ملاحظات
الفصل الأول: نهاية العولمة
(1)
For examples of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s comments on
world literature (Weltliteratur) see
“Some Passages Pertaining to the Concept of World Literature,” in
Comparative Literature: The Early Years: An
Anthology of Essays, ed. H-J. Schulz and P. Rhein (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973),
1–11.
(2)
For most recent figures on comparative levels of military
expenditure around the world, see figures compiled by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which are available on
its website: http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (accessed
October 15, 2010). In 2009, US military spending measured as a
percentage of global spending was 43 percent.
(3)
The figure usually cited for box office receipts for
Fahrenheit 9/11 is
US$119.2 million. See note in Michael Cieply, “Muscular
‘Expendables’ Enlivens Battle for Studio,” New
York Times, August 16, 2010. Available at: http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/muscular-expendables-enlivens-battle-for-studio/
(accessed October 15, 2010).
(4)
Moore told the media on several occasions that he hoped that
the film would influence the outcome of the 2004 US presidential
election. See, for instance, Martin Kasindorf and Judy Keen’s interview
with Moore, “Fahrenheit 9/11: Will It
Change Any Voter’s Mind?” USA Today,
June 24, 2004. Available at:
www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-06-24-fahrenheit-cover_x.htm
(accessed October 15, 2010).
(5)
See for example Brendon O’Connor and Martin Griffiths, eds,
The Rise of Anti-Americanism (New
York: Routledge, 2005), and Brendon O’Connor, ed., Anti-Americanism (Oxford: Greenwood, 2007),
a four-volume set collecting academic writing as well as original source
material on anti-Americanism. Other examples of such texts are discussed
in Part III.
(6)
In the wake of 9/11, an enormous number of books have been
written assessing the status of US power – its decline, continuation, or
rise, or its legitimacy or illegitimacy – with respect to competitor
regions or nations. In English alone, a full list would run in the
hundreds – enough to create a new genre of books that cut across
political science, international relations, advice manuals for foreign
policy makers, and pop-psychology at a national level. This includes
titles such as: Robert Cooper, The Breaking of
Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (New
York: Atlantic Books, 2004); Richard Crockatt, After 9/11: Cultural Dimensions of American Global Power
(New York: Routledge, 2007); Robert Kagan, The
Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf,
2008); Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds, Worlds in
Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002); Ivo Daalder and James D. Lindsay,
America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in
Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 2003); Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers
Rise (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Stefan
Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The
Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert Harvey, Global Disorder: America and the Threat of World
Conflict (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003); Michael
Hirsh, At War with Ourselves: Why America Is
Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003); Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded
Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2007); G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Andrew Kohut and Bruce
Stokes, America against the World: How We Are
Different and Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books,
2006); Charles Kupchan, The End of the American
Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first
Century (New York: Knopf, 2002); Anatol Lieven and John
Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s
Role in the World (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Kishore
Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of Innocence:
Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World (New York:
Public Affairs, 2005); Robert W. Merry, Sands of
Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of
Global Ambition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005);
Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome?: The Fall of an
Empire and the Fate of America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 2007); Ralph Peters, New Glory: Expanding
America’s Global Supremacy (New York: Penguin, 2005);
Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s
Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American
Dream (New York: Penguin, 2004); Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in
the World (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux,
2007); Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower?: The Rise of Europe and Its
Challenge to the United States (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2007); Nancy Soderberg, The
Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005); and Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S.
Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005).
(7)
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2000).
(8)
See Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling,” New Left Review 32 (2005): 23–80 and
New Left Review 33 (2005):
83–116; David Harvey, The New
Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and
Neil Smith, The Endgame of
Globalization (New York: Routledge,
2005).
(9)
See Niall Ferguson, Empire: The
Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons of Global
Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003) and Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire
(New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
(10)
The US share of global GDP declined to 27.7 percent in 2006
from 30.8 percent in 2000. See www.data360.org for
figures (accessed October 15, 2010).
