://web.naplesnews.com/03/03/naples/d920972a.htm (accessed October 19, 2009).
(12)
Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2008.
(13)
Samuelson 1973, pp. 274–76.
(14)
Wray 1998, p. 42.
(15)
Ibid., p. 64.
(16)
Furness 1910, p. 100, quoted in Wray 1998, p. 58.
(17)
See the LETSYSTEMS web page at www.gmlets.u-net.com (accessed October 22, 2009).
(18)
The Economist, December 18, 2008.
(19)
Buchan 1997, p. 281.
(20)
Wiener 1982. For Athens, see Hall 1998, p. 58, and chapter 10 below.
(21)
See Polanyi (1944) for a very influential expression of this point of view.
(22)
Tourneur 1607, act I, scene 1.
(23)
Buchan 1997, p. 20.
(24)
Balzac 1988.
(25)
Amis 1984.

الفصل السابع: الشرف بين اللصوص: الاكتناز والسرقة

(1)
Davies (2003) shows that the first documented banks were in Mesopotamia and did indeed serve as storehouses for grain. the first documented private banks appear in Athens, in the late fifth century B. C. E. (Cohen 1992, p. 42).
(2)
Sheilagh Ogilvie tells me this certainly occurred in sixteenth-century Bohemia.
(3)
Similar behavior tends to be observed when there are rumors of a gasoline shortage.
(4)
Cornett & Saunders 1998, pp. 329–33. Joseph Mollicone, the bank president who sparked the crisis, was convicted in 1993 of embezzlement and sentenced to thirty years in prison; he was released in July 2002 (Financial Times, July 24, 2002).

الفصل الثامن: الشرف بين المصرفيين

(1)
Professor Mark Perry of the University of Michigan (see http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2008/01/history-of-us-bank-failures.html). I do not mean to suggest Professor Perry was less well-informed than most other experts; his view was the mainstream view for the reasons I have discussed.
(2)
Gorton 2009.
(3)
British building societies are rather like American savings-and-loan institutions, with a strong concentration of their loans in the form of housing mortgages.
(4)
See Cecchetti 2007.
(5)
Friedman & Schwartz 1963; Gorton 2009, p. 21. See Calomiris 2007.
(6)
See Gorton 2009.
(7)
Ibid.
(8)
Recorded in the documents of the hearing on the role of credit rating agencies in the financial crisis, held on October 22, 2008 by House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081022112325.pdf. See the New York Times report at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/rating-agencies-draw-fire-capitol-hill.
(9)
An excellent guide to the economics of structured products is Coval et al. (2009).
(10)
Mackenzie (2009) has an excellent discussion of this problem.
(11)
Johnson 2009.
(12)
Blakemore et al. 2000.
(13)
As measured by the Case-Shiller composite-10 index, published by Standard & Poor’s.
(14)
See Gorton 2008 and Shiller 2008.
(15)
This point is well made by Cowen (2009).
(16)
Kübler-Ross 1973.
(17)
See Shiller 2000.
(18)
See Gorton 2009.
(19)
O’Rourke 2008.
(20)
Tett (2009) provides a compellingly written account of the unfolding of the financial crisis centered around the complex derivative products developed at JPMorgan.
(21)
Akerlof & Shiller 2009.

الفصل التاسع: الاحترافية والإنجاز في ساحات العمل وساحات الحروب

(1)
Calvino 1991, pp. 20–23.
(2)
Quotations from the proceedings are from Marrus (1997, especially pp. 182, 206, 217). The English version is given as in Marrus, even where the translation is evidently slightly faulty (as in “pity with” instead of “pity for”). Overy (2001) is a fascinating account of the interrogation of Nazi leaders before the trial, reproducing many original transcripts.
(3)
Brendon 2000, p. 404. Nevertheless, though the Nuremberg trials brought out these tensions explicitly and in a starker form than ever before or since, the sense that the life of a complex society encourages a single-mindedness essential to our success, while simultaneously provoking deep unease at the effects of this single-mindedness on the quality of our lives, has been with us for many centuries.
(4)
The evolution of human mental capacities, especially for broad, abstract reasoning, is the subject of Mithen (1996), whose main focus is the development of consciousness; on Mithen’s view many of these mental capacities are byproducts of skills that evolved for ecological adaptation and social interaction. Miller (2000) proposes sexual selection as an explanation: far from being a byproduct, human mental abilities were actively selected by females. In fact, the two theories are less starkly opposed than they may appear: the particular forms of mental capacity that were sexually selected were not necessarily the ones we see today, and sexual interaction was surely one of the most important forms of social interaction driving the evolutionary process.
(5)
Hall 1998, pp. 48, 58.
(6)
An intriguing account of this process in the U. S. Navy is given in Hutchins (1995, especially pp. 6–26).
(7)
Dumont 1981.
(8)
Donne 1997, pp. 126-27.
(9)
Durkheim’s theory of suicide is set out in Durkheim (1897). He proposed four types of suicide, distinguishing notably between egoistic suicide, which was driven by lack of social integration in modern society, and anomic suicide, which was driven by lack of social regulation. A sense of some of the empirical and conceptual controversy still surrounding these ideas can be gained from the readings in Lester (1994), though the discussions of the empirical material are neither very clear nor (to my mind) very convincing.
(10)
Wrosch & Miller 2009.
(11)
Furedi 2002.
(12)
Terkel 1974, pp. 203-4.
(13)
De Botton (2009) is one of the rare books to look in detail at how a range of occupations shape the way in which their participants conceive of their lives. Amélie Nothomb’s novel Fear and Trembling is a superb evocation of emotions on an almost epic scale, but set in a very ordinary office in Tokyo (Nothomb 2002).
(14)
This is documented in Hamermesh (2005), which shows from surveys of labor market behavior that variety in one’s work and life is valuable to people and is one of the fruits of education.
(15)
Perec 1979, pp. 94-95 (my translation).
(16)
Amnesty International 2001.
(17)
Gusterson 1996.
(18)
Terkel 1986.
(19)
Richerson & Boyd 1998.
(20)
A recent instance is the U. S.-led invasion of Iraq in March-April 2003. The photographer Laurent van der Stockt, interviewed by Michel Guerrin in Le Monde (April 13/14), describes the killing by U. S. Marines of civilians, including women and children, who evidently posed no threat to the troops but were in some sense simply in the way.

