ملاحظات

الفصل الأول: نهاية العولمة

(1)
For examples of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s comments on world literature (Weltliteratur) see “Some Passages Pertaining to the Concept of World Literature,” in Comparative Literature: The Early Years: An Anthology of Essays, ed. H-J. Schulz and P. Rhein (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 1–11.
(2)
For most recent figures on comparative levels of military expenditure around the world, see figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which are available on its website: http://milexdata.sipri.org/ (accessed October 15, 2010). In 2009, US military spending measured as a percentage of global spending was 43 percent.
(3)
The figure usually cited for box office receipts for Fahrenheit 9/11 is US$119.2 million. See note in Michael Cieply, “Muscular ‘Expendables’ Enlivens Battle for Studio,” New York Times, August 16, 2010. Available at: http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/muscular-expendables-enlivens-battle-for-studio/ (accessed October 15, 2010).
(4)
Moore told the media on several occasions that he hoped that the film would influence the outcome of the 2004 US presidential election. See, for instance, Martin Kasindorf and Judy Keen’s interview with Moore, “Fahrenheit 9/11: Will It Change Any Voter’s Mind?” USA Today, June 24, 2004. Available at: www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/president/2004-06-24-fahrenheit-cover_x.htm (accessed October 15, 2010).
(5)
See for example Brendon O’Connor and Martin Griffiths, eds, The Rise of Anti-Americanism (New York: Routledge, 2005), and Brendon O’Connor, ed., Anti-Americanism (Oxford: Greenwood, 2007), a four-volume set collecting academic writing as well as original source material on anti-Americanism. Other examples of such texts are discussed in Part III.
(6)
In the wake of 9/11, an enormous number of books have been written assessing the status of US power – its decline, continuation, or rise, or its legitimacy or illegitimacy – with respect to competitor regions or nations. In English alone, a full list would run in the hundreds – enough to create a new genre of books that cut across political science, international relations, advice manuals for foreign policy makers, and pop-psychology at a national level. This includes titles such as: Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Atlantic Books, 2004); Richard Crockatt, After 9/11: Cultural Dimensions of American Global Power (New York: Routledge, 2007); Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds, Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002); Ivo Daalder and James D. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert Harvey, Global Disorder: America and the Threat of World Conflict (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003); Michael Hirsh, At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Michael H. Hunt, The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); G. John Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books, 2006); Charles Kupchan, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century (New York: Knopf, 2002); Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Kishore Mahbubani, Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Robert W. Merry, Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005); Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome?: The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007); Ralph Peters, New Glory: Expanding America’s Global Supremacy (New York: Penguin, 2005); Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream (New York: Penguin, 2004); Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2007); Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca, The Next Superpower?: The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); Nancy Soderberg, The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005); and Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: Norton, 2005).
(7)
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
(8)
See Giovanni Arrighi, “Hegemony Unravelling,” New Left Review 32 (2005): 23–80 and New Left Review 33 (2005): 83–116; David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Neil Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2005).
(9)
See Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003) and Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
(10)
The US share of global GDP declined to 27.7 percent in 2006 from 30.8 percent in 2000. See www.data360.org for figures (accessed October 15, 2010).
(11)
In addition to those texts listed in note 6 above, see Dan Diner and Sander L. Gilman, America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on Anti-Americanism, trans. Allison Brown (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996); J. L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996); Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toine, eds, The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); and “What We Think of America,” special edition of Granta 77 (Spring 2002), which includes articles by Ariel Dorfman, Michael Ignatieff, Ivan Klíma, Doris Lessing, Orhan Pamuk, Harold Pinter, J. M. Coetzee, and others.
(12)
See Russell A. Berman, Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem (New York: Hoover Institution Press, 2004); and Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (New York: Penguin, 2004).
(13)
For example, see Christopher Connery, “On the Continuing Necessity of Anti-Americanism,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 2.3 (2001): 399–405; and Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, Anti-Americanism (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
(14)
The 2011 Budget Request for the US Office of Homeland Security is $54.7 billion. To track the growth in expenditures, see the documents collected on Whitehouse’s Office of Management and Budget website: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ (accessed October 27, 2010).