(11)
In addition to those texts listed in note 6 above, see Dan
Diner and Sander L. Gilman, America in the Eyes
of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism, trans.
Allison Brown (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996); J. L. Granatstein,
Yankee Go Home? Canadians and
Anti-Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996); Denis
Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toine, eds, The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of
French Perception (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990);
and “What We Think of America,” special edition of Granta 77 (Spring 2002), which includes
articles by Ariel Dorfman, Michael Ignatieff, Ivan Klíma, Doris Lessing,
Orhan Pamuk, Harold Pinter, J. M. Coetzee, and
others.
(12)
See Russell A. Berman, Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem (New
York: Hoover Institution Press, 2004); and Ian Buruma and Avishai
Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of
Its Enemies (New York: Penguin,
2004).
(13)
For example, see Christopher Connery, “On the Continuing
Necessity of Anti-Americanism,” Inter-Asia
Cultural Studies 2.3 (2001): 399–405; and Andrew Ross and
Kristin Ross, Anti-Americanism (New
York: New York University Press, 2004).
(14)
The 2011 Budget Request for the US Office of Homeland
Security is $54.7 billion. To track the growth in expenditures,
see the documents collected on Whitehouse’s Office of Management and
Budget website:
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ (accessed
October 27, 2010).
(15)
For example, such influential texts as Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983;
rev. edn, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and
Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983);
Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since
1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986).
(16)
Daniele Archibugi has made an argument for a “cosmopolitical
democracy” that would maintain the existing system of states while
creating a new global democratic structure in which the planet’s
populace could cast ballots and elect those who control the
supranational functions currently carried out by organizations such as
the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. See Archibugi,
“Cosmopolitical Democracy,” in Archibugi, ed., Debating Cosmopolitics (New York: Verso, 2003),
1–15.
(17)
For an overview of theories of globalization, see Imre
Szeman, “Globalization,” Encyclopedia of
Postcolonial Studies, ed. John Hawley (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2001), 209–217; and “Globalization,” The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and
Criticism, ed. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and
Imre Szeman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005),
458–465.
(18)
Roland Robertson, Globalization:
Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992);
and Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions in Globalization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
(19)
Amongst the most powerful of these deflationary accounts of
the claims of globalization – especially with respect to the idea of a
global economy – is Paul Hirst and Graeme Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1999).
(20)
Francis Fukuyama, The End of
History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press,
1992), 4.
(21)
Robert Kagan, The Return of History
and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf,
2008).
(22)
Kagan, Return of History,
3.
(23)
Ibid., 5.
(24)
Ibid., 12.
(25)
Ibid., 97.
(26)
Text and video of Obama’s Berlin speech can be found on-line
at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/berlinvideo/
(accessed October 28, 2010).
(27)
Barack Obama, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2009 – Presentation
Speech.” Nobelprize.org. 13 Sep 2010. Available at:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/presentation-speech.html
(accessed October 28, 2010).
(28)
The full transcript of Obama’s speech at the West Point
Military Academy on December 1, 2009, can be found at:
www.stripes.com/
news/transcript-of-president-obama-s-speech-at-west-point-1.96961
(accessed October 28, 2010).
(29)
Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, “The Three Trillion Dollar
War,” London Times, February 23,
2008. Available at: www.timesonline.co.
uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece.
(30)
Richard Florida, The Rise of the
Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
69.
(31)
Pierre Bourdieu, On
Television (New York: New Press, 1999),
6.
(32)
Franco Moretti, “New York Times
Obituaries,” New Left Review 2 (2000):
105.
(33)
J. H. von Herder, Outlines of a
Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. T. Churchill
(London, 1800), 166.
(34)
Theodor Adorno, “On the Question: ‘What is German?,’”
Critical Models: Interventions and
Catchwords, trans. H. W. Pickford (New York: Columbia
University Press), 205.
(35)
For information on its activities, see
www.repohistory.org (accessed October 28,
2010).