خاتمة الجزأين الأول والثاني

(1)
See Perloff (2001, chapter 10) for a textbook discussion and Mas-Colell et al. (1995, chapter 10) for a rigorous but difficult technical treatment. For excellent and enjoyable nontechnical introductions to economic thinking, see Coyle (2002) and Harford (2005).
(2)
A very readable tour of the many different kinds of market in real economies is McMillan (2002).
(3)
These points are given an excellent and reasonably simple textbook treatment in Milgrom & Roberts (1992, especially chapter 4). Aoki (2001) is a fuller and more detailed textbook covering these themes.
(4)
See Rodrik (1997) for a skeptical view of globalization and Bourguignon et al. (2002) for a more general overview.
(5)
See McCulloch et al. (2001) and Bourguignon et al. (2002, especially chapter 4) for summaries of the evidence on trade, globalization, and world poverty and inequality.
(6)
Smith 1759, 1776.
(7)
Dougherty 2002. See also Rothschild 2001.
(8)
See Riley (2001) for a survey and Perloff (2001, chapter 19) for a textbook treatment.
(9)
Akerlof 1970.
(10)
See the summary in Seabright (1993).
(11)
Kreps & Wilson 1982.
(12)
See Hörner (2002) for a model of self-regulation via competition for reputation building. A textbook treatment of the economics of regulation is given in Viscusi et al. (2000).
(13)
See Tirole 1996 and Seabright 1997.
(14)
The classic work in this literature is Putnam (1993); Putnam (2000) applies the ideas to contemporary American society. Dasgupta & Serageldin (1999) provides a comprehensive overview of the issues.
(15)
This work is reviewed in Fehr & Gächter (2000a).
(16)
Case et al. 2000 and Cox 2001, for example. Bergstrom (1996) discusses the significance of kin selection for the economics of the family, and Robson (2001) surveys what evolutionary biology has to say about economic preferences and the nature of economic rationality. Cronk et al. (2000) consists of essays exploring adaptive explanations for phenomena documented by anthropologists; Dunbar et al. (1999) also contains much interesting material. Hirshleifer (1977) is an early and still very readable discussion of the links between biology and economics, and Ghiselin (2001) provides a large bibliography.
(17)
See Henrich et al. (2001) for a fascinating cross-cultural experiment and Francois & van Ypersele (2009) for a cross-country econometric study suggesting that competitive markets tend to foster interpersonal trust.
(18)
That the character of societies can be far removed from the intentions of individuals is something of a truism in sociology; see Barnes (1995) for a survey of the main sociological approaches to understanding social interaction. This concept was central to the work of Durkheim, especially his book On the Division of Labor in Society, first published in 1893 (1998). Kaufmann (1995) describes the general insights of complex systems theory into the nature of self-organizing structures.
(19)
Beinhocker 2006; Bernstein 2004; Findlay & O’Rourke 2007.

مقدمة الجزء الثالث

(1)
Hölldobler & Wilson 2008.
(2)
Beckerts et al. 1994, p. 181. See also Hölldobler & Wilson (1994, pp. 107–22) for similar observations about ants. Explicit analogies between ants and markets are explored in Kirman (1993).
(3)
Smith 1776, p. 473. Hirschman (1977) is an account of how various writers saw the importance of harnessing, rather than repressing, human self-interest.
(4)
Rothschild 2001, p. 119.