(15)
For example, such influential texts as Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983; rev. edn, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
(16)
Daniele Archibugi has made an argument for a “cosmopolitical democracy” that would maintain the existing system of states while creating a new global democratic structure in which the planet’s populace could cast ballots and elect those who control the supranational functions currently carried out by organizations such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. See Archibugi, “Cosmopolitical Democracy,” in Archibugi, ed., Debating Cosmopolitics (New York: Verso, 2003), 1–15.
(17)
For an overview of theories of globalization, see Imre Szeman, “Globalization,” Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies, ed. John Hawley (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 209–217; and “Globalization,” The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 458–465.
(18)
Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992); and Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions in Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
(19)
Amongst the most powerful of these deflationary accounts of the claims of globalization – especially with respect to the idea of a global economy – is Paul Hirst and Graeme Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
(20)
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 4.
(21)
Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008).
(22)
Kagan, Return of History, 3.
(23)
Ibid., 5.
(24)
Ibid., 12.
(25)
Ibid., 97.
(26)
Text and video of Obama’s Berlin speech can be found on-line at http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/berlinvideo/ (accessed October 28, 2010).
(27)
Barack Obama, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2009 – Presentation Speech.” Nobelprize.org. 13 Sep 2010. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/presentation-speech.html (accessed October 28, 2010).
(28)
The full transcript of Obama’s speech at the West Point Military Academy on December 1, 2009, can be found at: www.stripes.com/ news/transcript-of-president-obama-s-speech-at-west-point-1.96961 (accessed October 28, 2010).
(29)
Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, “The Three Trillion Dollar War,” London Times, February 23, 2008. Available at: www.timesonline.co. uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece.
(30)
Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 69.
(31)
Pierre Bourdieu, On Television (New York: New Press, 1999), 6.
(32)
Franco Moretti, “New York Times Obituaries,” New Left Review 2 (2000): 105.
(33)
J. H. von Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. T. Churchill (London, 1800), 166.
(34)
Theodor Adorno, “On the Question: ‘What is German?,’” Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. H. W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press), 205.
(35)
For information on its activities, see www.repohistory.org (accessed October 28, 2010).
(36)
See two recent additions to an ever-expanding field of books: George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Justin Fox, The Myth of The Rational Market (New York: Collins Business, 2009).
(37)
See Emmanul Saez, “Striking It Richer: Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States.” Available at: http://www.elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2006prel.pdf (accessed October 28, 2010). Saez has written a number of influential papers on this topic with Thomas Piketty.
(38)
Leonard Cohen, “Everybody Knows,” I’m Your Man. Columbia, 1988.
(39)
Yevgeny Zamyatin, We, trans. Natasha Randall (New York: Modern Library, 2006). The reference is to the activities of R-13, a poet in One State, and his method of approaching his craft.

الفصل الثاني: حدود الليبرالية

(1)
Wendy Brown, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory & Event 7, no. 1 (2003): para. 9.
(2)
Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (New York: Verso, 2009), 5.
(3)
Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (New York: Knopf, 2008), 3.
(4)
Kagan, Return of History, 97.
(5)
Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), xx.
(6)
Zakaria, Post-American World, 36.
(7)
Ibid., 70.
(8)
Ibid., 78.
(9)
Ibid.
(10)
Ibid., 218.
(11)
Kagan, Return of History, 81-82.
(12)
Sarika Chandra, Dislocalism: The Crisis of Globalization and the Remobilizing of Americanism, unpublished manuscript.
(13)
We take the phrase in the title from Jamie Peck’s excellent, “The Creativity Fix,” Eurozine, June 28, 2007: www.eurozine.com/articles/ 2007-06-28-peck-en.html (accessed October 29, 2010). Originally published in Fronesis 24 (2007).
(14)
Karl Marx, “The German Ideology: Part 1,” The Marx–Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 160.
(15)
David Brooks, Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 10.
