ملاحظات
تمهيد طبعة ١٩٨٢
(1)
Commentary
, April 1978,
pp. 29-71.
مقدمة
(1)
Joseph Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1954) p.
394.
الفصل الثاني: دور الحكومة في المجتمعات الحرة
(1)
A. V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public
Opinion in England during the Nineteenth
Century (2d. ed.; London:
Macmillan &
Co., 1914), p. li.
الفصل الثالث: الرقابة الحكومية على النقود
(1)
A Program for
Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1959) pp.
4-8.
(2)
See my A
Program for Monetary Stability and
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867-1960 (forthcoming by
Princeton University Press for the National Bureau
of Economic Research).
(3)
A Program for
Monetary Stability, op. cit., pp.
77-99.
الفصل الرابع: النظم المالية والتجارية الدولية
(1)
A warning is in order that this is a
subtle point that depends on what is held constant
in estimating the free market price, particularly
with respect to gold’s monetary
role.
(2)
There are conceivable exceptions to
these statements but, so far as I can see, they are
theoretical curiosities, not relevant practical
possibilities.
الفصل الخامس: السياسة المالية
(1)
A Program for
Monetary Stability, (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1959), p. 23.
(2)
Some of the results are contained in Milton
Friedman and David Meiselman, The Relative Stability of the Investment Multiplier
and Monetary Velocity in the United States,
1896-1958 (forthcoming publication of
Commission on Money and Credit).
الفصل السادس: دور الحكومة في التعليم
(1)
It is by no means so fantastic as may
appear that such a step would noticeably affect the
size of families. For example, one explanation of
the lower birth rate among higher than among lower
socio-economic groups may well be that children are
relatively more expensive to the former, thanks in
considerable measure to the higher standards of
schooling they maintain, the costs of which they
bear.
(2)
A striking example of the same effect
in another field is the British National Health
Service. In a careful and penetrating study, D. S.
Lees establishes rather conclusively that, “Far from
being extravagant, expenditure on NHS has been less
than consumers would probably have chosen to spend
in a free market. The record of hospital building in
particular has been deplorable.” “Health Through
Choice,” Hobart Paper
14 (London: Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1961), p. 58.
(3)
See George J. Stigler, Employment and Compensation in
Education (“Occasional Paper” No. 33,
[New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1950]), p. 33.
(4)
I am abstracting from expenditures on
basic research. I have interpreted schooling
narrowly so as to exclude considerations that would
open up an unduly wide field.
(5)
I have used Ohio rather than Illinois,
because since the article of which this chapter is a
revision was written (1953), Illinois has adopted
a program going part-way along this line by
providing scholarships tenable at private colleges
and universities in Illinois. California has done
the same. Virginia has adopted a similar program at
lower levels for a very different reason, to avoid
racial integration. The Virginia case is discussed
in chapter vii.
(6)
The increased return may be only partly
in a monetary form; it may also consist of
non-pecuniary advantages attached to the occupation
for which the vocational training fits the
individual. Similarly, the occupation may have
non-pecuniary disadvantages, which would have to be
reckoned among the costs of the
investment.
(7)
For a more detailed and precise
statement of the considerations entering into the
choice of an occupation, see Milton Friedman and
Simon Kuznets, Income from
Independent Professional Practice
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research,
1945), pp. 81-95, 118-37.
(8)
See G. S. Becker, “Underinvestment in
College Education?” American Economic
Review, Proceedings L (1960), 356-64;
T. W. Schultz, “Investment in human Capital,”
American Economic
Review, LXI (1961),
1-17.
(9)
Despite these obstacles to fixed money
loans, I am told that they have been a very common
means of financing education in Sweden, where they
have apparently been available at moderate rates of
interest. Presumably a proximate explanation is a
smaller dispersion of income among university
graduates than in the United States. But this is no
ultimate explanation and may not be the only or
major reason for the difference in practice. Further
study of Swedish and similar experience is highly
desirable to test whether the reasons given above
are adequate to explain the absence in the United
States and other countries of a highly developed
market in loans to finance vocational education, or
whether there may not be other obstacles that could
be removed more easily.
In recent years, there has been an encouraging development in the U.S. of private loans to college students. The main development has been stimulated by United Student Aid Funds, a non-profit institution which underwrites loans made by individual banks.
(10)
It is amusing to speculate on how the
business could be done and on some ancillary methods
of profiting from it. The initial entrants would be
able to choose the very best investments, by
imposing very high quality standards on the
individuals they were willing to finance. If they
did so, they would increase the profitability of
their investment by getting public recognition of
the superior quality of the individuals they
financed: the legend, “Training financed by XYZ
Insurance Company” could be made into an assurance
of quality (like “Approved by Good Housekeeping”)
that would attract custom. All sorts of other common
services might be rendered by the XYZ company to
“its” physicians, lawyers, dentists, and so
on.