(36)
See two recent additions to an ever-expanding field of
books: George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Justin Fox,
The Myth of The Rational
Market (New York: Collins Business,
2009).
(37)
See Emmanul Saez, “Striking It Richer: Evolution of Top
Incomes in the United States.” Available at: http://www.elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2006prel.pdf (accessed October 28, 2010).
Saez has written a number of influential papers on this topic with
Thomas Piketty.
(38)
Leonard Cohen, “Everybody Knows,” I’m Your Man. Columbia,
1988.
(39)
Yevgeny Zamyatin, We,
trans. Natasha Randall (New York: Modern Library, 2006). The
reference is to the activities of R-13, a poet in One State, and his
method of approaching his craft.
الفصل الثاني: حدود الليبرالية
(1)
Wendy Brown, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal
Democracy,” Theory & Event 7,
no. 1 (2003): para. 9.
(2)
Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy,
Then as Farce (New York: Verso, 2009),
5.
(3)
Robert Kagan, The Return of History
and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008),
3.
(4)
Kagan, Return of
History, 97.
(5)
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American
World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008),
xx.
(6)
Zakaria, Post-American
World, 36.
(7)
Ibid., 70.
(8)
Ibid., 78.
(9)
Ibid.
(10)
Ibid., 218.
(11)
Kagan, Return of
History, 81-82.
(12)
Sarika Chandra, Dislocalism: The
Crisis of Globalization and the Remobilizing of
Americanism, unpublished
manuscript.
(13)
We take the phrase in the title from Jamie Peck’s excellent,
“The Creativity Fix,” Eurozine, June
28, 2007: www.eurozine.com/articles/
2007-06-28-peck-en.html (accessed October 29, 2010).
Originally published in Fronesis 24
(2007).
(14)
Karl Marx, “The German Ideology: Part 1,” The Marx–Engels Reader, ed. Robert
C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978),
160.
(15)
David Brooks, Bobos in
Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got
There (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001),
10.
(16)
See The Flight of the Creative
Class (New York: Harper Business 2005), in which he
examines the global competition of states and cities to attract members
of this class; Cities and the Creative
Class (New York: Routledge 2004), which constitutes an
elaboration of his description of the communities creative workers are
attracted to and in which they flourish; and Who’s Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live
the Most Important Decision of Your Life (New York: Basic
Books, 2008), which puts his analysis to use in the form of a city guide
for members of the creative class.
(17)
Though the CCNC predates Florida’s books, its growth and
expansion since becoming a not-for-profit organization in 2002 has been
enabled by the spread of the idea that city spending on culture supports
economic development. The CCNC acts as advocate of and clearinghouse for
ideas linking culture and economic development. For example, the January
2010 Creative City News reports on the investment of $5 million
by the City of Woodstock in the creation of a new art gallery; the
December 2009 newsletter includes stories on urban investments in
culture in places such as Barrie and Collingwood, ON, Halifax, NS, and
Barrie, ON.
(18)
Governments across the world have in recent years produced
planning strategies for their cultural sector in relation to its
economic impact, or have developed new departments of government to
manage the economics of culture. To give a few examples: Winnipeg is
concluding its year as Cultural Capital of Canada with the production of
an arts and culture strategy document, “Ticket
to the Future: The Economic Impact of the Arts and
Creative Industries in Winnipeg.” In the UK, the Creative &
Cultural Skills unit of the national government announced £1.3 million
to create 200 culture jobs for young people claiming unemployment
benefits, including positions “such as theatre technician, costume and
wardrobe assistant, community arts officer and business administrator.”
See www.thestage.co.uk/news/newsstory.
php/26804/government-announces-13-million-fund (accessed
October 29, 2010).
