مقدمة: الجدل النظري
(1)See Connor (1990). For further discussion, and empirical examples, see the essays in Geopolitics (2002); and A. D. Smith: “Dating the Nation,” in Conversi (2002, 53–71).
(2)See Connor (1994, chs. 4, 8); and for a thorough analysis of this issue through the main rival paradigms of nations and nationalism, see Ichijo and Uzelac (2005).
(3)For an extended examination of the varieties of “modernism,” see A. D. Smith (1998, Part I).
(4)See Gellner (1983, chs. 2-3).
(5)See Hobsbawm (1990, ch. 2); Breuilly (1993).
(6)See Kedourie (1960), and for nationalism’s diffusion outside Europe, Kedourie (1971, Introduction); cf. Gellner (1964, ch. 7).
(7)See B. Anderson (1991, chs. 1–3); and cf. A. D. Smith (1991b).
(8)See Hastings (1997), and the assessments of his thesis in Nations and Nationalism (2003).
(9)See, inter alia, Wormald (1984); Reynolds (1984, ch. 7); and Gillingham (1992).
(10)See W. Connor: “The Timelessness of Nations,” and A. D. Smith: “History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarifications,” in Guibernau and Hutchinson (2004, 35–47, 195–209).
(11)Hastings (1997, 26). For the ancient Israelites, see Grosby (2002); for the medieval Swiss, see Im Hof (1991, ch. 1).
(12)On the small scale and size of nationalist movements in nineteenth-century Europe, see Argyle (1976).
(13)Hobsbawm (1990, 75); Breuilly (1996, 151, 154).
(14)Llobera (1994, 87-8); see also Reynolds (1983) and (1984, ch. 8).
(15)See Armstrong (1982); also Armstrong (1995).
(16)See B. Anderson (1991, ch. 1).
(17)Shils (1957); Geertz (1973). See Eller and Coughlan (1993) for a critique of “primordialism.”
(18)For this defense, see Grosby (1994, 1995).
(19)See van den Berghe (1995) and (2005).
(20)See Horowitz (2002).
(21)Grosby (2002, 120).
الفصل الأول: مفهوم الأمة وأشكالها المتنوعة
(1)No modernist spells out this conception in its “pure” form. I have constructed the ideal type of the modern nation from the various conceptions proposed by Deutsch (1966), Nairn (1977), Gellner (1983), Giddens (1984), Hobsbawm (1990), and Mann (1993).
(2)On the other hand, outside Europe, in Latin America, and large parts of Africa, where a bourgeoisie was much less in evidence, civic-territorial and republican conceptions of the nation prevailed, with Rousseau’s ideals providing the chief inspiration in French West Africa and Mill’s writings for British West Africa. On which, see Geiss (1974) and Hodgkin (1964). On the “stoic” phase of the Enlightenment, see Leith (1965).
(3)On the ancient Greek usages, see Geary (2001, ch. 2) and Tonkin et al. (1989, Introduction). For the history of the term “natio,” see Greenfeld (1992, ch. 1) and Zernatto (1944). On the distinction between “ethnographic” and “political” usages of nation, see the powerful argument in Breuilly (2005a)—though premodern usages often had political dimensions.
(4)The mass character of the modern nation is emphasized by Deutsch (1966), Gellner (1983), and Mann (1993), and may be compared with E. H. Carr’s (1945) typology, and progression, from monarchical to democratic-Jacobin to social mass nations and nationalism.
(5)For a highly critical analysis of the core doctrine of nationalism, see Freeden (1998); cf. Miller (1993) and A. D. Smith (1983, ch. 7) for somewhat more sympathetic accounts. More recently, see Hearn (2006, ch. 1).
(6)On the language of nations at the Council of Constance, see Loomis (1939) and Toftgaard (2005), which appear to contest the view of John Breuilly (2005b, 81) that at the Church Councils the term “nation” had no ethnic or linguistic connotations. For references to earlier usages, see the essays in Scales and Zimmer (2005), notably those by Reynolds and Scales; also Scales (2000). Reynolds, indeed, argues for the common assumption of “nations” in medieval Europe, albeit as a conception quite different from that of the modern nation.
(7)See Plamenatz (1976), Seton-Watson (1977), and Ignatieff (1993). For the uses of this distinction, see Breton (1988) and, on a more philosophical level, Miller (1995). For a critique of “civic” nationalism, see Yack (1999).
(8)For this analysis of the Arab national identities, see Suleiman (2003). Other works which link a sense of common ethnicity to modern nations include Hutchinson (1987) on Ireland (and more generally, Hutchinson 2000), Hosking (1993) on ethnic Russianness, and Panossian (2002) on Armenian nationalism. For the historiographical debates, see A. D. Smith (2000a).
(9)Other terms like “social class” also possess different uses and meanings; see Ossowski (1962). In fact, cultural and political identities are usually combined in different ways and to varying degrees; and it is difficult, perhaps even futile, to seek to disentangle them and place them in some kind of causal-historical sequence, as Weber (1968) attempted with his suggestion that political action tends to forge ethnic community.
(10)On the other hand, perennialists who tended to see nations everywhere generally operate with an analytic category which was defined too imprecisely to discriminate the national from other kinds of community and identity. In this respect, the “neo-perennialist” historians are more circumspect, usually confining themselves to making a case for a few well-chosen examples like England.
(11)A purely inductive method of defining the concept of the nation in terms of the ideas of self-styled nationalists—apart from posing the problem of having to define the term “nationalism” in the same manner—relies too much on the variability and self-categorization of its subjects. Hence, in contrast to the method I adopted in A. D. Smith (1983, ch. 7), a large element of stipulation is required for constructing the ideal type and to provide a benchmark for subsequent analysis.
(12)For a discussion of competing definitions of the concept of the nation, see Connor (1994, ch. 4) and Uzelac (2002). See also Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot (2005, Introduction and section I) and A. D. Smith (2001, ch. 1). For a critique of the latter, see Guibernau (2004).
(13)For Armstrong (1982), these social processes and symbolic resources span much of the medieval epoch in both Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East. For the links between ethnicity and religion, see Fishman (1980).
(14)See Routledge (2003) for his critique of modernist uses of the premodern past as a mirror of the present. The idea of continuity of nations and national sentiment has been most clearly argued for England and its neighbors by Hastings (1997); see also Gillingham (1992) and Lydon (1995). On Slavophilism, see Thaden (1964); and for the Gaelic revival in Ireland, see Lyons (1979) and Hutchinson (1987).
(15)For this approach, see Armstrong (1982) and Grosby (2006). Though close at times, this view is to be distinguished from that of both the cultural and the biological “primordialists,” on which see Horowitz (2002).
(16)For the rediscovery of the past in the “national awakening,” particularly in Eastern Europe, see Pearson (1993), Agnew (1993), and Hroch (1985). For a vivid example in Hungary, see Hofer (1980); and for Greece, Herzfeld (1982). On the role of the intellectuals, see, inter alia, Breuilly (1993, 46–51), Pinard and Hamilton (1984), and Zubaida (1978). For premodern revivals, see A. D. Smith (1986, chs. 3, 8).