(16)
See The Flight of the Creative Class (New York: Harper Business 2005), in which he examines the global competition of states and cities to attract members of this class; Cities and the Creative Class (New York: Routledge 2004), which constitutes an elaboration of his description of the communities creative workers are attracted to and in which they flourish; and Who’s Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life (New York: Basic Books, 2008), which puts his analysis to use in the form of a city guide for members of the creative class.
(17)
Though the CCNC predates Florida’s books, its growth and expansion since becoming a not-for-profit organization in 2002 has been enabled by the spread of the idea that city spending on culture supports economic development. The CCNC acts as advocate of and clearinghouse for ideas linking culture and economic development. For example, the January 2010 Creative City News reports on the investment of $5 million by the City of Woodstock in the creation of a new art gallery; the December 2009 newsletter includes stories on urban investments in culture in places such as Barrie and Collingwood, ON, Halifax, NS, and Barrie, ON.
(18)
Governments across the world have in recent years produced planning strategies for their cultural sector in relation to its economic impact, or have developed new departments of government to manage the economics of culture. To give a few examples: Winnipeg is concluding its year as Cultural Capital of Canada with the production of an arts and culture strategy document, “Ticket to the Future: The Economic Impact of the Arts and Creative Industries in Winnipeg.” In the UK, the Creative & Cultural Skills unit of the national government announced £1.3 million to create 200 culture jobs for young people claiming unemployment benefits, including positions “such as theatre technician, costume and wardrobe assistant, community arts officer and business administrator.” See www.thestage.co.uk/news/newsstory. php/26804/government-announces-13-million-fund (accessed October 29, 2010).
The action is just as great on the international level. Numerous international conferences focus on culture and economics, such as the annual Culturelink Conference (the third meeting of which was held in Zagreb, Croatia, in 2009) and the World Summit on the Arts (the fourth meeting held in Johannesburg in 2009). The recently released report of the Commonwealth Group on Culture and Development, a body established in 2009, links the achievement of development goals with the support of culture. And UNESCO’s November 2009 World Report, “Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue,” warns governments against cutting funding to culture during the current financial crisis, not just because it will impact on the issues contained in the report’s title, but because such fiscal cost saving will have a deep impact on any possible financial recovery.
(19)
See Florida’s review of Thomas Friedman’s The World is Flat, “The World is Spiky,” Atlantic Monthly (October 2005): 48–51.
(20)
Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 260.
(21)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, 250.
(22)
Ibid., 4.
(23)
Ibid., 31.
(24)
Ibid., 32.
(25)
Ibid., 190–211.
(26)
Ibid., 14.
(27)
Ibid., 320.
(28)
Ibid., 317.
(29)
Ibid., 37. The quotation Florida includes here is unattributed.
(30)
Ibid., 69.
(31)
Ibid., xiii. The number of times this claim is asserted is too frequent to cite, but take for instance statements such as these at opposite ends of the book: “Today’s economy is fundamentally a Creative Economy” (44) and “creativity is the fundamental source of economic growth” (317).
(32)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, 21.
(33)
The critical importance of tolerance to managing the perpetuation of hegemony appears in numerous works in the genre of popular books on current affairs. See, for example, Amy Chua, Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and Why They Fall (New York: Doubleday 2007).
(34)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, xiii.
(35)
Ibid., xiii.
(36)
Ibid., 23.
(37)
Ibid., 262-263.
(38)
Ibid., 325.
(39)
Mobility is presumed to be a central characteristic of the Creative Class. They can go wherever they want, which is why cities have to make certain that they have the appropriate environs to attract them. Yet even in the case of certain members of the Super-Creative Core, this mobility is close to a fiction. For example, academics find it extremely difficult to move; the nature of their work means that they have to participate in specific kinds of institutions (universities and colleges) that aren’t found in the same proportion as institutions of private industry and many of which are located in smaller cities and towns. There’s a reason why Durham, NC and State College, PA rank highly on his rankings of creative cities: it’s not because they have ahugenumberof amenities (art, coffee houses, alternative music, etc.) that exist outside of work, but because the nature of the institutions that exist there render large numbers of PhDs (especially relative to population) immobile.