The action is just as great on the international level. Numerous international conferences focus on culture and economics, such as the annual Culturelink Conference (the third meeting of which was held in Zagreb, Croatia, in 2009) and the World Summit on the Arts (the fourth meeting held in Johannesburg in 2009). The recently released report of the Commonwealth Group on Culture and Development, a body established in 2009, links the achievement of development goals with the support of culture. And UNESCO’s November 2009 World Report, “Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue,” warns governments against cutting funding to culture during the current financial crisis, not just because it will impact on the issues contained in the report’s title, but because such fiscal cost saving will have a deep impact on any possible financial recovery.
(19)
See Florida’s review of Thomas Friedman’s The World is Flat, “The World is Spiky,”
Atlantic Monthly (October 2005):
48–51.
(20)
Richard Florida, The Rise of the
Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
260.
(21)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, 250.
(22)
Ibid., 4.
(23)
Ibid., 31.
(24)
Ibid., 32.
(25)
Ibid., 190–211.
(26)
Ibid., 14.
(27)
Ibid., 320.
(28)
Ibid., 317.
(29)
Ibid., 37. The quotation Florida includes here is
unattributed.
(30)
Ibid., 69.
(31)
Ibid., xiii. The number of times this claim is asserted is
too frequent to cite, but take for instance statements such as these at
opposite ends of the book: “Today’s economy is fundamentally a Creative
Economy” (44) and “creativity is the fundamental source of economic
growth” (317).
(32)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, 21.
(33)
The critical importance of tolerance to managing the
perpetuation of hegemony appears in numerous works in the genre of
popular books on current affairs. See, for example, Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global
Dominance – and Why They Fall (New York: Doubleday
2007).
(34)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, xiii.
(35)
Ibid., xiii.
(36)
Ibid., 23.
(37)
Ibid., 262-263.
(38)
Ibid., 325.
(39)
Mobility is presumed to be a central characteristic of the
Creative Class. They can go wherever they want, which is why cities have
to make certain that they have the appropriate environs to attract them.
Yet even in the case of certain members of the Super-Creative Core, this
mobility is close to a fiction. For example, academics find it extremely
difficult to move; the nature of their work means that they have to
participate in specific kinds of institutions (universities and
colleges) that aren’t found in the same proportion as institutions of
private industry and many of which are located in smaller cities and
towns. There’s a reason why Durham, NC and State College, PA rank highly
on his rankings of creative cities: it’s not because they have
ahugenumberof amenities (art, coffee houses, alternative music, etc.)
that exist outside of work, but because the nature of the institutions
that exist there render large numbers of PhDs (especially relative to
population) immobile.
(40)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, 77.
(41)
Ibid., 88–101.
(42)
See, for instance, Jill Andresky Fraser, White Collar Sweatshop (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2002); Christian Marazzi, The Violence
of Financial Capitalism (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e),
2010); Andrew Ross, Nice Work If You Can Get It:
Life and Labor in Precarious Times (New York: New York
University Press, 2009); Juliet Schor, The
Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure
(New York: Basic Books, 1993); and Tiziana Terranova, “Free Labor:
Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,” Social Text 18, no. 2 (2000):
33–58.
(43)
“The no-collar workplace is not being imposed on us from
above; we are bringing it on ourselves … We do it because as creative
people, it is a central part of who we are or want to be”
(134).
(44)
Peter B€urger, Theory of the
Avant-garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1985), 49.
(45)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, 13.
(46)
Ibid., 201.
(47)
Ibid., 191.
(48)
For an overview of the uses and abuses of creativity, see Rob
Pope’s enormously helpful Creativity: Theory,
History, Practice (New York: Routledge,
2005).
(49)
Florida, Rise of the Creative
Class, 46.
(50)
Andrew Ross, “The Mental Labour Problem,” Social Text 63 (2000):
6.
(51)
Ibid., 11.
(52)
Paul Krugman, The Return of
Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: W.
W. Norton & Co 2009), 24.
(53)
Section 2 of Hardt and Negri’s Multitude (New York: Penguin, 2004) remains the most
useful and compelling description of the long emergence of the common in
and under capitalism.
