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بعض نصوص هايديجر المترجمة إلى الإنجليزية والواردة في ترجمة عربية في فصول الكتاب
الفصل الثالث
Dasein is an entity which, in its very being, comports itself
understandingly towards that being. In saying this, we are calling attention to
the formal concept of existence. Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity
which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and
belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity
possible ….
But these are both ways in which Dasein’s being takes on a definite
character, and they must be seen and understood a priori as grounded upon that
state of being which we have called “being-in-the-world”. An interpretation of
this constitutive state is needed if we are to set up our analytic of Dasein
correctly. The compound expression “being-in-the-world” indicates in the very
way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phenomenon. This primary
datum must be seen as a whole. But while being-in-the-world cannot be broken up
into contents which may be pieced together, this does not prevent it from having
several constitutive items in its structure. (Being and Time, p.
78)
الفصل الرابع
To Dasein’s being, an understanding of being belongs. Any
understanding [Verständnis] has its. being in an act of understanding
[Verstehen]. If being-in-the-world is a kind of being which is essentially
befitting to Dasein, then to understand being-in-the-world belongs to the
essential content of its understanding of being. The previous disclosure of that
for which what we encounter within-the-world is subsequently freed, amounts to
nothing else than understanding the world that world towards which Dasein as an
entity always comports itself.
Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something
beforehand, our doing so is grounded in our understanding such things as letting
something be involved, and such things as the “with-which” and the “in-which” of
involvements. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it,
such as the “towards-this”, as that in which there is an involvement, or such as
the “for-the-sake-of-which” to which every “towards-which” ultimately goes back-
all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility
[Verständlichkeif]. And what is that wherein Dasein as being-in-the-world
understands itself pre-ontologically? In understanding a context of relations
such as we have mentioned, Dasein has assigned itself to an “in-order-to”
[Um-zu], and it has done so in terms of a potentiality-for-being for the sake of
which it itself is—one which it may have seized upon either explicitly or
tacitly, and which may be either authentic or inauthentic. This “in-order-to”
prescribes a “towards-this” as a possible “in-which” for letting something be
involved; and the structure of letting it be involved implies that this is an
involvement which something has—an involvement which is with something. Dasein
always assigns itself from a “for-the-sake-of-which” to the “with-which” of an
involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities
be encountered as ready-to-hand. That wherein [Worin] Dasein understands itself
beforehand in the mode of assigning itself is that for which [das Woraufhin] it
has let entities be encountered beforehand. “The wherein” of an act of
understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that for which one lets
entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and
this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which
Dasein assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the
world.
That wherein Dasein already understands itself in this way is
always something with which it is primordially familiar. This familiarity with
the world does not necessarily require that the relations which are constitutive
for the world as world should be theoretically transparent. (Being and Time, pp.
118-19)
الفصل الخامس
[O]ntologically mood is a primordial kind of being for Dasein, in
which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and
beyond their range of disclosure …. Ontologically, we thus obtain as the first
essential characteristic of states-of-mind that they disclose Dasein in its
thrownness and—proximally and for the most part—in the manner of an evasive
turning-away.
… A mood assails us. It comes neither from “outside” nor from
“inside”, but arises out of being-in-the-world, as a way of such being. But with
the negative distinction between state-of-mind and the reflective apprehending
of something “within”, we have thus reached a positive insight into their
character as disclosure. The mood has already disclosed, in every case,
being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct
oneself towards something. Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the
first instance, and is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in
an enigmatical way and puts its mark on Things and persons. It is in this that
the second essential characteristic of states-of-mind shows itself. We have seen
that the world, Dasein-with, and existence are equiprimordially disclosed; and
state-of-mind is a basic existential species of their disclosedness, because
this disclosedness itself is essentially
being-in-the-world.
Besides these two essential characteristics of states-of-mind which
have been explained—the disclosing of thrownness and the current disclosing of
being-in-the-world as a whole—we have to notice a third, which contributes
above all towards a more penetrating understanding of the worldhood of world ….
[T]o be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of
that which is ready-to-hand, becomes ontologically possible only is so far as
being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner
that what is encounters within-the-world can “matter” to it in this way. The
fact that this sort of thing can “matter” to it is grounded in one’s
state-of-mind; and as a state-of-mind it has already disclosed the world—as
something by which it can be threatened, for instance. Only something which is
in the state-of-mind of fearing (of fearlessness) can discover that what is
environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein’s openness to the world is
constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind …. Under the
strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about … if
being-in-the-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself to
having entities within-the-world “matter” to it on a way which its moods have
outlined in advance. Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive
submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to
us. (Being and Time, pp. 175–7)
الفصل السادس
As understanding, Dasein projects its being upon possibilities.
