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المراجع والقراءات الإضافية

الفصل الأول

  • Ken Binmore, Playing for Real (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). This textbook on game theory is light on mathematics.
  • Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Why game theory matters in ethics.
  • Colin Camerer, Behavioral Game Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Some aspects of game theory work well in the laboratory, and some don’t. This book surveys the evidence, and looks at possible psychological explanations of deviations from the theory.
  • John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). Rawls is often said to be the greatest moral philosopher of the 20th century. He refers to the maximin principle as the difference principle when proposing it as a rational substitute for maximizing average utility.
  • John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). This beautiful book introduced game theory to biology.
  • Barry Nalebuff and Avinash Dixit, Thinking Strategically (New York: Norton, 1991). A book-club choice, it contains many examples of game theory in action, both in business and in everyday life.
  • Sylvia Nasar, A Beautiful Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). A best-selling biography of John Nash.
  • Alvin Roth and John Kagel, Handbook of Experimental Game Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). The survey by John Ledyard documents the immense amount of data supporting the claim that experienced subjects seldom cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
  • John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944). Not a best-seller. Their theory of utility appears in an appendix.

الفصل الثاني

  • Robert Aumann, Lectures on Game Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press Underground Classics in Economics, 1989). The classroom notes of one of the great game theorists.
  • Ken Binmore, Does Game Theory Work? (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). This book includes my own experiment on zero-sum games and references to others.
  • Steve Heine, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982). I write ‘Von Neumann’ rather than ‘von Neumann’ because one gets into trouble in some parts of the German-speaking world for according him the title that his father bought from the Hungarian government.
  • J. D. Williams, The Compleat Strategyst (New York: Dover, 1954). A delightful collection of simple two-person, zero-sum games.

الفصل الثالث

  • Robert Aumann, ‘Interactive Epistemology’, International Journal of Game Theory, 28 (1999): 263–314.
  • Martin Gardner, Mathematical Diversions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) and Hexaflexagons (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). These books gather together many delightful games and brainteasers from the author’s long-standing column in Scientific American.
  • Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). An unfussy introduction to game theory, with an orthodox treatment of refinements.
  • David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973).
  • Larry Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). This includes our paper on the replicator dynamics in the Ultimatum Game.

الفصل الرابع

  • Steven Brams, Superior Beings: If They Exist, How Would We Know? Game Theoretic Implications in Omniscience, Omnipotence, Immortality and Comprehensibility (New York: Springer Verlag, 1983).
  • John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988).
  • David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978; first published 1739). Arguably the greatest work of philosophy ever.
  • David Lewis, Conventions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
  • Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960). Schelling once bravely told a large audience of game theorists that game theory had contributed nothing whatever to the theory of focal points—except perhaps the idea of a payoff table!
  • Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (New York: Norton, 1978). Schelling’s Solitaire and a lot more.
  • Brian Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of the Social Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
  • Peyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory of Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

الفصل الخامس

  • Bob Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). This book sold the world on the idea that reciprocity matters.
  • ‘Review of The Complexity of Cooperation by Ken Binmore’, Journal of Artificial Societies, http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/1/review1.html. The book is a sequel to Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation; the review assesses his reiterated claims for TIT-FOR-TAT. See also Karl Sigmund’s Games of Life (Chapter 8 below).
  • Joe Heinrich et al. (eds), Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). An attempt to refute the repeated-game explanation of social norms that backfired. The paper by the anthropologist Jean Ensminger is particularly instructive.
  • George Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Term Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Folk theorems with imperfect monitoring for mathematicians.
  • Bob Trivers, Social Evolution (Menlo Park, CA: Cummings, 1985). Reciprocity and much else in animal societies.

الفصل السادس

  • Helena Cronin, The Ant and the Peacock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
  • John Harsanyi, Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
  • Roger Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

الفصل السابع

  • Ken Binmore and Paul Klemperer, ‘The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of British 3G Licences’, Economic Journal, 112 (2002): C74–C96.
  • R. Cassady, Auctions and Auctioneering (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1967). Lots of good stories.
  • Paul Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).
  • Paul Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

الفصل الثامن

  • John Alcock, The Triumph of Sociobiology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Sociobiologists aren’t the intellectual fascists they have been painted. Aside from offering wonderful examples of real sociobiology in action, this book lays bare the dishonest campaign of vilification directed at Edward Wilson and his followers by Gould, Lewontin, and other politically motivated polemicists.
  • Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson, ‘Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata’, Journal of Economic Theory, 57 (1992): 278–305.
  • Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976). One of the great works of popular science.
  • Peter Hammerstein, Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
  • William Hamilton, The Narrow Roads of Geneland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). A collection of some of Bill Hamilton’s path-breaking papers in evolutionary biology. The papers themselves are not easy reading for the general reader, but the linking remarks are a fascinating social commentary on how it was to be a graduate student in the old days, doing work so original that the academic establishment was unable to appreciate its value.
  • John Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Many wonderful examples.
  • Karl Sigmund, Games of Life: Explorations in Ecology, Evolution and Behaviour (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1993). Among other delights, this book reports on some of the author’s computer simulations with Martin Nowack. Their name for TIT-FOR-TAT is PAVLOV (see Chapter 5).
  • James Watson, The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA (New York: Touchstone, 1968).
  • Vero Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962).

الفصل التاسع

  • Ken Binmore, Playing for Real (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). Four chapters are devoted to bargaining issues.
  • Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). This book explains why I side with Rawls rather than Harsanyi on the implications of using the original position to make fairness judgements.
  • Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1992). This best-seller argues that good bargaining consists of insisting on a fair deal. Thinking strategically is dismissed as a dirty trick!
  • Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

الفصل العاشر

  • Ken Binmore, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). Chapter 3 discusses more fallacies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma that circulate in the philosophical literature.
  • Bob Frank, Passions with Reason (New York: Norton, 1988). An economist makes a case for the transparent disposition fallacy.
  • David Lewis, Conventions: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).
  • J. E. Littlewood, Mathematical Miscellany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953). I was a schoolboy when I first came across the paradox of three old ladies in this popular work by one of the great mathematicians.
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