الجزء الثالث: نتائج غير مقصودة: من الجماعات الأُسَرية إلى المدن الصناعية

الفصل العاشر: المدينة من أثينا القديمة إلى مانهاتن الحديثة

(1)
Some have attributed this painting to Piero della Francesca and in the first edition I followed the attribution. This remains disputed, however, and many consider it more likely to have been painted by another, possibly Leon Battista Alberti or Luciano Laurana.
(2)
An interesting account (and critique) of the thinking behind planned cities is in Scott (1998, chapter 4).
(3)
Bosker et al. 2008.
(4)
Hall 1998, p. 68.
(5)
Ibid., p. 234.
(6)
Ibid., p. 235.
(7)
Ibid., p. 238.
(8)
Hughes 1992, p. 155. This book should be read by everyone interested in cities, even those who have never been to Barcelona.
(9)
Jacobs 1961, pp. 50-51.
(10)
Ibid., p. 56.
(11)
Hall 1998, chapter 3.
(12)
Dr. Snow’s cholera map is reproduced in Tufte (1997a, p. 24, 1997b, pp. 30-31). The latter has an excellent discussion on pp. 27–37 of Snow’s inferences from the map and whether these were in fact responsible for the end of the epidemic. Such issues are also brought out on the John Snow website maintained by Ralph R. Frerichs at the UCLA Department of Epidemiology at www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow.html (accessed October 20, 2009).
(13)
Borges 1951, p. 423. I have not been able to find the original in Gibbon, and knowing Borges’s taste for whimsy am skeptical that I ever shall.
(14)
Corbin 1982.
(15)
Süskind 1988, pp. 3-4.
(16)
In any one place the children of the rich, being better fed, were somewhat less vulnerable to disease than those of the poor (though not much less so). But the rich were more likely to live in cities, where mortality rates were higher than in the country.
(17)
McGranahan 1993, p. 105.
(18)
Mayhew 1861, 2: 136.
(19)
Ibid., 2: 142–44.
(20)
Diamond 1997, especially chapter 11. See also Cochrane & Harpending 2009.
(21)
Libecap & Hansen 2001.
(22)
Chandler [1950] 2002.

الفصل الحادي عشر: الماء: سلعة أم منظومة اجتماعية؟

(1)
European Commission 1992.
(2)
See Ward 2002. Homer-Dixon (1999) presents a more systematic analysis of the various kinds of violent conflict to which environmental crises can give rise. Other interesting cases are discussed in “Streams of Blood, or Streams of Peace,” The Economist, May 1, 2008.
(3)
Robbins 1936.
(4)
Palaniappan & Gleick 2009, p. 1.
(5)
Schama 1987, pp. 22–25.
(6)
Hanson 1988.
(7)
World Health Organization (available at www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/burden/en/index.html, accessed October 22, 2009).
(8)
World Health Organization (available at www.who.int/pmnch/topics/add_publications/2008_worldmalariarep/en/, accessed October 22, 2009).
(9)
World Health Statistics 2009, table 3.1, www.who.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html (accessed October 22, 2009).
(10)
Begg et al. 1993, p. 146, and Malle 1996.
(11)
U. S. Geological Survey, Pesticides in the Nation’s Streams and Groundwater, 1992–2001: A Summary, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3028 (accessed October 22, 2009).
(12)
The focal role of inland seas was a central theme of Braudel (1972), Ascherson (1995), and Horden & Purcell (2000).
(13)
Dumont 1981.
(14)
Baumann 1969.
(15)
Auden 1979, pp. 184–87.
(16)
Opinion poll evidence comparing perceptions of general environmental issues across countries is given in Worcester (1995, especially pp. 20–24). Evidence for the high ranking of water within general environmental issues in Britain appears in Corrado & Ross (1990, table 6). The Lima opinion poll is cited in Worcester & Corrado (1991, p. 11). I am most grateful to Robert Worcester and Michele Corrado, both of MORI, for making these sources available to me.
(17)
See Ward 2002 and Gleick 2009.
(18)
The water rights systems in the United States are discussed in Rogers (1993) and Clyde (1989).
(19)
Wittfogel 1957.
(20)
Wade 1987.
(21)
Landes 1983, pp. 22-23. An obvious difficulty with this argument is that the mechanical clock and the culture he describes may both have been effects of some other cause.
(22)
For lighthouses, see Coase (1974); for the Coase theorem, see Coase (1960).
(23)
See, for instance, Shleifer & Vishny 1993.
(24)
Herman et al. 1988.