(17)Hastings (1997, 186) on the Christian adoption of the polity of the Old Testament. On the European uses of the idea of holy lands in states like England, France, Spain, Bohemia, and Muscovy, see Housley (2000).
(18)On the reception of the classical tradition in Europe, see Bolgar (1954); also for the rediscovery of Greek intellectual achievements, Campbell and Sherrard (1968, ch. 1).
(19)See Brubaker (1996, ch. 1); cf. A. D. Smith (1998, 77-8).
(20)For this tendency to accept national assumptions as ingrained and “enhabited,” see Billig (1995).
(21)On “situational ethnicity,” see especially Okamura (1981), and Wilmsen and McAllister (1995), and for the pervasive quality of national identity, see Connor (1994, esp. ch. 8).
(22)See Scheuch (1966) on the methodological problems of analyzing political culture.
(23)M. Weber (1948, 176). For an assessment of the political version of modernism in the work of Giddens, Mann, and Breuilly, in particular, see A. D. Smith (1998, ch. 4).
(24)See Breuilly (1993; 2005a); Mann (1993, ch. 7; 1995).
(25)See Hutchinson (2005, chs. 2-3); for the nations without states, see Guibernau (1999).
(26)For general surveys of the growth of the “national state” in Western Europe, see Tilly (1975), Ranum (1975), and A. Marx (2003).
(27)See Guibernau (1999); and for Scotland, Ichijo (2004).
الفصل الثاني: الجذور العرقية والدينية
(1)There is a vast literature on the concepts of ethnic identity and ethnicity. I have found particularly illuminating Sugar (1980), Horowitz (1985), and Eriksen (1993), as well as Barth’s (1969) path-breaking analysis. See also Wilmsen and McAllister (1995). For elite competition for cultural and symbolic resources, see Brass (1985, 1991). On ethnicity and war, see A. D. Smith (1981).
(2)On the conviction of ancestral ties, see Connor (1994, ch. 8). For critiques of the concept of ethnicity, see Hobsbawm (1990, 63–7) and Poole (1999).
(3)For these distinctions, see Handelman (1977) and Eriksen (1993). On the concept of ethnie, see A. D. Smith (1986, chs. 2–5; 1991a, chs. 2-3).
(4)This paragraph is based on A. D. Smith (2001, ch. 1). See also Hutchinson (2000).
(5)On the thesis of an ancient Athenian “nation” (as opposed to polis), see E. Cohen (2000). For the ambiguous legacy of city-state patriotism for nationalism, see Minogue (1976) and Viroli (1995)—indeed, Viroli sharply opposes such patriotism to an ethnocultural nationalism (on which, see chapter 6 below). For arguments about “civic” nationalism, see Miller (1995).
(6)For the Phoenicians, see Moscati (1973); and on the collective designation of the ancient Hellenes, see E. Hall (1992). For medieval English denigration of the Irish, see Lydon (1995). More generally on English attitudes, see the interesting account in R. Davies (2000); and for modern immigrants and their reception in Southern Europe, see the perceptive analysis in Triandafyllidou (2001, chs. 3-4).
(7)For the designations of France and français, see Beaune (1991); and on those of the Teutonici and deutsch, see Scales (2000), whose survey of medieval historians reveals wide differences in the dating of nations both among themselves and even more between medieval and modern historians.
(8)For an often controversial “constructivist” argument about the Roman ethnic designation of “barbarian” tribes, when in reality we are dealing with fluid political alignments of leaders and their followers, see Geary (2001, chs. 3-4). A not dissimilar example of ethnic classification by outsiders in sub-Saharan Africa, in this case by British colonialists, is described in Young (1985).
(9)On Latin literature in this early period, see Wilkinson (1976, ch. 2), and for the elaboration of cultural identities and myths of descent in early Republican Rome, see the fascinating accounts in Gruen (1994) and Fraschetti (2005). Connor’s thesis about the centrality of myths of ancestry is lucidly set out in Connor (1994, ch. 8).
(10)For a succinct survey and discussion of British reactions to black and Muslim immigrants, see Kumar (2003, ch. 8).
(11)On the territorialization of attachments and memories, see A. D. Smith (1999a, ch. 5). The discourse of “home” and “abroad” is analyzed by Billig (1995).
(12)For Horace’s eulogies of the Sabine hills, see Highet (1959). The late medieval ideal of the Garden of France is described in Beaune (1991, 296), and the impact of the sea and plain on seventeenth-century Holland is vividly evoked by Schama (1987, ch. 1). For the effect of the Alpine landscape on Swiss identity, see Zimmer (1998).
(13)On the pre-Romantic cult of Nature, see Charlton (1984). Schama (1995, 479–93) also describes the growing association of the pure Alpine landscapes with virtue and liberty, both generally and for Swiss national identity, especially in Albrecht von Haller’s eulogy, Die Alpen (1732). For the transformation of Russian attitudes to their landscapes and the Romantic appreciation of vast spaces, see the suggestive account in Ely (2002).
(14)For the New Year festivals in ancient Mesopotamia, see Frankfort (1948); and for the Panathenaic festival in Athens, see Andrewes (1971, 246, 263). The rituals of kingship in France are discussed by Le Goff (1998) and in sixteenth-century Russia by Crummey (1987, esp. 134–7). Hastings’ thesis about the early development of literary culture in medieval England is critically assessed in Kumar (2003, ch. 3); see also the essays on medieval English literature and national identity, in Lavezzo (2004).
(15)For the ancient Persian laws, see Wiesehofer (2004, Part I); and for the various definitions of Jewishness in the Second Temple period, see S. Cohen (1998), Schwartz (2004), and chapter 3 below.
(16)Of the modernists, Giddens (1984) and Breuilly (1993) are the strongest exponents of the association between legal standardization in a community, citizenship, and the modern state. The role of lawmaking by the religious institutions of diaspora Armenians and Jews is discussed by Armstrong (1982, ch. 7).
(17)For the use of cultural resources by intellectuals, see especially Kedourie (1971, Introduction) and Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983, Introduction and ch. 7); and especially Brass (1991, ch. 2).
(18)On which, see O’Brien (1988a) and, for the French Revolution, O’Brien (1988b). The “sacred” dimensions of nations and nationalism are discussed in A. D. Smith (2000b).
(19)On Egyptian myths and religion generally, see David (1982), and for their Creation myths, Oakes and Gahlin (2005, 300–7); for the Japanese myths, see Blacker (1984).
(20)For political myth generally, see Tudor (1972) and Armstrong (1982, chs. 4-5). The Romulus myth is analyzed by Fraschetti (2005); and the myths of Athens’ origins in E. Cohen (2000, ch. 4) and, in Greek art, Robertson (1987, 175-6). Tiridates’ conversion in Armenia is discussed in Redgate (2000, ch. 6); for Clovis’ conversion, see E. James (1988, ch. 4); and for the tales of Vladimir’s conversion, see Milner-Gulland (1999, 91–6). The rediscovery of the Swiss foundation myth is analyzed by Kreis (1991) in its nineteenth-century setting, and for the Scots Declaration of Arbroath in 1320, see Duncan (1970) and Cowan (2003).