This being-towards-possibilities which understands is itself a
potentiality-for-being, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as
disclosed, exert their counter-thrust upon Dasein. The projecting of the
understanding has its own possibility—that of developing itself. This
development of the understanding we call “interpretation”. In it the
understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In
interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes
itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the
latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of
information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of
possibilities projected in understanding ….
In terms of the significance which is disclosed in understanding
the world, concernful being-alongside the ready-to-hand gives itself to
understand whatever involvement that which is encountered can have. To say that
“circumspection discovers” means that the “world” which has already been
understood comes to be interpreted. The ready-to-hand comes explicitly into the
sight which understands. All preparing, putting to rights, repairing, improving,
rounding-out, are accomplished in the following way: we take apart in its
“in-order-to” that which is circumspectively ready-to-hand, and we concern ourselves
with it
in accordance with what becomes visible through this process. That which has
been circumspectively taken apart with regard to Its “in-order-to”, and taken
apart as such—that which is explicitly understood—has the structure of
something as something. The circumspective question as to what this particular
thing that is ready-to-hand may be, receives the circumspectively interpretative
answer that it is for such and such a purpose. If we tell what it is for, we are
not simply designating something; but that which is designated is understood as
that as which we are to take the thing in question. That which is disclosed in
understanding—that which is understood—is already accessible in such a way
that its “as” which can be made to stand out explicitly. The “as” makes up the
structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes
the interpretation. In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by
interpreting it circumspectively, we “see” it as a table, a door, a carriage, or
a bridge; but what we have thus interpreted need not necessarily be also taken
apart by making an assertion which definitely characterizes it. Any mere
pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which
already understands and interprets …. When we have to do with anything, the mere
seeing of the things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of
interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something free,
as it were, of the “as” requires a certain readjustment. When we merely stare at
something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to
understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the “as” is a privation
of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands. It is not more primordial
than that kind of seeing, but is derived from it. If the “as” is ontically
unexpressed, this must not seduce us into overlooking it as a constitutive state
for understanding, existential and a priori. (Being and Time, pp.
188–90)
الفصل السابع
Dasein, as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to
others. It itself is not; its being has been taken away by the others. Dasein’s
everyday possibilities of being are for them others to dispose of as they
please. These others, moreover, are not definite others. On the contrary, any
other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination
by others which has already been taken over unawares from Dasein as being-with.
One belongs to the others oneself and enhances their power. “The others” whom one
thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to them
essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part are there in
everyday being-with-one-another. The “who” is not this one, not that one, not
oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter,
the “they”.
We have shown earlier how in the environment which lies closest to
us, the public “environment” already is ready-to-hand and is also a matter of
concern. In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information
services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This
being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of
being of “the others”, in such a way, indeed, that the others, as
distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness
and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the “they” is unfolded. We take
pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge
about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the
“great mass” as they shrink back; we find “shocking” what Ary find shocking. The
“they”, which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum,
prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.
The “they” has its own ways in which to be. That tendency of being
with which we have called “distantiality” is grounded in the fact that
being-with-one-another concerns itself as such. with averageness, which is an
existential characteristic of the “they”. The “they”, in its being, essentially
makes an issue of this. Thus the “they” maintains itself factically in the
averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and
that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which
it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be
ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the
fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything
that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known.
Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every
secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential
tendency of Dasein which we call the “levelling down” of all possibilities of
being. (Being and Time, pp. 164-5)
الفصل الثامن
The closest closeness which one may have in being towards death as
a possibility, is as far as possible from anything actual. The more unveiledly
this possibility gets understood, the more purely does the understanding
penetrate into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at
all. Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be “actualized”, nothing
which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the
impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way
of existing ….
Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility. Being towards this
possibility discloses to Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-being, in which its
very being is the issue. Here it can become manifest to Dasein that in this
distinctive possibility of its own self, it has been wrenched away from the
“they”. This means that in anticipation any Dasein can have wrenched itself away
from the “they” already. But when one understands that this is something which
Dasein “can” have done, this only reveals its factical lostness in the
everydayness of the they-self.
The ownmost possibility is non-relational. Anticipation allows
Dasein to understand that that potentiality-for-being in which its ownmost being
is an issue, must be taken over by Dasein alone. Death does not just “belong” to
one’s own Dasein in an undifferentiated way; death lays claim to it as an
individual Dasein. The non-relational character of death, as understood in
anticipation, individualizes Dasein down to itself. This individualizing is a
way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence. It makes manifest that all
being alongside the things with which we concern ourselves, and all being-with
others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-being is the issue.
Dasein can be authentically itself only if it makes this possible for itself of
its own accord. But if concern and solicitude fail us, this does not signify at
all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically
being-its-self. As structures essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a
share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever. Dasein is
authentically itself only to the extent that, as concernful being-alongside and
solicitous being-with, it projects itself upon its ownmost
potentiality-for-being rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. The
entity which anticipates its non-relational possibility, is thus forced by that
very anticipation into the possibility of taking over from itself its ownmost
being, and doing so of its own accord.