(11)
I am indebted to Harry G. Johnson and
Paul W. Cook, Jr., for suggesting the inclusion of
this qualification. For a fuller discussion of the
role of non-pecuniary advantages and disadvantages
in determining earnings in different pursuits, see
Friedman and Kuznets, loc.
cit.
الفصل السابع: الرأسمالية والتمييز العنصري
(1)
In a brilliant and penetrating analysis of
some economic issues involved in discrimination, Gary
Becker demonstrates that the problem of discrimination
is almost identical in its logical structure with that
of foreign trade and tariffs. See G. S. Becker,
The Economics of
Discrimination (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1957).
(2)
To avoid misunderstanding, it should be
noted explicitly that in speaking of the proposal in
the preceding chapter, I am taking it for granted
that the minimum requirements imposed on schools in
order that vouchers be usable do not include whether
the school is segregated or
not.
الفصل الثامن: الاحتكار والمسئولية الاجتماعية لرجال الأعمال والنقابات العمالية
(1)
G. Warren Nutter, The Extent of Enterprise
Monopoly in the United States,
1899-1939 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1951) and George J. Stigler,
Five Lectures on
Economic Problems (London;
Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), pp.
46-65.
(2)
“Some Comments on the Significance
of Labor Unions for Economic Policy,” in David
McCord Wright (ed.), The
Impact of the Union (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1951), pp.
204-34.
(3)
The Wealth
of Nations (1776), Bk. I, chap.
x, Pt. II (Cannan ed. London, 1930), p.
130.
(4)
Ibid, Bk. IV, chapter ii, p.
421.
الفصل التاسع: ترخيص مزاولة المهنة
(1)
Walter Gellhorn, Individual Freedom and
Governmental Restraints (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1956). Chapter
entitled “The Right to Make a Living,” p.
106.
(2)
Ibid. pp.
140-41.
(3)
Ibid., pp.
129-30.
(4)
In fairness to Walter Gellhorn, I
should note that he does not share my view that the
correct solution to these problems is to abandon
licensing. On the contrary, he thinks that while
licensing has gone much too far it has some real
functions to perform. He suggests procedural reforms
and changes that in his view would limit the abuse
of licensure arrangements.
(5)
Ibid., pp.
121-22.
(6)
Ibid., p.
146.
(7)
See, for example, Wesley Mitchell’s
famous article on the “Backward Art of Spending
Money,” reprinted in his book of essays carrying
that title (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), pp.
3-19.
(8)
See Reuben Kessel, “Price
Discrimination in Medicine,” The Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. I (October, 1958),
20-53.
الفصل العاشر: توزيع الدخل
(1)
Principles of
Political Economy (Ashley edition;
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909), p.
751.
(2)
This point is so important that it may
be worth giving the figures and calculations. The
latest year for which figures are available as this
is written is the taxable year 1959 in U. S.
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income for 1959. For
that year: Aggregate taxable income reported
on:
| Individual tax returns | $166,540 million |
| Income tax before tax credit | 39,092 million |
| Income tax after tax credit | 38,645 million |
A flat rate tax of 23(1/2) per cent on the aggregate taxable income would have yielded (.235) x $166,540 million = $39,137 million.
If we assume the same tax credit, the final yield would have been about the same as that actually attained.
الفصل الحادي عشر: إجراءات الرفاهية الاجتماعية
(1)
Another current example of the same
argument is in connection with proposals for
federal subsidies for schooling (misleadingly
labeled, “aid to education”). A case can be made
for using federal funds to supplement schooling
expenditures in the states with the lowest
incomes, on the grounds that the children
schooled may migrate to other states. There is
no case whatsoever for imposing taxes on all the
states and giving federal subsidies to all the
states. Yet every bill introduced into Congress
provides for the latter and not the former. Some
proponents of these bills, who recognize that
only subsidies to some states can be justified,
defend their position by saying that a bill
providing only for such subsidies could not be
passed and that the only way to get
disproportionate subsidies to poorer states is
to include them in a bill providing subsidies to
all states.
الفصل الثاني عشر: تخفيف حدة الفقر
(1)
This figure is equal to government transfer
payments ($31.1 billion) less veterans’ benefits
($4.8 billion), both from the Department of
Commerce national income accounts, plus federal
expenditures on the agricultural program ($5.5
billion) plus federal expenditures on public housing and
other aids to housing ($0.5 billion), both for
year ending June 30, 1961 from Treasury accounts, plus a
rough allowance of $0.7 billion to raise it to
even billions and to allow for administrative costs of
federal programs, omitted state and local programs, and
miscellaneous items. My guess is that this figure is a
substantial underestimate.
(2)
A. V. Dicey, Law
and Public Opinion in England, (2d ed.,
London: Macmillan, 1914), p.
xxxv.
الفصل الثالث عشر: الخاتمة
(1)
A. V. Dicey, op.
cit., pp. 257-8.