الفصل الثاني عشر: هل كل شيء خاضع للتسعير؟

(1)
The prices of Cigna Corporation, Aetna Inc., and United Health Group Inc. rose by between 5% and 10% of their previous days’ closing prices before noon on July 28, 2009, the day of the announcement.
(3)
This is not just the simple median of all the different traders’ estimates but the median weighted by the number of contracts each trader holds.
(7)
Gibbon 1776, chapter 5, entitled “The Sale of the Empire by the Praetorians.”
(8)
Klemperer 1999, note 21.
(9)
Hendricks & Porter 1988.
(10)
Mauss 1950.
(11)
Davis 2000.
(12)
McCloskey 1976.
(13)
De Soto 2000.
(14)
Gann 2001.
(15)
The comparative study of British and American blood transfusion systems—one relying on donations, the other to a much greater extent on sales—was the subject of a classic study by Titmuss (1970), who claimed that paying people to give blood was inefficient as well as unethical, because it resulted in higher levels of infected blood and less willingness to provide blood among people who would otherwise have been willing to do so for free (this last phenomenon is known as “crowding-out” of altruism byfinancial incentives). See also the review essays by Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972). Surprisingly, Titmuss’s hypothesis was not subjected to an experimental test in the realm of blood donation until the work of Mellström & Johannesson (2008); they found no statistically significant crowding-out on average but didfind it among women subjects. Bénabou & Tirole (2006) and Seabright (2009a) discuss ways of understanding crowding-out phenomena as a form of social signaling. Anderson (1995) is a careful (though in my view largely unconvincing) statement of the case for refusing to trade in many of the controversial areas listed in the text.
(16)
Larissa McFarquhar, “The Kindest Cut,” The New Yorker, July 27, 2009, p. 43.

الفصل الثالث عشر: العائلات والشركات

(1)
The classic source for this question about the boundaries of firms is Coase (1937). One of the collections in which it is republished (Putterman & Kroszner 1996) contains many useful essays dealing with this and related questions. Hart (1995, especially part 1) is a good undergraduate-level overview, Williamson (1985) a less formal one, and a classic reference for what has come to be known as “transactions cost economics.” Aoki (2001) is a comprehensive monograph reviewing contributions to the economics of institutions in the transactions cost tradition. Mokyr (2002, particularly chapter 4) provides an excellent historical perspective on the impact of technical change on the size and character offirms since the industrial revolution.
(2)
On output, see Bourguignon & Morrison (2002, table 1); on energy and freshwater, see McNeill (2000, tables 1.5 and 5.1).
(3)
The exceptions include, not just plantation agriculture in the Americas, but also the great European feudal estates; it is also true that even family farms have often been active in labor markets, hiring in or hiring out labor according to the rhythms of the agricultural year.
(4)
The material on Henry Ford in this chapter is drawn from Hall (1998, chapter 13).
(5)
A remarkable exception is reported by Jones (1988): “before the birth of Christ an ironmaster in Szechuan was employing 1000 men” (p. 74).
(6)
On the economic and social foundations of European military efficiency, see Hanson, who studies Athenian infantry prowess (1989) and undertakes a longer historical comparison (2001).
(7)
Hutchins 1995, pp. 6-7.
(8)
Ibid., p. 6.
(9)
See Buder 1970.
(10)
Jones (1988, p. 23): “the silk industry in Italy was carried out in fourand six-storey mills as early as the sixteenth century.”
(11)
Hall 1998, pp. 330-31.
(12)
Ibid., p. 414.
(13)
Ibid., p. 409.
(14)
Ibid., p. 411
(15)
Aoki 2001, p. 108.
(16)
Hall 1998, p. 409.
(17)
Ibid., p. 405.
(18)
Landes 1998, p. 306. See also Hall 1998, pp. 404-5. Jones (1988, p. 72) has used the converse argument to point to the absence of mass demand as a reason why a number of episodes of striking economic growth in the premodern world were not sustained: “concentration on products for which there could be no mass demand and from which there were few spin-offs slowed an economic advance that was technically within the reach of some organized society.”
(19)
Lamoreaux et al. (2002) gives an interesting account of the evolution of the textile and other light industries in early nineteenth-century New England, from a structure based on families and family control to a more centralized factory system. For example, owners of the new large mills built in the second and third decades of the century “needed many more workers than could be obtained from local farm households [;] they had to convince young, unmarried women from all over New England to come work temporarily in the mills. In order to make factory employment more attractive to this group, they invested in boarding houses and educational institutions.”
(20)
Statistics about the size of U. S. businesses from the U. S. Census Bureau.
(21)
Chandler 1990. See also the review essay by Teece (1993).
(22)
Fukuyama 1995, particularly in application to China at pp. 69–82.
(23)
There exist categories of nonvoting shares, though the law prevents the firm’s directors from treating these differently as far as dividend payments are concerned.
(24)
For an analysis of this episode and its aftermath, see Berglof & Burckardt (2003).
(25)
Even McDonald’s relies on franchising to combine standardization with some of the flexibility that is one of the virtues of the small.
(26)
Teece (1993, especially footnote 52) emphasizes thatfirms facing identical technological conditions could have quite different capacities for coordinating their production, differences that could persist over many decades.
(27)
Chandler 1977.
(28)
Lamoreaux et al. (2002) provides an overview of these developments and an outline of an alternative synthesis.
(29)
Hutchins (1995) describes in detail how the different cognitive tasks involved in the navigation of a large naval vessel are not concentrated in the mind of a single individual but are distributed throughout the members of the ship’s crew, and analyzes the coordinating mechanisms that turn this distributed process into a recognizably coherent response to a cognitive problem.
(30)
See Baker & Hubbard 2004.
(31)
Anthony (2007) has fascinating evidence on horses, wheels, and chariots and on their impact on warfare, migration, and the development of civilization. Among the intriguing details (p). 196: “at least seventy-seven ancestral mares … are required to account for the genetic variety in modern populations around the globe. Wild mares must have been taken into domesticated horse herds in many different places at different times. Meanwhile, the male aspect of modern horse DNA … shows remarkable homogeneity. It is possible that just a single wild stallion was domesticated.”
(32)
See Cooper 1998.
(33)
Mowery & Ziedonis 2004.
(34)
John Sutton’s theories aboutfirm size are set out in Sutton (1998); an application to questions of globalization was given in his Royal Economic Society public lecture, the text of which is not available but is loosely based on a British Academy lecture (Sutton 2001).