(21)See Connor (1994, ch. 8) and Horowitz (1985, chs. 1-2).
(22)See especially Novak (1995) and Nicholson (1988) for the biblical Covenant with ancient Israel. Its implications for later Jews, as well as other ethnies, are discussed in A. D. Smith (2003, chs. 3-4). See also the special issue of Nations and Nationalism (1999).
(23)For discussion of covenantal myths of election, see O’Brien (1988a); also the essays in Hutchinson and Lehmann (1994). For a rich and incisive account of the workings and consequences of living according to the biblical Covenant among Afrikaners, Ulster-Scots, and Zionist Jews in Israel, see Akenson (1992).
(24)Medieval Christian antemurale myths of missionary election, especially in the European shatter zones, are discussed in Armstrong (1982, ch. 3). See also Housley (2000) and Nations and Nationalism (1999), especially the essays by Hastings and Templin; and A. D. Smith (1986, ch. 3; 2003, chs. 4, 6; 1999b) for this and the following paragraph.
(25)See Grosby (1991, 240; also in Grosby 2002, 36); also, more generally, Grosby (1995; 2006). On the connections between geography and nations, see Hooson (1994).
(26)On sacred territories, generally, see Hastings (2003); on the vision of Poland as a sacred territory, see Kristof (1994).
(27)For Ashur-bani-pal’s library of Babylonian texts, as well as his nostalgia for earlier Mesopotamian culture, see Roux (1964, chs. 20-1); also Oppenheim (1977). Early Roman literature and piety are discussed in Wilkinson (1976, ch. 2). On Ethiopia, D. Levine (1974, ch. 7) describes the medieval “Solomonic” dynasty’s attempt to revive the culture of the ancient kingdom of Aksum. For an analysis of “golden ages” and their uses, see A. D. Smith (1997).
(28)On the Greek nationalist Hellenic vision, see the perceptive analysis in Kitromilides (1979). The Egyptian Pharaonicist movement is discussed with rich detail by Gershoni and Jankowski (1987, chs. 7-8). For other “golden age” myths, see the essays in Hosking and Schöpflin (1997), especially by N. Davies and Wilson.
(29)The ideal of martyrdom in early Christian Armenia is discussed in the introduction to Elishe’s History by Thomson (1982); see also the perceptive account in Nersessian (2001, ch. 2). For the Dutch sense of national suffering, see Schama (1987, chs. 1-2). Sacrifice for the glory of the ancient polis is praised in Simonides’ epitaphs to the Spartans at Thermopylae and at Plataea, and above all in Pericles’ Funeral Oration to the Athenian dead of the first year of the Peloponnesian War; on which see E. Cohen (2000, ch. 4).
(30)On the Pantheon and its uses, see Ozouf (1998). The cult of the war experience and the focus of the civic religion of nationalism on mass sacrifice and the war dead are superbly analyzed by Mosse (1990), and for Germany, Mosse (1975, esp. ch. 3); see also the moving account in J. Winter (1995, ch. 4).
(31)On the essential “goodness” of nations, see Anderson (1999).
الفصل الثالث: المجتمع في العصور القديمة
(1)For surveys of the ethnic communities of the ancient Near East, see Wiseman (1973) and, for the Hellenistic period, Mendels (1992). I have discussed some of the issues raised in this chapter in A. D. Smith (2004, ch. 5).
(2)Gellner (1983); also Hobsbawm (1990, esp. ch. 2); and for a clear rejection of any premodern nations or nationalism, see Breuilly (1993; 2005a).
(3)Cited in S. T. Smith (2003, 137, and see passim), a careful and thought-provoking archaeological exploration of Egyptian relations with Nubia. See S. Jones (1997) for her cultural approach to the archaeology of ethnicity; also Welsby and Anderson (2004, ch. 5).
(4)The Pharaohs of the New Kingdom, of course, acquired an empire in the mid-second millennium BC, but, as with other later empires, this did not prevent them from categorizing as “foreign” and denigrating the populations that they subjugated, while at the same time assimilating these same individuals, including the Nubians, some of whom came to serve in the Egyptian police force, and even as soldiers on becoming free citizens; on which see S. T. Smith (2003) and Hayes (1973).
(5)Reade (1984, 23); and for the propaganda of Assyrian art, Reade (1979). On the Nimrud ivories, see Mallowan (1978).
(6)Liverani (1979, 305; italics in original).
(7)For the relations between Assyrians and other conquered peoples in this period, see Tadmor (1997) and Liverani (1979); and more generally, Larsen (1979b) and the essays in Larsen (1979a, Part IV). The Assyrian ideology of kingship and hierarchy can be clearly seen in their reliefs and statuary, especially those of their kings; on which, see I. Winter (1997). For this and several of the subsequent references on ancient Mesopotamia, I am indebted to Professor Mark Geller.
(8)Nylander (1979, 374-5). See also Wiesehofer (2004, 26).
(9)Herodotus: Histories I, 125, cited in Wiesehofer (2004, 35).
(10)See Barth (1969, Introduction). On the relations between Achaemenid Persians and their subject peoples, see Wiesehofer (2004, chs. 2-3); Cook (1983, chs. 7-8); and with regard to Persian-Jewish relations, Widengren (1973).
(11)For Sumerian responses to these incursions and a vivid lament for the “land of Sumer,” see Pongratz-Leisten (1997). For Sumerian religion, see Jacobsen (1976); and for the revival under the Third Dynasty of Ur, see Roux (1964, ch. 10).
(12)Millard (1973, 38); and generally on the Phoenicians, Moscati (1973).
(13)Ap-Thomas (1973, 262). One needs to recall that most Phoenician literature is not extant. On the lack of any political unity among the Phoenicians to match their shared cultural practices, see Routledge (2003).
(14)On early Greek genealogies and the rules of royal succession, see the detailed analysis of Finkelberg (2005, chs. 2-3). The uses of ethnic origins by “Ionian” Athens and “Dorian” Sparta in their arguments before and during the Peloponnesian War are assessed by Alty (1982).
(15)On the rise of pan-Hellenic sentiments and stereotypes of Greek freedom and Persian servility, see E. Hall (1992); also Bacon (1961). For a perceptive analysis of the internal “aggregative” manner of constructing a Greek identity in the archaic age, see J. Hall (1997).
(16)Herodotus: Histories, VIII, 144.2, cited in J. Hall (1997, 44).
(17)On pan-Hellenism and its limits, see Finley (1986, ch. 7) and the essays in Fondation Hardt (1962).
(18)For the thesis of an Athenian “nation,” see the stimulating analysis of E. Cohen (2000), though the extent to which its culture was really distinctive in the wider Greek ethnocultural community can be questioned. However, see the recent forceful argument in favor of an Athenian nationhood that contributed to, and drew strength from, a wider pan-Hellenic sense of national identity, in Roshwald (2006, 22–30). For the Athenian myth of “Ionian” descent, see J. Hall (1997, ch. 3).