(54)
“There is an aesthetic base component in human nature.” Paolo
Virno, “The Dismeasure of Art. An Interview with Paolo Virno,” Open 17 (2009). Available at:
www.skor.nl/article-4178-nl.html?lang=en (accessed
October 29, 2010).
(55)
See Antonio Negri, Insurgencies:
Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia
Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2005).
(56)
The single reference to globalization in The Great Reset confirms that his ideas
about creativity and innovation are situated within its general
parameters: “As globalization has increased the financial return on
innovation (by widening the consumer market), the pull of innovative
places, which are already dense with highly talented workers, has only
grown stronger.” Florida, The Great
Reset (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2010),
152.
(57)
Friedman’s books to date are From
Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor, 1989); The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding
Globalization (New York: Anchor, 2000); Longitudes and Attitudes (New York: Anchor,
2002); The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the
Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2005); and Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why
We Need a Green Revolution – and How It Can Renew America
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).
(58)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree, 7.
(59)
Ibid., 9.
(60)
Ibid., 9.
(61)
Friedman, The World Is
Flat, 9.
(62)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree, 7.
(63)
David Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural
Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
(64)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree, ix.
(65)
Ibid., 109.
(66)
Karl Marx, “The German Ideology: Part 1,” The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C.
Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 172.
(67)
See David Bell’s “Does This Man Deserve Tenure?” The New Republic, September 6, 2010. Bell
criticizes the holes and gaps that exist in MarkC. Taylor’s Crisis of Campus: A Bold Plan for Reforming Our
Colleges and Universities. The problem? The deformations
and mutations of ideas as they grow froman 800-word op-ed piece into a
50 000-word book. He writes, “far from reinforcing the original logic
and evidence, the new accretions of text only strain them further, while
smothering the original provocations under thick layers of padded
anecdote, pop sociology and oracular pronouncement. Call the syndrome
Friedmanitis, after aprominent early victim, the New York Times columnist Tom Friedman.” Friedmanitis is
possible only through rapid and unending appeals to common sense.
Available at:
www.tnr.com/book/review/marktaylor-crisis-campus-colleges-universities
(accessed November 1, 2010).
(68)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive
Tree, 30.
(69)
Ibid., 31.
(70)
Lionel Gossman. “Anecdote and History,” History and Theory 42 (2003):
167-168.
(71)
Joel Fineman, “The History of the Anecdote,” in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser
(New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 49–76. Fineman goes onto write,
“The anecdote produces the effect of the real, the occurrence of
contingency, by establishing an event within and yet without the framing
context of historical successivity.” Gossman also quotes this on pp.
163-164 of his essay.
(72)
Bertolt Brecht, “Anecdotes of Mr. Keuner,” Tales from the Calendar, trans. Yvonne Kapp
and Michael Hamburger (London: Methuen & Co., 1961),
110–124.
(73)
Brecht, “Anecdotes of Mr. Keuner,”
121-122.
(74)
Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 8th edn
(Boston: Addison Wesley, 2008).
(75)
The two papers usually cited as the first elaborations of
Krugman’s “new trade theory” and “new economic geography” are,
respectively, “Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and
International Trade,” Journal of International
Economics 9.4 (1979): 469–479, and “Increasing Returns
and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political
Economy 99.2 (1991): 483–499.
(76)
“Enemies of the WTO: Bogus Arguments Against the World Trade
Organization,” The Great Unraveling
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004),
367–372.
(77)
Paul Krugman, “Global Schmobal,” The
Great Unraveling: Losing Our Way in the New Century (New
York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 367-368.
(78)
Ibid., 370.
(79)
Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a
Liberal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009),
265.
(80)
Krugman, Conscience of a
Liberal, 4.
(81)
Ibid., 4.
(82)
Ibid., 6.
(83)
Ibid., 7.
(84)
Ibid., 7.
(85)
Ibid., 10-11.
(86)
Ibid., 145.