الفصل الرابع عشر: المعرفة والرمزية

(1)
The story of the Chauvet cave, along with pictures of the artworks and a discussion of the archeological and geological context, can be found online at www.culture.fr/culture/arcnat/chauvet/fr/ (accessed October 22, 2009).
(2)
Mithen (1996) cites Glyn Isaac as describing how “for almost a million years, toolkits tended to involve the same essential ingredients seemingly being shuffled in restless, minor, directionless changes” (p. 19).
(3)
The evolution of human culture is a central theme of Klein & Edgar (2001) and Klein (2009, especially chapter 8); the authors support the hypothesis of African origins but favor the hypothesis of a relatively sudden transformation. McBrearty & Brooks (2000) argue strongly in favor of a more gradual African evolution. Mithen (1996) has an excellent account of the challenge of explaining the development of human cultural and cognitive capacities, as well as an intriguing hypothesis about how it might have happened.
(4)
This remains a speculation, though, and it is hard to see what evidence could, realistically, confirm or refute it.
(5)
Not all specialists would accept this characterization: Sue Blackmore, for instance, tells me, in a personal communication, that she doesn’t see why symbolic representation is necessary for imitation. My own view is that imitation as such had been a feature of human behavior long before the developments we can describe as culture (all those unchanging stone tools), but it was the fluidity of symbolic recombination that gave imitation the explosive potential so grippingly described in Blackmore (1999).
(6)
And the brain itself uses symbols which are not necessarily images to represent external objects (see Ramachandran & Blakeslee (1999, chapter 4) for a particularly clear and intuitive account of this point of view). So a more general reliance on symbols rather than more specifically on images for communication is a natural extension of our biological capacities from the perceptual sphere to the sphere of communication.
(7)
Mithen 1996, pp. 160-61. One of the key pieces of evidence is the structure and position of the larynx, which in humans carries a much greater risk of choking than in apes. This risk implies that there must already have been adaptive benefits from the greater capacity of the human larynx to produce sounds suitable for language; otherwise there would have been strong selective pressures against its evolution.
(8)
Whiten et al. 1999; Whiten & Boesch 2001.
(9)
Diamond 1992, pp. 133–35. It is likely that the increased life span coevolved with increased brain size, since larger brains do not instantly increase fitness but, rather, raise the returns to learning, which is a type of investment. This would therefore have increased the overall adaptive value of longer life expectancy, since it gave a longer period in which learning investments would be productive. See KaplanHurtado et al. (2000) and Robson & Kaplan (2003).
(10)
The citations about the impact of printing are from Eisenstein (1982), which was reissued in abridged form as Eisenstein (1993). Afine social history of printing is Febvre & Martin (1997), while Martin (1994) connects the history of printing with that of writing and literacy more generally.
(11)
This is compatible with a large increase in absolute rewards for those whose talents appeal to a geographically dispersed audience who can be brought together by the cheap reproduction and diffusion of information goods. I recall reading somewhere that Joseph Losey’s movie version of Don Giovanni has been seen by more people than have seen the live opera in the more than two centuries since Mozart wrote it.
(12)
Frank 1999, p. 38. A previous book by the same author (Frank 1996) was devoted entirely to such markets and their effects on society. The underlying idea wasfirst developed by Rosen (1981).
(13)
See Boldrin & Levine 2008, chapter 1.
(14)
Jaffe & Lerner 2004.
(15)
Acemoglu & Linn 2004.
(16)
Moser 2005.
(17)
See Carlton & Waldman 2002 and Bernheim & Whinston 1998.
(18)
Boldrin & Levine 2008.
(19)
I’m not, of course, the first to have this idea. Most days my email inbox contains advertisements for products purporting to do at least some of these things—yet somehow I’m still a frog.
(20)
Kremer & Snyder (2003) have argued that a similar problem explains why private-sector pharmaceutical companies invest less in vaccines than in curative drugs.
(21)
Stokes 1965, p. 30. The analogy is interesting even if one does not accept his psychoanalytic, and specifically Kleinian, framework (Melanie Klein this time, not Richard, nor even Naomi).
(22)
Gray et al. 1991. The ability to screen out irrelevant information is known as “latent inhibition.”
(23)
Cognitive psychologist Colin Martindale has advanced the theory that the changing characteristics of all artistic movements can be explained by pressure for novelty generated by the habituation of artistic audiences to familiar stimuli (Martindale 1990); such a theory seems naturally suited to explaining an increasing shrillness of artistic movements as they struggle to compete in a symbolically overpopulated space of public attention. An interesting comparison is with David Galenson’s book about two different styles of artistic creativity, the experimental and the conceptually innovative (Galenson 2001).
(24)
Jones 1988, especially pp. 176ff, and Landes 1998. For a skeptical view, see Pomeranz 2000.
(25)
Landes 1998, pp. 94, 96.