(19)For these Sumerian complaints from the “Marriage of Martu,” see Liverani (1973, 106). The most detailed cultural analysis of the construction of the “Amurru” and their god by the Sumerians is Beaulieu (2002).
(20)See Malamat (1973) for an overview of the various Aramean tribal confederations.
(21)The Sefire stele with its references to “all-Aram” is well analyzed by Grosby (2002, chs. 5-6); see also Zadok (1991).
(22)Tadmor (1991). For the thesis that “all-Aram” in Syria designated an incipient nationality, see Grosby (2002, chs. 5-6). On the possibility of an Assyrian “national state,” see below and n. 34.
(23)See Grosby (2002, 123–5) for this characterization of Edom and its territory; also Bartlett (1973).
(24)See Noth (1960) for the idea of an Israelite amphictyony. Israelite myths of descent are discussed in Cazelles (1979). For a recent balanced assessment of the vexed problem of Israelite origins, see Frendo (2004).
(25)For this assessment, see Eissfeldt (1975, 551-2). More recent research focuses on the peasant or nomad origins of Israel, on which see Ahlstrom (1986, chs. 2-3) and Dever (2003). On the centrality of Ephraim and Joshua, see Cazelles (1979, 280–3), and for the ancient Near Eastern social milieu, see Zeitlin (1984).
(26)Hosea (13: 10-11) for a prophetic rebuke; but cf. the strong counterarguments in Talmon (1986, Part I). Skepticism towards the existence, let alone significance, of the United Monarchy can be found in Ahlström (1986, ch. 7) and, of course, in the writings of “revisionists” like P. Davies (1992) and Finkelstein and Silberman (2001). But see the vigorous critique in Dever (2004).
(27)For the shift from an oral to a textual culture among the elites in eighthand seventh-century Judah, see the excellent analysis in Schniedewind (2005, ch. 5). For the editing of the Pentateuch, see Friedman (1997); also Emerton (2004), and other essays in Day (2004). On the Covenant ideal, see the detailed analysis in Nicholson (1988).
(28)See Grosby (2002, 94–7). For the view that most of the geographical locations in the Pentateuch are best placed in the period of king Josiah, see Finkelstein and Silberman (2001, chs. 10-11), a view firmly rejected by William Dever (2003).
(29)Ackroyd (1979, 339). See also Ahlström (1986, ch. 7).
(30)For the political symbols of Jewish “nationalism,” see Mendels (1992) who distinguishes them from modern national symbols. The extent, manner, and scope of Jewish adoption of surrounding Hellenistic material and literary culture are carefully assessed by L. Levine (1998). For the ideological system of most Palestinian Jews in the late Second Temple period, see the thought-provoking analysis in Schwartz (2004). See also Roshwald (2006, ch. 1) and Goodblatt (2006).
(31)On the Greeks, see J. Hall (1997) and, for the Mycenaean and Homeric epochs, Finkelberg (2005); also Finley (1986, ch. 7). For the Israelites, see especially the essays in Day (2004); also Schniedewind (2005).
(32)See Kumar (2006) for a comparison of the French and British imperial nations and their respective nationalisms.
(33)See Oppenheim (1977, III); also Brinkman (1979); and for the monumental art of Assyrian monarchy, see Reade (1979); and I. Winter (1997).
(34)For his thesis, see Parpola (2004); but cf. Machinist (1997) and Liverani (1979).
(35)For this nostalgia of legitimation, see Wiesehofer (2004).
(36)The Tale of Sinuhe cited in Grosby (2002, 31-2) and Pritchard (1975, 5–11); and Trigger et al. (1983, 316-17), where the mixture of Egyptian cultural superiority and assimilation of foreigners is underlined for the Late Period and under Persian rule, especially through the detailed testimonies of Herodotus.
(37)Kemp (1983, 71–3). Routledge (2003) argues for the mobility of individuals into the elites, whereas Beyer (1959) stresses the social and educational divide between noble and priestly families and the rest of the population in the ancient world.
(38)Book of Numbers (34). On the territorial dimension of Judaism, see W. D. Davies (1982). On the sanctification of the Promised Land, see Zeitlin (1984, 171).
(39)See Ackroyd (1979). For Josiah’s reforms, see Schniedewind (2005, ch. 6); and Friedman (1997, ch. 5). More generally, see Roshwald (2006, 14–22).
(40)For the Zealots, see Brandon (1967, ch. 2); but cf. the critique in Zeitlin (1988, chs. 2, 10). For the Roman-Jewish wars, see M. Aberbach (1966) and Mendels (1992). For a profound exploration of the various ways of defining Jewishness in this period, see S. Cohen (1998).
الفصل الرابع: الأمم الهرمية
(1)The ancient Near Eastern origin of medieval Islamic and Christian concepts of administration is signaled in Armstrong (1982, ch. 5). For Egyptian concepts, see Trigger et al. (1983), and for Mesopotamian ideas, see Frankfort (1948).
(2)For the Assyrian combination of hierarchy and ethnicity, see the references to Liverani (1979) and Parpola (2004) in chapter 3 above. For the question of the continuity between ancient and modern Assyrians, see Odisho (2001).
(3)The Armenian version of covenantal public culture through its Holy Apostolic Church is discussed by Garsoian (1999, ch. 12) and Nersessian (2001). For early Armenia in general, see Redgate (2000) and for the early Armenian Christian concept and history of martyrdom, in the wars against Sasanian Iran, see Thomson (1982).
(4)The biblical Covenant is examined in Novak (1995) and A. D. Smith (2003, ch. 3); and by Walzer (1984) for its inspiration for the English and American Revolutions. See also Roshwald (2006, ch. 4).
(5)The Ethiopian “Solomonic” dynasty and the myth of the transfer of the Ark of the Covenant from Jerusalem to Aksum in the Kebra-Negast (Book of Kings) are described and analyzed in D. Levine (1974, ch. 7) and Ullendorff (1988). See also Henze (2000, 56–72).
(6)On the Greek polis, see Andrewes (1971) and A. H. Jones (1978); on Greek festivals and civic religion, see Cartledge (1987).
(7)See Ogilvie (1976) for the early history of Rome; also Fraschetti (2005). For Rome’s expansion within Italy, see Grimal (1968, 84–123). Its encounter with Magna Graecia and the impact of Greek culture on Roman identity are analyzed by Gruen (1994).
(8)For the Augustan poets, see Wilkinson (1976, ch. 5) and Highet (1959). The same republican nostalgia can be found in the Histories, the Annals, and the Germania of Tacitus, on which see Martin (1989).
(9)For the Italian communes and their revival of Roman political forms, see Waley (1969) and Martines (2002).
(10)On the Men of the Great Synagogue and the Pharisees in the Persian and then the Ptolemaic province of Yahud (Judea), see L. Finkelstein (1989), and for the Hasmonean revolt and kingdom, see Goldstein (1989). For a penetrating analysis of the belief system of the majority of Jews in Palestine in the Second Temple period, see Schwartz (2004, 49–74).
