قراءات إضافية
الفصل الأول: لماذا فلسفة علم الأحياء؟
Good overviews of the philosophy of
biology include Sex and
Death by Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths
(University of Chicago Press, 1999); Philosophy of Biology, by Alex Rosenberg and
Daniel McShea (Routledge, 2008); and Philosophy of Biology by Peter Godfrey-Smith
(Princeton University Press, 2016). Also useful are two
collections of articles: A Companion
to Philosophy of Biology, edited by Sahotra
Sarkar and Anya Plutynski (Blackwell, 2008); and The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy
of Biology, edited by David L. Hull and
Michael Ruse (Cambridge University Press,
2007).
الفصل الثاني: التطور والانتخاب الطبيعي
Darwin’s argument is set out in
On the Origin of
Species (John Murray, 1859). Paley’s design
argument can be found in his Natural
Theology (J. Faulder, 1802). A good
discussion of Darwin and Paley is Francisco J. Ayala’s
‘Darwin’s greatest discovery: design without designer’,
Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences vol. 104, 2007. A good
introduction to the neo-Darwinian theory is John Maynard
Smith’s The Theory of Evolution
(Cambridge University Press, 1993). The logic of Darwinian
explanation is explored by Elliott Sober in The Nature of Selection
(University of Chicago Press, 1984), and by Daniel Dennett
in Darwin’s Dangerous
Idea (Penguin, 1995). The proximate/ultimate
distinction was set out by Ernst Mayr in ‘Cause and effect
in biology’, Science vol.
134, 1961, and is critically re-assessed by Kevin N. Laland
et al. in ‘Cause and effect in biology revisited’, Science vol. 334, 2011. The
evidence in favour of evolution is set out in Jerry Coyne’s
Why Evolution is True
(Oxford University Press, 2010). Elliott Sober’s Evidence and Evolution
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) is an advanced discussion
of how evolutionary hypotheses can be tested against
data.
الفصل الثالث: الوظيفة والتكيف
Good discussions of biological
function include Philip Kitcher’s ‘Function and design’ and
Peter Godfrey-Smith’s ‘Functions: consensus without unity’,
both reprinted in D. Hull and M. Ruse (eds.) Philosophy of Biology (Oxford
University Press, 1998). The aetiological theory is set out
by Karen Neander in ‘The teleological notion of “function”’,
Australasian Journal of
Philosophy vol. 69, 1991. The causal role
theory derives from Robert Cummins’s article ‘Functional
analysis’, The Journal of
Philosophy vol. 72, 1975. The orthodox junk
DNA viewpoint is challenged by Joseph Ecker et al. in
‘Genomics: ENCODE explained’, Nature vol. 489, 2012. W. Ford Doolittle
replies in ‘Is junk DNA bunk? A critique of ENCODE’,
Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences vol. 110, 2013. Stephen
Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin’s critique of adaptationism
is found in ‘The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian
paradigm’, Proceedings of the Royal
Society B, vol. 205, 1979. A special issue of
the journal Biology and
Philosophy 2009 contains papers re-assessing
Gould and Lewontin’s critique on the thirtieth anniversary
of its publication.
الفصل الرابع: مستويات الانتخاب
Philosophical overviews of the levels
of selection include Elizabeth Lloyd’s article ‘Units and
levels of selection’ in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and
Samir Okasha’s Evolution and the
Levels of Selection (Oxford University Press,
2006). George Williams’s critique of group selection is
found in his Adaptation and Natural
Selection (Princeton University Press, 1966),
and discussed by Elliott Sober in The Nature of Selection (University of
Chicago Press, 1984). Hamilton’s original papers on kin
selection/inclusive fitness are reprinted in his collection
Narrow Roads of Gene
Land vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1998).
A recent philosophical discussion of Hamilton’s work is
Jonathan Birch’s The Philosophy of
Social Evolution (Oxford University Press,
2017). The kin versus group selection issue is examined by
Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson in Unto Others (Oxford University
Press, 1998), and by Samir Okasha in ‘The relation between
kin and group selection’, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol.
67, 2015. Dawkins’s gene’s eye view of evolution is set out
in The Selfish Gene
(Oxford University Press, 1976), and The Extended Phenotype (Oxford University
Press, 1982). A good philosophical analysis of Dawkins’s
ideas is found in Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffith’s Sex and Death (University of
Chicago Press, 1999). The major transitions discussion stems
from John Maynard Smith and Eörs Szathmáry’s The Major Transitions in
Evolution (Oxford University Press, 1995);
good philosophical treatments include Peter Godfrey-Smith’s
Darwinian Populations
(Oxford University Press, 2009), and the collection
The Major Transitions in
Evolution Revisited, edited by Kim Sterelny
and Brett Calcott (MIT Press, 2011).