الفصل الخامس عشر: الإقصاء: البطالة والفقر والمرض

(1)
Brendon 2000, pp. 79–81.
(2)
A discussion of Walker Evans’s relation to the Farm Security Administration is at http://xroads.virginia.edu/˜ug97/fsa/welcome.html.
(3)
“Manipuram” and “Kovilur” arefictitious names for real villages where I lived for nearly a year in 1985 and which I revisited in 1990 and 1992. Research findings from these villages have resulted in several publications, one of which is Seabright (1997). Bliss & Stern (1983) is a detailed and fascinating case study of the north Indian village of Palanpur, revisited in Lanjouw & Stern (1998). The best general-purpose textbook on economic development is Ray (1998), though Basu (1998) has some excellent chapters, particularly the early ones. Bardhan & Udry (1999) is a good advanced undergraduate textbook on institutional aspects of economic development.
(4)
Venkatesh 2006.
(5)
Assortative matching is discussed nontechnically in chapter 5 of Cohen (1998) and technically in Shimer & Smith (2000). It has been applied to understanding a wide range of phenomena, including growing inequality in household income (Deaton 1995; Lerman 1996), poverty traps in developing economies (Kremer 1993), peer-group lending in poor countries (Ghatak 1999), rising divorce rates (Weiss 1997), transmission rates of HIV infection (Dow & Philipson 1996), racial and class segregation in the schooling system (Bénabou 1994), and the changing employment structure of U. S. firms (Kremer & Maskin 1996; Acemoglu 1999; Mailath et al. 2000).
(6)
One piece of evidence suggesting this may be an important phenomenon is presented in Hamermesh (2001), who argues that measures of job satisfaction—which are likely to be very sensitive to the quality of a person’s coworkers—have become more unequal in both the United States and Germany in recent years.
(7)
Kremer 1993.
(8)
Depression and mental health statistics for the United States are available at www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numbers-count-mental-disorders-in-america/index.shtml (accessed October 22, 2009). Suicide and other mortality statistics for the United States are at http://webappa.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_sy.html (accessed October 22, 2009). Statistics on suicide and other causes of mortality for the world as a whole are available at www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/bodgbddeathdalyestimates.xls (accessed October 22, 2009).
(9)
An introduction to the theory of principal-agent relationships is in James Mirrlees’s Nobel lecture (Mirrlees 1997); an excellent but advanced text is Laffont & Martimort (2002). Holmström & Milgrom (1991) applies the theory to multiple tasks, where some tasks are more easily monitored than others. Applications to multitasking are discussed in Seabright (1999).
(10)
Bursztajn et al. 1990, p. 414. This is an interesting discussion of medical decision making, with many case studies. Chapter 10 is entitled “Trust” and describes many of the difficulties facing doctors in reconciling their wish to establish trust with patients and the need to make hard-headed resourceallocation decisions.
(11)
Holmström & Milgrom 1991.
(12)
Luhrmann 2000, p. 243.
(13)
Ibid., p. 260.
(14)
Ibid., p. 17.
(15)
For evidence that adjusting GDP to take account of nonmarket aspects of welfare has an overall positive impact on estimates of income growth, see Crafts (2003).
(16)
For an example of the romanticization of mental illness, see Laing (1960); for a more subtle and historically wide-ranging version, see Foucault (1965). Kakar (1982) is a more nuanced account of the different ways in which American and Indian societies both conceptualize mental illness and respond to individuals with certain presenting conditions.
(17)
Steckel & Wallis 2009, table 2.

خاتمة الجزء الثالث

(1)
Schelling (1978) is a superb introduction to the issues.
(2)
Krugman (1991) remains the best introduction to this literature. See also Fujita et al. (1999) and the review essay by Neary (2001).
(3)
Seabright (1993) and Portney (2000) are two introductory essays; Pearce & Turner (1990), a textbook treatment, Dasgupta (1993, 2001), two comprehensive monographs, and Dasgupta & Mäler (1997), a set of essays about problems of environment and development.
(4)
See McMillan (2002) and Harford (2005) for two very readable introductions.
(5)
Farrell (1987) provides a very clear account of the reasons why asymmetries of information prevent efficient bargaining of the kind necessary for the Coase theorem to hold.