(11)Hastings (1997, 186) also claimed that Christianity, in including the Old Testament in its scriptures, took over the almost monolithic image of the nation contained therein, especially as the New Testament lacked a political model. One should add that in its early days, Christianity appeared to appreciate the covenantal ideal of the nation, whereas later, when it became the official religion of the Roman empire, it looked to the more hierarchical model offered by the Old Testament’s ideal of sacred kingship.
(12)On these early Swiss intercantonal oaths, see Im Hof (1991, ch. 1) and Zimmer (2003, ch. 1).
(13)Wiesehofer (2004, 165); and ibid., 171, for Shapur’s inscription.
(14)On Chosroes’ reforms, see Frye (1966, 259, 261). For the cycles of legends, see Cambridge History of Iran (1983, Vol. 3, Part 1, 359ff.) and Wiesehofer (2004, 224-5).
(15)For Kartir’s reforms, see Wiesehofer (2004, 200); and for later developments in medieval Iran, see Frye (1978).
(16)For the self-definition of the Byzantines, see Mango (1980, 6, 27–31, 218–20); also Hupchik (2002, 26–8).
(17)Vasiliev (1958, 562). For the possibility of a “precocious nationalism” in late Byzantium, after the restoration of the empire under the Palaeologi in 1261, see Armstrong (1982, 178–81, 216-17). But this is generally rejected by historians of Greece such as Kitromilides (1989) and Roudometof (1998).
(18)For the quotation from the Russian Primary Chronicle, see Milner-Gulland (1999, 149). The growing Byzantine tendencies of the Muscovite autocracy, especially under Ivan III, are described in Crummey (1987, 132–4); see also Franklin (2002). For Ivan IV’s autocracy, see Pavlov and Perrie (2003).
(19)See Crummey (1987, 137–9). For Philotheus of Pskov’s letter, see Zernov (1978, 49); but cf. the skeptical comments of Franklin (2002, esp. at 191-2).
(20)For the two myths, tsarist and ethnic Russian, see Cherniavsky (1975) and Hosking (1997, 47–56).
(21)On early Russian myths and legends, see Hubbs (1993); also Franklin (2002). The later rise of Russian ethnoscapes and national identity is discussed by Ely (2002).
(22)On the opposition between westernizing tsarist court culture and popular ethnic Russian culture, see Hosking (1993).
(23)See Geary (2001). While Geary’s “constructivist” interpretation fits well the fluid conditions of the late Roman empire and its aftermath, he seems to take far too seriously the tendency of some nationalisms to seek the origins of “their” nations in this period and the succeeding “Dark Ages,” and thereby passes over later periods from the tenth century, in which it is possible to begin to discern the outlines of national division, if not national identity, in medieval Western Europe—of knowing, in Walker Connor’s words, not who we are, but who we are not. Geary also underplays the persistence and near ubiquity of the “ethnic lens” in so many periods and areas, and of more specific ethnic models of social organization, from the Old Testament and Herodotus to postcolonialism and postcommunism.
(24)See Reynolds (1984, 250-1; 1983); cf. the more traditional interpretation of Seton-Watson (1977, 15).
(25)See Reynolds (2005); cf. the modernist stance of Breuilly (2005b).
(26)See Hastings (1997, ch. 2); also Wormald (2005).
(27)Kumar (2003, 42-3, 47-8); cf. the contributions by Susan Reynolds, Robert Colls, and Anthony D. Smith in the debate with Krishan Kumar, published in Nations and Nationalism (2007).
(28)See Wormald (2005, esp. 117-18) and Foot (2005). For some objections, see Breuilly (2005b, esp. 73-4) and Kumar (2003, 41–8). See also the essays in Smyth (2002a), especially Smyth (2002b) and Reuter (2002). For the Anglo-Saxon migration, identity, and literature, see Howe (1989).
(29)See Kumar (2003, 49–53); Gillingham (1995); and for medieval Anglo-Irish relations, see Lydon (1995). For Anglo-Saxon and Norman ethnic myths, see MacDougall (1982) and Mason (1983).
(30)R. Davies (2000, 106); see also Gillingham (1992) and Frame (2005).
(31)See Knapp (2004, 144-5); see also Galloway (2004, 41–95).
(32)Kumar (2003, 58); and see Clanchy (1998, 173–5) and Keeney (1972). For Shakespeare’s biblically inspired portrait of Henry V, see S. Marx (2000, ch. 3).
(33)See Housley (2000, 237, 238-9).
(34)See Beaune (1985, 287) and Strayer (1971, chs. 17-18).
(35)For the text of the eighth-century prologue to the Salic Law, see E. James (1988, 236). See also Citron (1989, 114–17).
(36)For this development, see Strayer (1971, chs. 17-18); also Beaune (1991, 173).
(37)Strayer (1971, 302).
(38)On de Sauqueville, see Beaune (1991, 176); on Nogaret, see Strayer (1971, 309, 311). For the quotation from the papal bull, Rex Glorie, in Registrum Clementis Papae V, Rome 1885–92, no. 7501, see Strayer (1971, 312-13).
(39)Beaune (1991, 192), to whose magisterial analysis this and the following paragraphs are heavily indebted. For Chastellain, see also Beaune (1991, 180).
(40)See Beaune (1991, 285) for this analysis and for the quotations from the chancellor of France (ibid., 296), Doctrinal de Noblesse (ibid., 305), and for the prayer for Jean de Bueil (ibid., 308). See also the brief comments in Potter (2003, 3–5).
(41)On the royal public culture, see Le Goff (1998).
(42)Cowan (2003, 42). I am indebted to Dr. Atsuko Ichijo for this reference.
(43)Webster (1997, 85–9). On the Declaration of Arbroath, see Duncan (1970).
(44)Webster (1997, 89). See, on this, Ichijo (2002). This is especially true of William Wallace’s uprising and campaign. For the rise of national identity in medieval Wales, see Richter (2002).
(45)Cowan (2003, 57-8).
(46)Kumar (2003, 80-1). The fact that many Scots were Anglicized hardly invalidates their national sentiment. So were the elites in Latin America, America, much of Africa, and India. This does not deter us from designating these secession or resistance movements as cases of nationalism.
(47)Webster (1997, ch. 5; 1998). An interesting comparison can be made with early Armenian historiography, which also delineated a sense of Armenian national identity, albeit here tied to and interpreted through the lens of the Old Testament and Apostolic Christianity; on which see Garsoian (1999, ch. 12) and Atiyah (1968).
الفصل الخامس: الأمم العهدية
(1)See Kedourie (1960, chs. 2-3); Gellner (1964, ch. 7); Hobsbawm (1990, 10).
(2)Gellner (1983, 91, n. 1); Hobsbawm (1990, 75).
(3)Scales (2005, 172); and idem (2000). For a slightly later period, see Poliakov (1975, 77-8).
(4)Housley (2000, 240); see also Zacek (1969, 171–4). But while the Czech language flourished, and anti-German sentiment was prevalent, burgeoning national sentiment was insufficient to bind the nobles to the artisans, or reconcile the Utraquist and Taborite wings of Hussitism in what was basically a religious revolution.