(87)
Ibid., 163.
(88)
Ibid., 172.
(89)
Ibid., 182.
(90)
Ibid., 193.
(91)
Ibid., 115.
(92)
Ibid., x.
(93)
Paul Krugman, The Return of
Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009),
133.
(94)
Krugman, Return of Depression
Economics, 10.
(95)
Ibid., 14.
(96)
Ibid., 102.
(97)
Ibid., 163.
(98)
Ibid., 136.
(99)
Ibid., 186.
(100)
Ibid., 103.
(101)
Ibid., 113.
(102)
Ibid., 114.
(103)
Ibid., 118.
(104)
“Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive,
the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come,
can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge
to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities.” John Maynard Keynes, General
Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London:
Macmillan, 1936), 161. See also Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Finance Capitalism (New
York: Semiotext(e), 2010), especially chapter 4.
(105)
Robert Kurz, “World Power and World-Money: The Economic
Function of the US Military-Machine within Global Capitalism and the
Background of the New Financial Crisis,” trans. Imre Szeman and Matt
MacLellan, Mediations 25 no. 1
(2009-2010), forthcoming.
(106)
How might Krugman react to the historicization of economics?
Take, for instance, Immanuel Wallerstein’s description of the roots of
the contemporary organization of academic social science: “From the
dominant liberal ideology of the nineteenth century which argued that
state and market, politics and economics, were analytically separate …
Society was adjured to keep them separate, and scholars studies them
separately. Since there seemed to be many realities that apparently were
neither in the domain of the market [economics] nor in that of the state
[political science], these realities were placed in a residual grab-bag
which took as compensation the grand name of sociology … Finally, since
there were people beyond the realm of the civilized world, … the study
of such people encompasses special rules and special training, which
took on the somewhat polemical name of anthropology.” Immanuel
Wallerstein, The Essential
Wallerstein (New York: New Press, 2000),
133.
(107)
Michael Denning, Culture in
the Age of Three Worlds (New York: Verso, 2004),
27.
(108)
Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at
the Brand Bullies (Toronto: Vintage Canada,
2000).
(109)
Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The
Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Toronto: Vintage Canada,
2008).
(110)
Klein, Shock Doctrine,
4.
(111)
Ibid., 4.
(112)
Ibid., 7.
(113)
Ibid., 7.
(114)
Democracy Now, September
24, 2007, Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein on the
Iraq War, Bush’s Tax Cuts, Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism, and
More. Available at: https://www.democracynow.org/2007/
9/24/alan_greenspan_vs_naomi_klein_on (accessed November 3,
2010).
(115)
Klein, Shock
Doctrine, 24.
(116)
An earlier version of these paragraphs on a “non-moralizing
critique of capitalism” can be found in Cazdyn’s The Already Dead: The New Time of Politics, Culture and
Illness (Durham: Duke University Press,
forthcoming).
(117)
Matt Taibbi, “The Great American Bubble Machine,” Rolling Stone, April 5, 2010; Jeremy
Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s
Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books,
2008).
(118)
This delineation of crisis and disaster is taken from
Cazdyn’s “Disaster, Crisis, Revolution,” in Disastrous Consequences, ed. Eric Cazdyn, South Atlantic Quarterly 106, no. 4 (2007):
647–662.
(119)
WikiLeaks published this “Afghan War Diary” or, as the
archive is also called, “The War Logs,” on July 25, 2010. Prior to
releasing these documents on its web site, WikiLeaks made the records
available to the Guardian, the
New York Times, and Der Spiegel, which published many of the
records on that same day.
(120)
WikiLeaks. Available at:
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About.
(121)
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press
Briefing by Press SecretaryRobert Gibbs,” July 26, 2010. “And, again, I
think it’s – let’s be clear, and Iwant tomake sure that I’m clear onthis
– based on the fact that there’s nothing – there’s no broad new
revelations in this, our concern isn’t that people might know that we’re
concerned about safe havens in Pakistan, or that we’re concerned, as we
are, about civilian casualties. Lord, all you need is a laptop and
amouse to figure that out, or 50 cents or $1.50, depending
onwhichnewspaper you buy. I don’t think that is, in a sense, top secret.