مقدمة إلى الجزء الرابع

(1)
Weisdorf (2005) provides an excellent survey.
(2)
I have developed the argument about defense and the adoption of agriculture more fully with Bob Rowthorn in Rowthorn & Seabright (2009). Evidence about the existence of multiple independent adoptions is summarized in Richerson et al. (2001), and the rapid spread of agriculture around the world is documented in Bellwood (1996) and Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). Barker (2006) provides an encyclopedic overview of what is known about the origins of agriculture, emphasizing among other things how many communities had adopted practices that made agriculture a more natural option than it would otherwise have been (a point also made by Tudge (1999)). As Mithen (1996) points out, earlier humans had sophisticated biological knowledge, so that it does not seem likely that their disinclination to adopt agriculture lay in lack of skill. Existing theories are dominated by two hypotheses: that of a late Pleistocene food crisis caused by population pressure (Cohen 1977) and that of rapid climate change including global warming (Richardson et al. 2001). the first is problematic because of evidence that hunter-gatherers were able to control population growth through various measures, including infanticide. According to Cohen & Armelagos (1984), the second may only be a necessary and not a sufficient condition for adoption of agriculture, given the evidence about the health of early farmers. Given that evidence, climate change might not have increased agricultural productivity enough to make its adoption inevitable. As Mithen points out, many previous episodes of comparable climate change had not led to agriculture. Two additional theories help explain why adoption of agriculture could have led to a “point of no return,” though neither explains the initial adoption. Bar-Yosef & Belfer-Cohen (1989) suggest that sedentism removed constraints to population growth and made a return to hunting and gathering impossible. Winterhalder & Lu (1995) suggest that more intense hunting by already sedentary communities would have depleted big game, with the same consequence of rendering a return to hunting and gathering impossible. This hypothesis is strongly corroborated by data in Stutz et al. (2009). And Mithen himself offers his account of an evolving human consciousness as a way of explaining why modern humans might have been more aware of the possibilities of agriculture than their biologically sophisticated, but less symbolically creative, forebears: they knew about wild animals and plants but were not used to thinking of them as potentially domesticable.
So my suggestion that defense needs imposed important externalities is best seen as a way to reconcile the evidence about the health of early farmers with the possibility that climate change might nevertheless have made agriculture sufficiently productive to become strongly attractive to individual communities. That defense needs were an important preoccupation of early agricultural societies is strongly argued by Gat (2006).
(3)
This point therefore also applies to some hunter-gatherer societies like the salmon fishers of the Pacific Northwest that had become relatively sedentary (and also therefore large, complex, and socially stratified) because of the immobile nature of their hunting grounds.
(4)
Ferguson 1773, p. 218. I owe both this and my acquaintance with Ibn Khaldun (1377) to the excellent book by Gellner (1994), on pp. 62-63 of which I originally came across the reference to Ferguson.

الجزء الرابع: العمل الجماعي: من دول مُحارِبة إلى سوق أُمَمية

الفصل السادس عشر: دول وإمبراطوريات

(1)
Cavalli-Sforza 2000, pp. 104–13. Renfrew (1989) is a treatment of the puzzle of the origins of Indo-European languages that also depends on the hypothesis of a gradual spread of a technology (in this case, a linguistic technology) carried by the spread of agriculture.
(2)
Gkiasta et al. 2003.
(3)
See Zeder 2008.
(4)
Cavalli-Sforza (2000). For the Bantu expansion more generally, see Ehret (1998).
(5)
Leblanc et al. 2007.
(6)
Richards (2003) reports point estimates for the proportion of mitochondrial DNA from Neolithic migrants from Turkey in northern Greek populations to be around 20% and the proportion of Y-chromosome DNA to be around 25%—a higher proportion of the latter being expected if indigenous females were incorporated into the migrants’ gene pool at a higher rate than indigenous males.
(7)
The claim that almost no societies refrained from enslaving others at some time in their history, and that slavery became more likely the wealthier the society concerned, was due atfirst to Nieboer (1900, especially pp. 255–61, 286–88, 294, 303, 306, and 417–27). I am grateful to Stanley Engerman for this reference. The classic source for the economics of slavery is Fogel & Engerman (1974).
(8)
Gat 2002, 2006, chapter 9.
(9)
Hanson 1989, pp. xxiv–xxv.
(10)
Pericles’ description of the Peloponnesians comes from Thucydides, book 1, chapter 141; in the edition by Strassler (1998), p. 81.
(11)
Hanson 2001, pp. 274-75.
(12)
Kennedy 1989. The work of Peter Turchin (2003) explores inter alia the interaction between demographic expansion and fiscal strength, in a more quantitative style than Kennedy.
(13)
Darwin 2008.
(14)
White 1966.
(15)
Scott 1998, pp. 64–73.
(16)
This view is reviewed and rejected in Keeley (1996, especially pp. 121–26). Gat (2006) defends a more nuanced version of the view, which is that states that have overcome the Malthusian population trap have more reason to avoid conflict since they have more to lose; trade may play a part in the generation of that prosperity. However, if you are more prosperous this gives you a reason to avoid conflict with any opponent, not necessarily only your close trading partners.
(17)
For the annihilation of the aboriginal Australians and Tasmanians and the Hereros, see Diamond (1992, pp. 278–88).
(18)
Hochschild 1999, passim, but especially chapter 15. Such slaughter may even have been encouraged by the fact that, with the end of slavery, these inhabitants no longer represented an economic resource for their murderers; they were simply in the way.
(19)
The argument that asymmetries in size and strength explain violence between adults in some species is discussed in Wrangham & Peterson (1996, pp. 156–72). The evidence on gorilla infanticide is at pp. 146–51.
(20)
Hanson 2001, pp. 273–75.
(21)
Cohen 1992, pp. 43-44.
(22)
Cave & Coulson 1936, pp. 104-5.
(23)
Landes 1998, p. 339. It is not entirely clear what Landes means by this last remark—perhaps that no European state was without powerful enemies who were always trying to achieve a military advantage.
(24)
The website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute is at www.sipri.se.
(25)
Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995.
(26)
Aizenman & Glick 2005. This evidence suggests that military spending is good for economic growth once the nature of the military threats faced by a country is taken into account. Of course, this may be true on average even if for certain countries military spending is useless or counterproductive or serves the interests only of a narrow elite.
(27)
Aidt et al. 2006.