(5)See N. Davies (1979, Vol. I. ch. 6); Petrovich (1980). Knoll (1993) argues for a widespread elite sense of Polish national identity in the fifteenth century.
(6)See Llobera (1994, 79-80) and Linehan (1982).
(7)See Housley (2000) and Llobera (1994), to whose account I am indebted. But cf. A. Marx (2003) for the view that Spain’s “exclusionary nationalism” of the sixteenth century created a relatively homogeneous nation.
(8)Stergios (2006) concentrates mainly on the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For an earlier period, and an equally negative view of any Italian national sentiment, see Hankey (2002).
(9)Llobera (1994, 68–70) and Toftgaard (2005, 62–5, 176).
(10)Toftgaard (2005, 96). I am grateful to Dr. Toftgaard for allowing me to quote from his PhD thesis, which compares language and national identity in medieval and Renaissance Italy and France.
(11)Toftgaard (2005, 23, 140–3, 278–80); cf. Hankey (2002). For later nationalist use of these “cultural materials,” see Doumanis (2001, ch. 1).
(12)See Beaune (1991, esp. 296) and Toftgaard (2005, 180–200). See also Llobera (1994, 55-6).
(13)Toftgaard (2005, 65–72, 210–38); Rickard (1974, 87–94).
(14)Llobera (1994, 39), citing Kohn’s early article on seventeenth-century English nationalism (Kohn 1940, 70).
(15)Greenfeld (1992, ch. 1); and for his critique of Greenfeld’s thesis of an English sixteenth-century nationalism, see Kumar (2003, 90–103). Interestingly, Kumar is much more favorably disposed to Kohn’s arguments of a seventeenth-century English nationalism.
(16)Marcu (1976); but cf. Breuilly (1993, Introduction).
(17)Both quotations in Mundy and Woody (1961, 344), cited in Toftgaard (2005, 60-1); see also Loomis (1939), who claims that the term “natio” signified both a territorial and a linguistic and descent community, and that churches were becoming increasingly “national” in this period.
(18)On this fragmentation, see Keen (1973, ch. 19) and Perkins (2005).
(19)See A. Marx (2003); also on war and national states in early modern Europe, Howard (1976) and Tilly (1975, Introduction, and essay by Finer).
(20)See Llobera (1994, 78–80); also Linehan (1982). For medieval persecutions of heretics, lepers, and Jews, see Moore (1987).
(21)A. Marx (2003, 6); also Tilly (1975, Introduction). For an extended critique of Marx’s account, see A. D. Smith (2005).
(22)Kedourie (1971, Introduction); cf. A. D. Smith (1979, ch. 2). For the Christian “vernacular thesis,” see Hastings (1997).
(23)For the Reformation as a general European movement, see the magisterial account of MacCulloch (2004). For Reformation culture, see Rublack (2005); see also the older historical account of Green (1964). For the influence of the Hebrew Bible on English literature and the national self-image of the English, see D. Aberbach (2005).
(24)Schama (1987, 94-5, italics in original), still the most vivid and comprehensive account of Dutch seventeenth-century culture.
(25)Walzer (1984) reveals the dual promise of the Almighty, the unconditional liberation of the children of Israel from Egypt, and the conditional attainment of the Promised Land only to those who receive and practice God’s Torah—as well as its subsequent uses and inspiration in the English and American Revolutions.
(26)Nicholson (1988) discusses the various Covenant texts in the Pentateuch, while Novak (1995) and Sacks (2002) range more widely, to look at the rabbinic and ethical aspects.
(27)MacCulloch (2004, 106–115; and on the Covenant, 178-9); Green (1964, ch. 10).
(28)MacCulloch (2004, 178-9, 243-4).
(29)Williamson (1979, 4).
(30)Cited in Mackie (1976, 206); see also Williamson (1979, ch. 3).
(31)Cited in Mackie (1976, 212-13); see also Kidd (1993, 23-4).
(32)Cited in Williamson (1979, 5); for the quote from the anonymous English pamphlet of 1554, see Loades (1982, 304).
(33)MacCulloch (2004, 285); and Haller (1963). Loades (1992, 313) also stresses the English aspects of what became, with its successive expanded editions, an apology for English martyrs, and claims the importance for Foxe of England as an elect nation.
(34)For these and other quotes on English election, see Hill (1994, 267); see also D. Aberbach (2005).
(35)Fletcher (1982, 315-16).
(36)Cited in Greenfeld (1992, 75). For the quote from Cromwell’s address to Parliament, see Kohn (1944, 176); and for the Bible carried by Cromwell’s soldiers into battle, see Calamy imprimatur  (1997).
(37)John Milton: Areopagitica iv, 339-40, cited in Greenfeld (1992, 76).
(38)John Milton: Prose Works, London, Bell, 1884–9, iii, 315, cited in Kohn (1944, 171). Kumar (2003, 103–15) disputes the degree of nationalism (as opposed to national sentiment) in Puritans like Milton, Cromwell, Baxter, and William Clarke; they were, primarily, ardent pan-European Puritans, waging war against the anti-Christ. Yet, he also concedes the national, if not nationalist, tenor of many of their speeches and writings.
(39)For the biddagsbrieven, see Gorski (2000, 1441-2).
(40)See Gorski (2000, 1442). This is one piece of evidence in his case for an “anti-modernist” redating of the onset of nationalism, well over a century before the French Revolution. Yet, the theoretical part of his article appears to advance a “post-modernist” approach, at odds with the historical evidence he produces.
(41)Joost von Vondel: Passcha, 58, cited in Schama (1987, 113).
(42)Schama (1987, 106–17) gives a vivid account of the context of the biblical art of the period. See also Westermann (2004, ch. 5) for the art of Dutch political identity.
(43)The Gedenck-Clanck prayer is cited in Schama (1987, 98).
(44)For the Calvinist programme, see MacCulloch (2004, 367–78) and Gorski (2000, 1446-7).
(45)On the Ulster-Scots, see Akenson (1992); for the Afrikaners, see Cauthen (1997, 107–31); on Hungary, see Graeme Murdock: “Magyar Judah: Constructing a New Canaan in Eastern Europe,” in Swanson (2000, 263–74). For a brief overview of the first American Protestant colonies, see, inter alia, MacCulloch (2004, 533–45). On the French Wars of Religion, see Briggs (1998, 10–32); also MacCulloch (2004, 306–9, 337–40, 471–5).
(46)For Denmark and the Reformation, see Jesperson (2004, ch. 5); on Sweden in this period, see Scott (1977, 124–30, 153–6).
(47)Jesperson (2004, ch. 2); see also Ostergård (1996); Strath (1994).
(48)For a classic account of this struggle, see Parker (1985); also MacCulloch (2004, 367–78).
(49)Parker (1985, 57–63).
الفصل السادس: الأمم الجمهورية
(1)See Schama (1989, 507–11); also Cobban (1963, Vol. 1, Part 2).
(2)Schama (1989, 389). On the Horatii of David, see, inter alia, Brookner (1980, ch. 5); also Rosenblum (1967, ch. 2).