The ownmost, non-relational possibility is not to be outstripped.
Being towards this possibility enables Dasein to understand that giving itself
up impends for it as the uttermost possibility of its existence. Anticipation,
however, unlike inauthentic being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that
death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting
this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one’s own death, one is
liberated from one’s lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally
thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the
first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical
possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped.
Anticipation discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in
giving itself up, and thus it shatters all one’s tenaciousness to whatever
existence one has reached. (Being and Time, pp. 306–8)
Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work [of art]
is the instigation of the strife in which the unconcealment of beings as a
whole, or truth, is won.
Truth happens [for example) in the [Greek] temple’s standing where
it is. This does not mean that something is correctly represented and rendered
here, but that beings as a whole are brought into unconcealment and held
therein. To hold originally means to take into protective heed. Truth happens in
Van Gogh’s painting (of a peasant’s shoes]. This does not mean that something at
hand is correctly portrayed but rather that in the revelation of the equipmental
being of the shoes, beings as a whole—world and earth in their counterplay—attain
to unconcealment. Thus in the work it is truth, not merely something
true, that is at work. The picture that shows the peasant shoes, the poem that
says the Roman fountain, do not simply make manifest what these isolated beings
as such are—if indeed they manifest anything at all; rather, they make
unconcealment as such happen in regard to beings as a whole. The more simply and
essentially the shoes are engrossed in their essence, the more directly and
engagingly do all beings attain a greater degree of being along with them. That
is how self-concealing being is cleared. Light of this kind joins its shining to
and into the work. This shining, joined in the work, is the beautiful. Beauty is
one way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment. (“The Origin of the
Work of Art”, in Basic Writings, pp. 180-81)
الفصل العاشر
Speaking is known as the articulated vocalization of thought by
means of the organs of speech. But speaking is at the same time also listening.
It is the custom to put speaking and listening in opposition: one man speaks,
the other listens. But listening accompanies and surrounds not only speaking
such as takes place in conversation. The simultaneousness of speaking and
listening has a larger meaning. Speaking is of itself a listening. Speaking is
listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not while but
before we are speaking. This listening to language also comes before all other
kinds of listening that we know, in a most inconspicuous manner. We do not
merely speak the language—we speak by way of it. We can do so solely because
we always have already listened to the language. What do we hear there? We hear
language speaking.
But—does language itself speak? How is it supposed to perform
such a feat when obviously it is not equipped with organs of speech? Yet
language speaks. Language first of all and inherently obeys the essential nature
of speaking: it says. Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What it
says wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken Saying which
pervades the design (Aufriss) of language (Sprachwesen). Language speaks in that
it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them
whatever is present to appear and to fade. We, accordingly, listen to language
in this way, that we let it say its Saying to us. No matter in what way we may
listen besides, whenever we are listening to something we are letting something
be said to us, and all perception and conception is already contained in that
act. In our speaking, as a listening to language, we say again the Saying we
have heard. We let its soundless voice come to us, and then demand, reach out
and call for the sound that is already kept in store for us (“The Way to
Language”, in On the Way to Language, pp. 123-4).
الفصل الحادي عشر
What is modern technology? It too is a revealing …. The revealing
that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as
such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do
indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the
windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store
it.
In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of
coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil
as a mineral deposit. The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in
order appears differently than it did when to set in order still meant to take
care of and maintain. The work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the
field. In sowing grain it places seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and
watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has
come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature.
It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the
mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to
yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield
atomic energy, which can be unleashed either for destructive or for peaceful
use.
This setting-upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is
an expediting, and in two ways. It expedites, in that It unlocks and exposes.
Yet that expediting is always itself directed from the beginning toward
furthering something else, Le, toward driving on to the maximum yield at the
minimum expense. The coal that has been hauled out in some mining district has
not been supplied in order that it may simply be present somewhere or other. It
is stockpiled; that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun’s warmth that is
stored in it. The sun’s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is
ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the who is that keep a factory
running ….
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the
character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth. That
challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is
unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is
in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew.
Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of
revealing. But the revealing never simply comes to an end. Neither does it run
off into the indeterminate. The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly
interlocking paths, through regulating their course. This regulating itself is,
for its part, everywhere secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief
characteristics of the challenging revealing.
What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that
which results from this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is
ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so
that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this
way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve. The word expresses
here something more, and something more essential, than mere “stock”. The word
“standing-reserve” assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing
less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the
challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no
longer stands over against us as object. (“The Question Concerning Technology”,
in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, pp.
14–17)