الفصل الخامس: الأنواع والتصنيف
Marc Ereshefsky’s article ‘Species’,
in the online Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, offers a good overview of the
species problem. Book-length treatments include John
Wilkins’s Species
(University of California Press, 2009) and Robert Richards’s
The Species Problem
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). Mayr’s biological
species concept is set out in his Animal Species and Evolution (Harvard
University Press, 1963). A useful overview of species
concepts is Jerry Coyne and H. Allen Orr’s ‘Speciation’ in
A. Rosenberg and R. Arp (eds.) Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology
(Blackwell, 2009). The species-as-individuals thesis is set
out by David Hull in ‘A matter of individuality’, Philosophy of Science 45, 1978;
a good discussion is Thomas Reydon’s ‘Species are
individuals, or are they?’, Philosophy of Science 70, 2003. The
widespread consensus that species do not have essences is
challenged by Michael Devitt in ‘Resurrecting biological
essentialism’, Philosophy of
Science 75, 2008. The Linnaean classification
system is discussed in Marc Ereshefsky’s The Poverty of the Linnaean
Hierarchy (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
A useful introduction to phylogenetic systematics is found
in David Hull’s ‘Contemporary systematic philosophies’, in
E. Sober (ed.) Conceptual Issues in
Evolutionary Biology (MIT Press, 2008).
الفصل السادس: الجينات
Evelyn Fox Keller’s The Century of the Gene
(Harvard University Press, 2000) discusses genetics in
historical perspective. Paul Griffiths’ and Karola Stotz’s
Genetics and Philosophy
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) offers a
broad overview of philosophical issues in genetics. Philip
Kitcher’s article ‘1953 and all that’, in The Philosophical Review 43,
1984, is the locus
classicus for the view that Mendelian
genetics cannot be reduced to molecular genetics.
Alternative perspectives on reductionism are found in
Sahotra Sarkar’s Genetics and
Reductionism (Cambridge University Press,
1998), and Ken Waters’s ‘Molecular genetics’, in the online
Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. The gene concept is examined at
length by Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Staffan Muller-Wille in
the article ‘Gene’ in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and in
their book The Gene
(University of Chicago Press, 2018). The idea of genetic
information is defended by John Maynard Smith in ‘The
concept of information in biology’, Philosophy of Science 67, 2000; it is
critiqued by Paul Griffiths in ‘Genetic information:
a metaphor in search of a theory’, Philosophy of Science 68, 2001; and by
Sahotra Sarkar in ‘Decoding coding: information and DNA’, in
his Molecular Models of
Life (MIT Press, 2004).
الفصل السابع: السلوك البشري والعقل والثقافة
A good overview of how evolutionary
biology can be applied to the study of human behaviour is
Kevin Laland and Gillian Brown’s
Sense and Nonsense (Oxford University Press,
2002). Kenneth Schaffner’s book Behaving: What’s Genetic, What’s Not, and Why Should We
Care? (Oxford University Press, 2016) offers
a searching discussion of behaviour genetics, heritability
analysis, and the challenges to the nature–nurture
dichotomy. Edward O. Wilson’s On
Human Nature (Harvard University Press, 1978)
is the original defence of human sociobiology; Wilson’s
ideas are critiqued by Philip Kitcher in Vaulting Ambition (MIT Press,
1985). John Tooby and Leda Cosmides outline evolutionary
psychology in their ‘The psychological foundations of
culture’, in H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (eds.)
The Adapted Mind
(Oxford University Press, 1992). Good philosophical
discussions include Steve Downes’s article ‘Evolutionary
psychology’ in the online Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and David
Buller’s book Adapting
Minds (MIT Press, 2005). Cultural evolution
theory is outlined by Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd in
their book Not by Genes Alone
(University of Chicago Press, 2005). Good
philosophical discussions include Tim Lewens’s book
Cultural Evolution
(Oxford University Press, 2015), and his article of the same
name in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Cecilia Heyes’ book Cognitive Gadgets (Cambridge
University Press, 2018) integrates cultural evolution with
aspects of evolutionary psychology.