(3)Rosenblum (1961); on Füssli, see Antal (1956, 71–4). For other depictions of the Rütli Oath, see Jacob Kreis: “Schweiz: Nationalpedagogik in Wort und Bild,” in Flacke (1998, 446–75, esp. 457–60). And for other oath-swearings from classical antiquity, including those by Beaufort (1771) and Caraffe (1794), see Detroit (1974).
(4)O’Brien (1988b); H. M. Jones (1974, chs. 10-11); Cobban (1963, Vol. 1, Part 2).
(5)See Kedourie (1960, chs. 2-3); and on Herder, Berlin (1976), and more generally, on Romanticism, Berlin (1999).
(6)J.-J. Rousseau: Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, 1772, translated in Watkins (1953, 178); see also J.-J. Rousseau: Du Contrat Social, IV, viii, also in Watkins (1953, 147-8).
(7)For the revolutionary fêtes, see Kennedy (1989, 300–8); and Herbert (1972). For the debt to city-state patriotism, see Minogue (1976); and for the many calls by cultural critics and writers on the arts to return to a heroic antiquity, see Leith (1965) and Rosenblum (1967).
(8)See Martines (2002, ch. 11); and on Florence, see Brucker’s assessment of Hans Baron’s thesis on the humanist turn in Florentine politics, in Brucker (1969, 230–40).
(9)Zimmer (2003, 19, note 10). For the Swiss Reformers, see MacCulloch (2004, 174–9). On the uses of the Batavian myth of Dutch origins, see Gorski (2000), and for its influence on Dutch artists, notably in Rembrandt’s painting of The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis for the Amsterdam Town Hall, see Westermann (2004, 99–101) and Rosenberg (1968, 287–92).
(10)Ihalainen (2005, esp. ch. 2) exhaustively documents the importance of the analogy with ancient Israel in official sermons and rhetoric in Sweden, Holland, and England in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as its partial and uneven decline in the mid-eighteenth century, in favor of models of classical patriotism, especially in England. On the rise of the “scientific state,” see A. D. Smith (1983, ch. 10). On the transmission of the classical heritage, see Bolgar (1954).
(11)See Bell (2001, 39), citing J.-J. Rousseau: Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne, 1772, and in Watkins (1953, 163).
(12)See Bell (2001, ch. 1), a thought-provoking analysis, though it was only an elite that was able to give voice to these new ideas. On the Wars of Religion, and the contemporary reactions, see MacCulloch (2004, 469–74). For the place of the Catholic and other religions before and during the Revolution, see Aston (2000).
(13)Mass education is emphasized by Gellner (1973; 1983) in his own theory of nationalism. On the French republican case, see Prost (2002, ch. 3).
(14)See Viroli (1995); Connor (1994, esp. chs. 4, 8; 2004); and Hroch (1985) on the three-stage transition to ethnic nationalism. On the eighteenth-century Danish patriotic societies, see Engelhardt (2007).
(15)See the debate referred to in the Introduction between Walker Connor and Anthony D. Smith, in Guibernau and Hutchinson (2004). For nations without states, whose members may feel dual allegiances, see Guibernau (1999); and for the Basques and Catalans, see Conversi (1997).
(16)On the debate between the “Franks” and the “Gauls,” see Pomian (1997) and Poliakov (1975, ch. 1). On the language policies of the Jacobins, see Lartichaux (1977).
(17)Renan (1882), translated in Bhabha (1990); on medieval Italian city-states and identities, see Hankey (2002). On ancient Athens, see E. Cohen (2000).
(18)Cited in Bell (2001, 38). For the sacred symbolism of nationalist movements, see Breuilly (1993, 64–8), Kedourie (1971, Introduction), and A. D. Smith (2000b; 2003, ch. 2). Roshwald (2006, ch. 4) sees in the revolutionary legacy a much contested covenantal tradition.
(19)See O’Brien (1988b) on the export of revolutionary French nationalism. On ideas of national “genius” and “character,” see Perkins (1999) and Kemilainen (1964).
(20)On the canon of great men in France and the French language, see Bell (2001, chs. 4, 6); and on the English eighteenth-century national literary revival, see Newman (1987). The general trends in the growth of a national reading public are illuminated by Anderson (1991, chs. 2-3, 5); and for the role of language in national identity, see Edwards (1985, ch. 2), and, in France, Lartichaux (1977).
(21)On French Jewry in the Revolution and under Napoleon, see Benbassa (1999, chs. 6-7) and Vital (1990, ch. 1).
(22)See, on the white Anglo-Saxon basis of the American nation, Kaufmann (2002) and Huntington (2004); and on WASP dominance and decline, Kaufmann (2004b). For ethnic change in the United States, see Gans (1979). For ethnic dimensions of “civic” nationalisms, see Yack (1999).
(23)The pre-Romantic idealization of Nature is well analyzed by Charlton (1984). On landscape and memory, see the fascinating volume by Schama (1995); and on landscape and national identity in Switzerland and Canada, see the excellent analysis of Kaufmann and Zimmer (1998).
(24)On the sanctification of territory and the ensuing conflicts, see A. D. Smith (1999b). For some case studies of the links between territory and national identity, see Hooson (1994).
(25)For the commemoration of the dead in general, see the seminal work of Mosse (1990; 1994) and the essays in Gillis (1994). For the canon of fallen heroes, especially in France, see Bell (2001, ch. 4) and Detroit (1974).
(26)The cult of the Glorious Dead is discussed in J. Winter (1995, ch. 4) and A. D. Smith (2003, ch. 9); and especially by Mosse (1990) and Prost (1998; 2002, ch. 1).
(27)For the reflexive character of nationalism, see Breuilly (1993, 64–8). By the time of Grundtvig’s educational movement, Denmark was ceasing to be an absolute monarchy and was assuming a civic character, though not republican in form; on which, see Jesperson (2004, ch. 5). For the Slavophile conception, see Hosking (1997, 271–5).
(28)On this conception of the nation and its character, see Anderson (1991; 1999). For such golden ages and missions, see A. D. Smith (1997; 2003, chs. 5, 7).
(29)On German festivals and monuments, see Mosse (1975, ch. 3). On statuary and celebrations in England, Germany, and the United States, see Hobsbawm (1983, ch. 7). The cult of the fallen soldier and its role in American national identity is discussed by Grant (2005); and on national monuments generally, see Michalski (1998).
(30)Cited in Cobban (1963, Vol. 1, 165, italics in original).
(31)Cited in Scurr (2006, 214).
(32)For a description of this festival, see Schama (1989, 831–6). On the Revolution and religion, see Aston (2000, Part 3).
(33)Republicanism in France and its symbols are discussed in Prost (2002), Pilbeam (1995, ch. 1), Gildea (1994), and compared with England and Norway by Elgenius (2005).
(34)Cited in Roudometof (2001, 63).
(35)See Kitromilides (1989) for the novelty of the idea of a Greek nation; for the Greek Orthodox Church, see Frazee (1969).