(40)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, 77.
(41)
Ibid., 88–101.
(42)
See, for instance, Jill Andresky Fraser, White Collar Sweatshop (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002); Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Financial Capitalism (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2010); Andrew Ross, Nice Work If You Can Get It: Life and Labor in Precarious Times (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Juliet Schor, The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure (New York: Basic Books, 1993); and Tiziana Terranova, “Free Labor: Producing Culture for the Digital Economy,” Social Text 18, no. 2 (2000): 33–58.
(43)
“The no-collar workplace is not being imposed on us from above; we are bringing it on ourselves … We do it because as creative people, it is a central part of who we are or want to be” (134).
(44)
Peter B€urger, Theory of the Avant-garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 49.
(45)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, 13.
(46)
Ibid., 201.
(47)
Ibid., 191.
(48)
For an overview of the uses and abuses of creativity, see Rob Pope’s enormously helpful Creativity: Theory, History, Practice (New York: Routledge, 2005).
(49)
Florida, Rise of the Creative Class, 46.
(50)
Andrew Ross, “The Mental Labour Problem,” Social Text 63 (2000): 6.
(51)
Ibid., 11.
(52)
Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co 2009), 24.
(53)
Section 2 of Hardt and Negri’s Multitude (New York: Penguin, 2004) remains the most useful and compelling description of the long emergence of the common in and under capitalism.
(54)
“There is an aesthetic base component in human nature.” Paolo Virno, “The Dismeasure of Art. An Interview with Paolo Virno,” Open 17 (2009). Available at: www.skor.nl/article-4178-nl.html?lang=en (accessed October 29, 2010).
(55)
See Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
(56)
The single reference to globalization in The Great Reset confirms that his ideas about creativity and innovation are situated within its general parameters: “As globalization has increased the financial return on innovation (by widening the consumer market), the pull of innovative places, which are already dense with highly talented workers, has only grown stronger.” Florida, The Great Reset (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2010), 152.
(57)
Friedman’s books to date are From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor, 1989); The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Anchor, 2000); Longitudes and Attitudes (New York: Anchor, 2002); The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); and Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution – and How It Can Renew America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).
(58)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 7.
(59)
Ibid., 9.
(60)
Ibid., 9.
(61)
Friedman, The World Is Flat, 9.
(62)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 7.
(63)
David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
(64)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, ix.
(65)
Ibid., 109.
(66)
Karl Marx, “The German Ideology: Part 1,” The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), 172.
(67)
See David Bell’s “Does This Man Deserve Tenure?” The New Republic, September 6, 2010. Bell criticizes the holes and gaps that exist in MarkC. Taylor’s Crisis of Campus: A Bold Plan for Reforming Our Colleges and Universities. The problem? The deformations and mutations of ideas as they grow froman 800-word op-ed piece into a 50 000-word book. He writes, “far from reinforcing the original logic and evidence, the new accretions of text only strain them further, while smothering the original provocations under thick layers of padded anecdote, pop sociology and oracular pronouncement. Call the syndrome Friedmanitis, after aprominent early victim, the New York Times columnist Tom Friedman.” Friedmanitis is possible only through rapid and unending appeals to common sense. Available at: www.tnr.com/book/review/marktaylor-crisis-campus-colleges-universities (accessed November 1, 2010).
(68)
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 30.
(69)
Ibid., 31.
(70)
Lionel Gossman. “Anecdote and History,” History and Theory 42 (2003): 167-168.
(71)
Joel Fineman, “The History of the Anecdote,” in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram Veeser (New York and London: Routledge, 1989), 49–76. Fineman goes onto write, “The anecdote produces the effect of the real, the occurrence of contingency, by establishing an event within and yet without the framing context of historical successivity.” Gossman also quotes this on pp. 163-164 of his essay.
(72)
Bertolt Brecht, “Anecdotes of Mr. Keuner,” Tales from the Calendar, trans. Yvonne Kapp and Michael Hamburger (London: Methuen & Co., 1961), 110–124.
(73)
Brecht, “Anecdotes of Mr. Keuner,” 121-122.