But what generally governs the classification of these documents are
names, operations, personnel, people that are cooperating – all of which
if it’s compromised has a compromising effect on our security.”
Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/pressbriefing-
press-secretary-robert-gibbs-7262010 (accessed November 3,
2010).
(122)
Democracy Now, transcripts
from July 28, 2010.
(123)
Democracy Now,
transcripts from July 28, 2010.
(124)
Democracy Now,
“WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange: ‘Transparent Government Tends
to Produce Just Government,’” July 28, 2010.
https://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/28/wikileaks_founder_julian_
assange_transparent_government (accessed November
3, 2010).
(125)
Estimated by WikiLeak researchers. See Democracy Now, “Julian Assange Responds to
Increasing US Government Attacks on WikiLeaks,” August 3,
2010.
(126)
Klein, Shock Doctrine,
31-32.
(127)
J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A
Study (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1902).
(128)
Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The
Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York: Free
Press, 2005).
(129)
It’s a Wonderful Life,
dir. Frank Capra, Liberty Films, 1946.
(130)
Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated
Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliot (New York: Verso, 2009),
33.
(131)
See Fredric Jameson’s Introduction to Archaeologies of the Future (“Introduction: Utopia
Now”). Jameson writes, “For even if we can no longer adhere with an
unmixed conscience to this unreliable form, we may now have recourse to
that ingenious political slogan Sartre invented to find his way between
a flawed communism and an even more unacceptable anti-communism.”
Archaeologies of the Future (New
York: Verso, 2005), xvi.
الفصل الثالث: الجيل العالمي
(1)
See note 6 in Part I for a representative list of works that
have been published on America and anti-Americanism in the wake of
9/11.
(2)
In Canada, Ronald Wright’s What Is
America? A Short History of the New World Order (Toronto:
Knopf Canada, 2008), an examination of the social and political psyche
of the United States that locates its roots in discovery of the New
World, proved to be an extremely popular text. Philippe Roger, L’Ennemi américain: généalogie de l’antiaméricaine
français (Paris: Seuil, 2002) and Jean-François Revel,
L’obsession anti-américaine
(Paris: Plon, 2002) are examples of post-9/11 work on anti-Americanism
in France.
(3)
See for example Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, eds, Anti-Americanism (New York: New York
University Press, 2004), and Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson, eds,
The Anti-American Century
(Budapest: CEU Press, 2007).
(4)
Harold Pinter, “Nobel Lecture – Literature 2005.”
Nobelprize.org. August 13, 2010:
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/
laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html (accessed November 8,
2010).
(5)
Pinter had described to the press what the general tenor of
his comments at the Nobel ceremonies would be in advance of his
acceptance speech.
(6)
James Traub, “Their Highbrow Hatred of Us,” New York Times Magazine, October 30,
2005.
(7)
Cazdyn develops this point by referring to the work of Masao
Miyoshi and Edward Said in his Introduction to Trespasses: Selected Writings of Masao Miyoshi (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2010), pp. xv–xxxiii.
(8)
Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (New York: Verso,
1983).
(9)
Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy, and
Other Essays (London:NewLeft Books, 1971),
127–186.
(10)
To preserve the anonymity of interview subjects, we
identify these quotations merely by country.
(11)
Alain Badiou, The Communist
Hypothesis (New York: Verso, 2010),
5.
(12)
For a recent discussion of demographic tensions in
Germany, see “Graying Germany Contemplates Demographic Time Bomb,”
Der Spiegel, June 27, 2010,
at:
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,697085,00.html
(accessed November 8, 2010).