الفصل السابع عشر: العولمة والعمل الجماعي

(1)
Macaulay 1857.
(2)
Gray 1998.
(3)
Burke 1790.
(4)
Ricardo 1817.
(5)
Rodrik (1997) places more emphasis on the risks of globalization; though see also Bourguignon et al. (2002) and Wolf (2004).
(6)
Bourguignon & Morrison 2002.
(7)
Quoted in Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War, book 2, chapter 39; in the edition by Strassler (1998, p. 113).
(8)
I am grateful to David Wiggins for making me realize that my wording in the first edition was anachronistic on this point.
(9)
Miller (2009) discusses how our evolved desire to signal our personal attributes through consumption decisions can be manipulated by advertisers in ways that are no longer even very effective signals.
(10)
Packard 1957.
(11)
Wantchekon 2003.
(12)
Rawls 1975.
(13)
Huntington 1993.
(14)
Macpherson 1962.
(15)
The importance of the religious wars is particularly emphasized by Tully (1980, 1993).
(16)
For example, Sandel 1982 and Gray 2000.
(17)
Constant 1819.
(18)
Williams 1993.
(19)
Lewis 2002, p. 6.
(20)
Lewis (2003) is one of several writers to develop this argument.
(21)
Rousseau 1755, p. 90.

الفصل الثامن عشر: الخاتمة: ما مدى هشاشة التجربة الكبرى؟

(1)
World Health Organization 2004. In addition, infectious agents are suspected of involvement in a number of cancers that are recorded as noncommunicable diseases (see Price-Smith 2002, p. 37).
(2)
For the influenza pandemic, see Taubenberger & Morens (2006). Keeley (1996, especially pp. 89–94) reviews evidence suggesting that prehistoric and preindustrial societies had casualty rates from warfare that were much higher even than the wartime casualty rates of industrial societies.
(3)
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2008, especially chapter 4.2.
(4)
See Homer-Dixon 1999.
(5)
Ibid., p. 75.
(6)
Radical technological innovations could conceivably change this in the future—targeted viruses that can kill massive numbers of an enemy population while leaving a domestic population unharmed, and do not need sophisticated delivery mechanisms might be one way—but this remains entirely speculative.
(7)
Geoffrey Hawthorn tells me the story of a popular Venezuelan rock band that was asked by the FARC to play for them. The band said it required twenty thousand dollars, a decent stadium to play in, and safe passage to and from Caracas. No problem, said the FARC. The band had its fee, a private jet to and from the venue, and at the venue itself a large stadium with state-of-the-art sound and lighting. In itself trivial, but indicative of how much nonstates can confidently control.
(8)
Gladwell (2000) provides an excellent account of the way in which ideas (including panics) can spread, emphasizing the role of certain key individuals with large numbers of links to others and a strong persuasive power. This means that societies can have hubs in the realm of ideas even if their physical and formal organizational hubs are few.
(9)
See Barabási (2002) for an introduction.
(10)
“Moins de 400 femmes porteraient le voile intégral en France,” Libération, July 29, 2009, at www.liberation.fr/societe/0101582553-moins-de-400-femmes-porteraient-le-voile-integral-en-france.
(11)
Olson 1965, p. 29.
(12)
Published as Stern 2007.

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