(74)
Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 8th edn (Boston: Addison Wesley, 2008).
(75)
The two papers usually cited as the first elaborations of Krugman’s “new trade theory” and “new economic geography” are, respectively, “Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition, and International Trade,” Journal of International Economics 9.4 (1979): 469–479, and “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography,” Journal of Political Economy 99.2 (1991): 483–499.
(76)
“Enemies of the WTO: Bogus Arguments Against the World Trade Organization,” The Great Unraveling (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 367–372.
(77)
Paul Krugman, “Global Schmobal,” The Great Unraveling: Losing Our Way in the New Century (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 367-368.
(78)
Ibid., 370.
(79)
Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 265.
(80)
Krugman, Conscience of a Liberal, 4.
(81)
Ibid., 4.
(82)
Ibid., 6.
(83)
Ibid., 7.
(84)
Ibid., 7.
(85)
Ibid., 10-11.
(86)
Ibid., 145.
(87)
Ibid., 163.
(88)
Ibid., 172.
(89)
Ibid., 182.
(90)
Ibid., 193.
(91)
Ibid., 115.
(92)
Ibid., x.
(93)
Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2009), 133.
(94)
Krugman, Return of Depression Economics, 10.
(95)
Ibid., 14.
(96)
Ibid., 102.
(97)
Ibid., 163.
(98)
Ibid., 136.
(99)
Ibid., 186.
(100)
Ibid., 103.
(101)
Ibid., 113.
(102)
Ibid., 114.
(103)
Ibid., 118.
(104)
“Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936), 161. See also Christian Marazzi, The Violence of Finance Capitalism (New York: Semiotext(e), 2010), especially chapter 4.
(105)
Robert Kurz, “World Power and World-Money: The Economic Function of the US Military-Machine within Global Capitalism and the Background of the New Financial Crisis,” trans. Imre Szeman and Matt MacLellan, Mediations 25 no. 1 (2009-2010), forthcoming.
(106)
How might Krugman react to the historicization of economics? Take, for instance, Immanuel Wallerstein’s description of the roots of the contemporary organization of academic social science: “From the dominant liberal ideology of the nineteenth century which argued that state and market, politics and economics, were analytically separate … Society was adjured to keep them separate, and scholars studies them separately. Since there seemed to be many realities that apparently were neither in the domain of the market [economics] nor in that of the state [political science], these realities were placed in a residual grab-bag which took as compensation the grand name of sociology … Finally, since there were people beyond the realm of the civilized world, … the study of such people encompasses special rules and special training, which took on the somewhat polemical name of anthropology.” Immanuel Wallerstein, The Essential Wallerstein (New York: New Press, 2000), 133.
(107)
Michael Denning, Culture in the Age of Three Worlds (New York: Verso, 2004), 27.
(108)
Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000).
(109)
Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2008).
(110)
Klein, Shock Doctrine, 4.
(111)
Ibid., 4.
(112)
Ibid., 7.
(113)
Ibid., 7.
(114)
Democracy Now, September 24, 2007, Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein on the Iraq War, Bush’s Tax Cuts, Economic Populism, Crony Capitalism, and More. Available at: https://www.democracynow.org/2007/ 9/24/alan_greenspan_vs_naomi_klein_on (accessed November 3, 2010).
(115)
Klein, Shock Doctrine, 24.
(116)
An earlier version of these paragraphs on a “non-moralizing critique of capitalism” can be found in Cazdyn’s The Already Dead: The New Time of Politics, Culture and Illness (Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
(117)
Matt Taibbi, “The Great American Bubble Machine,” Rolling Stone, April 5, 2010; Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York: Nation Books, 2008).
(118)
This delineation of crisis and disaster is taken from Cazdyn’s “Disaster, Crisis, Revolution,” in Disastrous Consequences, ed. Eric Cazdyn, South Atlantic Quarterly 106, no. 4 (2007): 647–662.
(119)
WikiLeaks published this “Afghan War Diary” or, as the archive is also called, “The War Logs,” on July 25, 2010. Prior to releasing these documents on its web site, WikiLeaks made the records available to the Guardian, the New York Times, and Der Spiegel, which published many of the records on that same day.