(13)
For a discussion of the social tensions raised by the
flying of the German flag during the 2010 World Cup, see Kevin
Hagen, “Immigrants Defend the Flag While Left-Wing Germans Tear It
Down,” Der Spiegel, June 29,
2010, at: www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/0,1518,703533,00.html (accessed November 8,
2010). Similar anxieties appeared as a result of the flag waving
that accompanied the success of the German national team during the
2006 World Cup in Germany. See Michael Sontheimer, “How Germans
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Flag,” Der Spiegel, June 29, 2006, at: www.
spiegel.de/international/0,1518,424373,00.html
(accessed November 8, 2010).
الخاتمة: «لا تسألَنَّ عن السبب!»
(1)
Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno, “Something’s Missing: A
Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the
Contradictions of Utopian Longing,” in Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature:
Selected Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank
Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998),
14.
(2)
Guy Debord, Society of the
Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zones
Books, 1994).
(3)
Slavoj Žižek, “Nobody has to be vile,” London Review of Books 28, no. 7 (April 6, 2006):
10.
(4)
For an exception to this general trend in media coverage of Bill
Gates’s and Warren Buffett’s “Giving Pledge,” see “Negative Reaction to
Charity Campaign: German Millionaires Criticize Gates’ ‘Giving Pledge,’”
Der Spiegel, August 10, 2010.
Available at:
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,710972,00.html
(accessed November 8, 2010).
(5)
Paul Krugman, “The Curious Politics of Immigration,” The
Conscience of a Liberal Blog (NY Times),
April 26, 2010. Available at:
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/the-curious-politicsof-
immigration/ (accessed November 8,
2010).
(6)
Nicholas Brown, “Hegel for Marxists (and Marxism for Everyone),”
unpublished paper.
(7)
For a more detailed analysis, see Imre Szeman, “‘Do No Evil’:
Google and Evil as a Political Category,” Topia:
Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 18 (2007):
131–139.
(8)
Fredric Jameson has suggested that “the most radical demand to
make on our own system … [is] the demand for full employment, universal full
employment around the globe” (37). What such a demand reveals starkly is the
shape and character of political and economic structures that render any
such demand unrealizable. The possibility for all individuals to engage in
productive social labor simply cannot
happen because of the structural need for a reserve army of labor, which
takes distinct forms in different parts of the world. Jameson’s point here,
as in much of his writing on utopia, is that because so basic a right cannot
be realized, a political opening is possible: a demand for a “society
structurally distinct from this one in every conceivable way, from the
psychological to the sociological, from the cultural to the political” (37).
Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia,” New Left
Review 25 (2004): 35–54.
(9)
Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral
Sense,” Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language, ed. and trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and
David J. Parent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989),
251.
(10)
Bloch and Adorno, “Something’s Missing,”
1–17.
(11)
Ibid., 1.
(12)
Bloch in ibid., 3-4.
(13)
Adorno in ibid., 11.
(14)
Adorno in ibid., 13.
(15)
Ibid., 15.
(16)
Bloch in ibid., 7.
(17)
“Aber etwas fehlt,” though translated as “But it won’t quite do”
and “But they won’t quite do” in Bertolt Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the
City of Mahagonny,” in Bertolt Brecht: Collected
Plays, vol. 2, part 3, ed. John Willett and Ralph Mannheim
(London: Eyre Methuen, 1979), 19. The title of Scene 8 is “Seek and ye shall
not find.”
(18)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,”
20.
(19)
Theodor W. Adorno, “Mahagonny,” in The
Weimar Republic Source book, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and
Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 588.
First published as “Mahagonny,” Musikblätter des
Anbruch 14 (February-March 1932):
12–15.
(20)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,”
20.
(21)
Ibid., 63-64.
(22)
Lydia Goehr, “Hardboiled Disillusionment: Mahagonny as the Last Culinary Opera,” Cultural Critique 68 (2008):
4-5.
(23)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(24)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(25)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,”
24.
(26)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(27)
Bloch and Adorno, “Something’s Missing,”
12.