(36)On Atatürk’s programme, see Poulton (1997) and Lewis (1968, ch. 10); see also the “ethnosymbolic” interpretation of Turkish nationalism by Canefe (2005) and a more “post-modern” interpretation of the Turkish republican view of history in Cinar (2005).
(37)See Hodgkin (1964) for Rousseau’s influence; also Geiss (1974).
(38)See Viroli (1995); Herbert (1972, 39).
(39)On this, see Chatterjee (1986).
الفصل السابع: مصائر بديلة
(1)Cited in Roudometof (2001, 63). For classic accounts of the Greek War of Independence and modern Greece, see Dakin (1972) and Campbell and Sherrard (1968). For ideological aspects of republicanism and nationalism, see Kitromilides (1979; 2006), though whether a distinction can be usefully drawn between republican patriotism and nationalism is questionable.
(2)On this cleavage and trajectory, see Roudometof (1998) and Campbell and Sherrard (1968, ch. 1).
(3)For the apocalyptic tradition and its influence on Greek nationalism, see Hatzopoulos (2005). For the role of Orthodoxy, see Roudometof (2001, 52–6); and for the growth of a possible Hellenic consciousness among the late Byzantine elites, see Armstrong (1982, 178–81).
(4)On Orthodoxy and “phyletism” in the context of a new Greek national state, see Kitromilides (1989); on the position of the Orthodox Church in Greece, see Frazee (1969).
(5)On Spiridon Zambelios and Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, see Roudometof (2001, 108–10), and for the links with Greek Orthodox traditions in the latter, despite the novelty of his conception, see Kitromilides (1998). For the Megale Idea and its consequences, see Koliopoulos and Veremis (2004, chs. 12, 14).
(6)See especially Pilbeam (1995); also Prost (2002).
(7)See Gallant (2001, ch. 4), and Koliopoulos and Veremis (2004, 228–35).
(8)For the ideology of the Slavophiles, see Thaden (1964); for the Pharaonic movement in early twentieth-century Egypt, see Gershoni and Jankowski (1987, chs. 7-8); and for French nineteenth-century conflicts, see Gildea (1994) and Pilbeam (1995, esp. chs. 5-6, 10). The rise, nature, and ideals of Hindu nationalism in India are analyzed in Bhatt (2001) and the major study of Jaffrelot (1996) of the politics of Hindu nationalism.
(9)For the modern “myth” of Greek descent from the ancient Greeks, see Just (1989); and for the Greek need to articulate a national “mission,” in the face of Jacob Fallmerayer’s “Slavic” interpretation of modern Greek descent, published in 1830, see Roudometof (2001, 106-7).
(10)For a résumé of recent research on Swiss origins and historical development, see Zimmer (2003, ch. 1); and for the early oaths, see Im Hof (1991, ch. 1). The conflicting currents of Swiss historiography of the late nineteenth century are discussed in Zimmer (2000).
(11)For the 1891 celebrations, see Kreis (1991). On modern Switzerland and its overlapping identities, see Steinberg (1976).
(12)For the development of modern Japan from the Tokugawa period, and its myths of origin, see Lehmann (1982, esp. 133–5), and Oguma (2002); on the cult of the war dead at the Yasukuni shrine, see Harootunian (1999).
(13)For the Romantic movement in Japan, see Doak (1997). Modern theories of Japan’s origins and presumed homogeneity are critically analyzed by Oguma (2002). For a thoughtful study of postwar Japanese “victimhood,” see Shiiyama (2005).
(14)On the Protestant culture and mission of eighteenth—and early nineteenth-century England and Britain, see especially Clark (2000); and Colley (1992, ch. 1).
(15)For the British Protestant tradition, see Clark (2000); for English (rather than British) cultural and political exceptionalism, see A. D. Smith (2006).
(16)For Ulster and South Africa, see Akenson (1992); and on Afrikaner celebrations, see Templin (1999) and Thompson (1985).
(17)The processes involved in the growth of an American nation are charted in Kaufmann (2002); for the American conviction of Protestant destiny and national election, see Tuveson (1968), Huntington (2004, chs. 3–5), and Roshwald (2006, ch. 4).
(18)On this missionary stance, see Cauthen (2004). The covenantal spirit in American visions of its unique wilderness nature and in American landscape painting by artists like Cole, Church, and Bierstadt is described and beautifully illustrated in the pioneering history and catalogue by Wilton and Barringer (2002).
(19)On early Zionist ideologies, see the excellent study of Shimoni (1995); and for its religious dimensions, see Mendes-Flohr (1994), and especially Luz (1988).
(20)For the ethnonationalist underpinnings of Zionist socialism, see Sternhell (1999). Shafir (1989) analyzes the vexed issue of the use by early Zionists of Arab labor.
(21)On the “hexagon” of France, see E. Weber (1991, ch. 3). The new concepts of nation, public, and society are discussed in Bell (2001, ch. 1). For the oaths and ceremonies of the Revolution, see chapter 6 above, notes l and 2.
(22)For the controversies about admission to the Pantheon, see Ozouf (1998). The cult of St. Joan in late nineteenth-century France is discussed in Gildea (1994, 154–65), and her images in Warner (1983). For a vivid analysis of the unique festival of La Pucelle in Orléans, see Prost (2002, ch. 7).
(23)On the rise of a German national identity in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see H. James (2000) and Blackbourn (2003). See also Kohn (1967, Part 2).
(24)The volkisch literary movement is discussed by Mosse (1964). For German public monuments, see Mosse (1975); and for the nineteenth-century cult of Dürer, see Kuhlemann (2002). Wagner’s theories are located in their German Romantic philosophical setting in the controversial analysis of Rose (1996).
(25)See Bracher (1973); on the Hitler myth, see Kershaw (1989). For Nazism as a secular religion, see Burleigh (2001). On the relationship of Nazism to nationalism, see A. D. Smith (1979, ch. 3).
(26)On East Germany, see Staab (1998). For some problems of modern German national identity, see Fulbrook (1997).
(27)On the Great Schism and the Old Believers, see Hosking (1997, 64–74).
(28)For the history of the Soviet Union, see Hosking (1985). For monuments and rituals of the Great Patriotic War, see Merridale (2001). The image of Stalin, compared to that of Ivan the Terrible, is analyzed by Perrie (1998); and for Russian nationalism under postwar Soviet communism, see Dunlop (1985).
(29)On the Turkish revolution, see Poulton (1997); and for the Turkification of the Ottoman empire after 1914, see Ulker (2005). The alternative destinies, and golden ages, of secular Turkish and Islamic-Ottoman Turkish ethnohistories are interestingly analyzed by Cinar (2005, ch. 4).
(30)For European influence on West Africa in particular, see July (1967) and Geiss (1974).
(31)On some religious and cultural causes of the Iranian Revolution, see Keddie (1981).
(32)On the Buddhist background of Burmese socialism, see Sarkisyanz (1964); for Thailand and its traditions, see Winichakul (1996); on Saudi Arabia and Wahabism, see Piscatori (1989).
(33)On dominant ethnies, see Kaufmann (2004a).