(120)
WikiLeaks. Available at: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About.
(121)
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Briefing by Press SecretaryRobert Gibbs,” July 26, 2010. “And, again, I think it’s – let’s be clear, and Iwant tomake sure that I’m clear onthis – based on the fact that there’s nothing – there’s no broad new revelations in this, our concern isn’t that people might know that we’re concerned about safe havens in Pakistan, or that we’re concerned, as we are, about civilian casualties. Lord, all you need is a laptop and amouse to figure that out, or 50 cents or $1.50, depending onwhichnewspaper you buy. I don’t think that is, in a sense, top secret. But what generally governs the classification of these documents are names, operations, personnel, people that are cooperating – all of which if it’s compromised has a compromising effect on our security.” Available at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/pressbriefing- press-secretary-robert-gibbs-7262010 (accessed November 3, 2010).
(122)
Democracy Now, transcripts from July 28, 2010.
(123)
Democracy Now, transcripts from July 28, 2010.
(124)
Democracy Now, “WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange: ‘Transparent Government Tends to Produce Just Government,’” July 28, 2010. https://www.democracynow.org/2010/7/28/wikileaks_founder_julian_ assange_transparent_government (accessed November 3, 2010).
(125)
Estimated by WikiLeak researchers. See Democracy Now, “Julian Assange Responds to Increasing US Government Attacks on WikiLeaks,” August 3, 2010.
(126)
Klein, Shock Doctrine, 31-32.
(127)
J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1902).
(128)
Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York: Free Press, 2005).
(129)
It’s a Wonderful Life, dir. Frank Capra, Liberty Films, 1946.
(130)
Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliot (New York: Verso, 2009), 33.
(131)
See Fredric Jameson’s Introduction to Archaeologies of the Future (“Introduction: Utopia Now”). Jameson writes, “For even if we can no longer adhere with an unmixed conscience to this unreliable form, we may now have recourse to that ingenious political slogan Sartre invented to find his way between a flawed communism and an even more unacceptable anti-communism.” Archaeologies of the Future (New York: Verso, 2005), xvi.

الفصل الثالث: الجيل العالمي

(1)
See note 6 in Part I for a representative list of works that have been published on America and anti-Americanism in the wake of 9/11.
(2)
In Canada, Ronald Wright’s What Is America? A Short History of the New World Order (Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2008), an examination of the social and political psyche of the United States that locates its roots in discovery of the New World, proved to be an extremely popular text. Philippe Roger, L’Ennemi américain: généalogie de l’antiaméricaine français (Paris: Seuil, 2002) and Jean-François Revel, L’obsession anti-américaine (Paris: Plon, 2002) are examples of post-9/11 work on anti-Americanism in France.
(3)
See for example Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, eds, Anti-Americanism (New York: New York University Press, 2004), and Ivan Krastev and Alan McPherson, eds, The Anti-American Century (Budapest: CEU Press, 2007).
(4)
Harold Pinter, “Nobel Lecture – Literature 2005.” Nobelprize.org. August 13, 2010: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/ laureates/2005/pinter-lecture-e.html (accessed November 8, 2010).
(5)
Pinter had described to the press what the general tenor of his comments at the Nobel ceremonies would be in advance of his acceptance speech.
(6)
James Traub, “Their Highbrow Hatred of Us,” New York Times Magazine, October 30, 2005.
(7)
Cazdyn develops this point by referring to the work of Masao Miyoshi and Edward Said in his Introduction to Trespasses: Selected Writings of Masao Miyoshi (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. xv–xxxiii.
(8)
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983).
(9)
Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays (London:NewLeft Books, 1971), 127–186.
(10)
To preserve the anonymity of interview subjects, we identify these quotations merely by country.
(11)
Alain Badiou, The Communist Hypothesis (New York: Verso, 2010), 5.
(12)
For a recent discussion of demographic tensions in Germany, see “Graying Germany Contemplates Demographic Time Bomb,” Der Spiegel, June 27, 2010, at: www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,697085,00.html (accessed November 8, 2010).
(13)
For a discussion of the social tensions raised by the flying of the German flag during the 2010 World Cup, see Kevin Hagen, “Immigrants Defend the Flag While Left-Wing Germans Tear It Down,” Der Spiegel, June 29, 2010, at: www.spiegel.de/international/ germany/0,1518,703533,00.html (accessed November 8, 2010). Similar anxieties appeared as a result of the flag waving that accompanied the success of the German national team during the 2006 World Cup in Germany. See Michael Sontheimer, “How Germans Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Flag,” Der Spiegel, June 29, 2006, at: www. spiegel.de/international/0,1518,424373,00.html (accessed November 8, 2010).

الخاتمة: «لا تسألَنَّ عن السبب!»

(1)
Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno, “Something’s Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing,” in Ernst Bloch, The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 14.
(2)
Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zones Books, 1994).
(3)
Slavoj Žižek, “Nobody has to be vile,” London Review of Books 28, no. 7 (April 6, 2006): 10.
(4)
For an exception to this general trend in media coverage of Bill Gates’s and Warren Buffett’s “Giving Pledge,” see “Negative Reaction to Charity Campaign: German Millionaires Criticize Gates’ ‘Giving Pledge,’” Der Spiegel, August 10, 2010. Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,710972,00.html (accessed November 8, 2010).
(5)
Paul Krugman, “The Curious Politics of Immigration,” The Conscience of a Liberal Blog (NY Times), April 26, 2010. Available at: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/the-curious-politicsof- immigration/ (accessed November 8, 2010).
(6)
Nicholas Brown, “Hegel for Marxists (and Marxism for Everyone),” unpublished paper.
(7)
For a more detailed analysis, see Imre Szeman, “‘Do No Evil’: Google and Evil as a Political Category,” Topia: Canadian Journal of Cultural Studies 18 (2007): 131–139.
(8)
Fredric Jameson has suggested that “the most radical demand to make on our own system … [is] the demand for full employment, universal full employment around the globe” (37). What such a demand reveals starkly is the shape and character of political and economic structures that render any such demand unrealizable. The possibility for all individuals to engage in productive social labor simply cannot happen because of the structural need for a reserve army of labor, which takes distinct forms in different parts of the world. Jameson’s point here, as in much of his writing on utopia, is that because so basic a right cannot be realized, a political opening is possible: a demand for a “society structurally distinct from this one in every conceivable way, from the psychological to the sociological, from the cultural to the political” (37). Jameson, “The Politics of Utopia,” New Left Review 25 (2004): 35–54.
(9)
Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, ed. and trans. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair, and David J. Parent (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 251.
(10)
Bloch and Adorno, “Something’s Missing,” 1–17.
(11)
Ibid., 1.
(12)
Bloch in ibid., 3-4.
(13)
Adorno in ibid., 11.
(14)
Adorno in ibid., 13.
(15)
Ibid., 15.
(16)
Bloch in ibid., 7.
(17)
“Aber etwas fehlt,” though translated as “But it won’t quite do” and “But they won’t quite do” in Bertolt Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,” in Bertolt Brecht: Collected Plays, vol. 2, part 3, ed. John Willett and Ralph Mannheim (London: Eyre Methuen, 1979), 19. The title of Scene 8 is “Seek and ye shall not find.”
(18)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,” 20.
(19)
Theodor W. Adorno, “Mahagonny,” in The Weimar Republic Source book, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 588. First published as “Mahagonny,” Musikblätter des Anbruch 14 (February-March 1932): 12–15.
(20)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,” 20.
(21)
Ibid., 63-64.
(22)
Lydia Goehr, “Hardboiled Disillusionment: Mahagonny as the Last Culinary Opera,” Cultural Critique 68 (2008): 4-5.
(23)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(24)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(25)
Brecht, “The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny,” 24.
(26)
Adorno, “Mahagonny,” 589.
(27)
Bloch and Adorno, “Something’s Missing,” 12.

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